384 
JOURNAL OF THE PLYMOUTH INSTITUTION. 
The greater intellects appear to have the faculty of forcing 
actions downwards in the mental scale, so that they shall he per- 
formed by less elevated centres. As man's brain differs, so must 
his responsibility differ. Thus many murderers are totally irre- 
sponsible, as they suffer under a moral mania. 
This tendency is hereditary, and even where not fully developed 
we see in the relations of lunatics eccentricities and idiosyncrasies 
that are easily accounted for by their unfortunate relationship. 
It seems better to divide the brain and its product anatomically 
rather than metaphysically, as in doing so we have a concrete sub- 
stance, and not an abstract phenomenon to deal with. 
The will grows with the general development of the brain. It 
is at best, however, an ill-defined power, and is constantly liable to 
perturbations from trifling external causes. Our free will appears 
to be so great because of the great complexity of our external 
relationship. 
An electric machine is a comparatively simple instrument, but 
gives wonderful results. The brain is a very complex instrument, 
and from it, therefore, we may expect marvellous and complex 
results. 
As our minds become more enlightened, we do away with dealings 
in the miraculous, and in this, as well as other cases, we shall try 
to place mental phenomena in the category of the physics. 
If we do not look on mental phenomena as the reflections of 
external impressions, we must create a new power elsewhere 
unheard of in nature, and also allow the destruction of definite 
force. The interrogation of self-consciousness practically tells us 
nothing, as each one does it in his own way, and the results are 
usually at variance. 
There are three methods, then, of studying mental science, the 
Metaphysical, the Psychological, and the Physiological ; but the 
last is the one which we must expect to produce the best and 
most lasting results. 
