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limited in order to be possessed.'' [Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 
iii. 185.) And in another place : " Society requires not only that 
the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in 
the mass and body as well as in the individuals the inclinations of 
men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their 
passions brought into subjection. This can only be done by a 
power out of themselves, ai:d not, in the exercise of its function, 
subject to that will and to those passions which it is its office to 
bridle and subdue." {Refl. on the Revolution in France, v. 123.) 
In civil life, therefore, liberty and law, so far from being 
essentially opposed, are in fact correlatives, imply one another. 
And this is the case also in regard to intellectual life. For a free 
act is essentially an act under the control of reason. We never 
think of calling the movement of an inanimate object free, except 
by metaphor ; and if we ever speak of the acts of a beast as free, 
we do so because we think of them as under the control of reason, 
and not merely impelled by appetite. But when we speak of an 
act under the control of reason, we mean that the act is directed 
towards a definite end, and that means are adopted which appear 
suitable for the attainment of the end. And this relation of means 
to an end, — that one thing which we call the cause is constantly 
followed by another which we call the effect, is what we call a 
law. Intellectual liberty cannot be exercised therefore without 
law : if there is no law, there is no liberty. It is plain then, that 
though liberty may be restricted by law, yet law is not necessarily 
opposed to liberty, — that law may exist without being a restraint 
on liberty at all. 
A law against stealing, whether it be a moral or civil law, is no 
restraint upon the liberty of an honest man. But as soon as he 
becomes dishonest, as soon as he has a will to steal, he falls under 
the restraint of the law ; the law opposes his liberty, his power of 
doing what he will. 
I suppose that no one thinks it a restraint upon his liberty that 
he cannot make five of two and two. But if he were once to will 
to do this he would immediately feel that his liberty was restricted, 
he would find an inexorable law opposed to his power of doing 
what he will. It is more conceivable that a person might revolt 
against the law that a certain conclusion must follow from certain 
premises, and in such a case as soon as he willed to draw a different 
conclusion from the premises he would find the law opposed to his 
