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constructing, with the clearest eye for probabilities, and the fullest 
obedience to knowledge, and then, in yet more energetic alliance 
with impartial nature, standing aloof to invent tests by which to 
try its own work." (Eook ii. c. 16.) Can activity of this kind be 
conceived apart from the control of law ? Is it not obedience to 
law which enables it, supports it, and ultimately crowns it with 
success ? 
But it may be said, ' the entire removal of the restraint of law 
is not contemplated even by the popular notion of liberty. Mr. 
Mill himself allows, as you have shown, large exceptions to the 
liberty which he claims. The true idea is rather this : that laws 
should be laid upon those who still need them; and that those 
should be set free who no longer require control.' 
This is at any rate a possible answer to the question I have 
asked, whether the removal of restraint is the true idea of intel- 
lectual liberty. But it is certainly not a satisfactory answer. It 
is really only the withdrawal of a certain class of persons, those 
who are assumed still to need control, from the operation of the 
general rule which is left unaffected, that intellectual liberty 
consists in the removal of restraint. 
The answer diminishes more or less the area of the objections to 
this popular view of intellectual freedom, but it leaves the 
objections themselves untouched. 
"We must turn then to the other mode of freedom. I have said 
that the mind may be called free if it is subject to no law, 
which I have shown to be contrary to experience, and to our very 
idea of liberty of action ; or it may be called free where its will 
is so entirely in accord with the law that there is no opposition 
between them : the law does not interfere with its power of doing 
as it wills. By bringing the will into accord with the law, it is 
plain that the opposition of the law to the will is removed, and the 
mind can follow the bent of its will without being thwarted or 
hindered. A person whose will is set upon doing something which 
is opposed to the law, but who abstains from doing it for fear of 
the penalties of the law, is not really free ; but when his will is 
altered, and he obeys the law, not from fear of the penalty, but 
because his will is brought into accord with the law, then, though 
the law remains, he is truly free. It is obvious that freedom of 
this kind can be good only when the law is good. 
The object of the intellect, its highest good, is truth. When the 
