THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATTER AND MIND. 61 
for he not only argues* that the prime cause of the evolution of 
simple Matter must be other than Matter, but he goes on to say- 
that the only rational conclusion to which we can arrive is, that, in 
its nature, it is one and the same with Mind. (Met. xii. 7.) The 
fact that the Democritan School took a reverse view only 
establishes the truth that they dissented from the generally 
recognized doctrine. 
Passing by the Dualistic and Monistic doctrines which have 
found varied support, it is observable that the physical researches 
of late years, and the passionate desire for unity engendered 
thereby, have contributed to push modern thought on afresh to the 
enquiry as to whether Matter and Mind are but names to designate 
the same reality under diverse aspects. The more bold of our 
modern speculators even advance the opinion that the peculiar 
phenomena to which we give the name " Mind " are simply the 
products of a more elaborate molecular combination. Thought, 
feeling, volition, are the outcome of molecular interaction in the 
same sense as are the flash and smoke of a lucifer match. This is 
the view of Biichner, Haeckel, and Maudsley. 
That the position thus taken cannot be established is obvious ; 
for it is based on several assumptions, neither of which can be 
maintained. 1. That it is inconceivable that there should exist 
an invisible essence or centre of power devoid of physical parts. 
2. That if such be allowed to exist, it is inconceivable how it can 
act on a material tangible mass like the brain and produce effects 
of a distinctly material character. 3. That if this were possible, 
there would be violence done to the principle of philosophical 
unity. 4. That physiological researches show thought and volition 
to depend for existence and continuity on the structure and varia- 
tions in the tissue of the brain. 5. That inasmuch as the doctrine 
of evolution is established up to the point where the question of 
Mind comes in, a presumption is thereby created that evolution 
reaches from the primary indifferentiated Matter, up through ever 
increasing differentiations, to those which constitute what we know 
as conscious Mind. . 
That neither of these assumptions will hold good is made out by 
arguments appropriate to each. 1. The ftem-conceivability of an 
invisible immaterial essence really means, that we are so accustomed 
to think under material images as to find it difficult to divest our- 
* Met. ii. 2 ; Phys. v. 1 ; Met. xii. 6 ; Phys. viii. 5. 
