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JOURNAL OP THE PLYMOUTH INSTITUTION. 
selves of such associations ■ yet as a fact we do think self as a non- 
material power. Moreover, the argument would apply equally to 
the force which Mr. Herbert Spencer affirms is not Matter. Also 
all physical research leads up to the unseen and the intangible. 
2. The impossibility of the immaterial acting on what is totally 
diverse from itself is the old difficulty recognized by Leibnitz and 
Malebranche ; and, as an argument, it applies equally to the non- 
material force which mechanical evolutionists are compelled to 
assume in order to account for molecular change. Further, if there 
be a non-material force, is it not conceivable enough that an imma- 
terial nature — Mind — should be able to act on the force which is 
said to differentiate Matter 1 ? 3. The principle of philosophical 
unity does not render the essential distinction between Matter and 
Mind unreasonable ; for if the principle is a priori, and therefore 
necessary and constant, it cannot be inherent, as such, in fleeting 
molecular combinations ; and if it bo the empirical result of obser- 
vation on physical order, and therefore limited in its value, it 
cannot be made to govern facts so unlike one another as are con- 
sciousness and the flash of a lucifer match. Besides, the desired 
unity is not attainable in the ?zo?2-mental world ; for no one has 
proved that ether evolved out of atomic matter or the reverse. 
Moreover, if all forms of life did not evolve from one primitive 
molecule, but from many co-existing molecules, then the unity of 
evolution of life is the unity of parallels from a common base. If 
there be such a unity in relation to life, why not also a further and 
higher unity in parallel lines of matter, force, ether, and mind 
from an eternal original? 4. The testimony of physiology is 
admitted as to matters of fact. It is admitted that a modification 
of brain tissue accompanies every act of consciousness. But the 
argument really means this, that if there be a ?£0??-material reality 
called Mind, it would be sure to manifest its power in the physical 
sphere irrespective of the condition and apart from any change in 
the organism with which it is associated. There is no independent 
argument, as we have seen, against the existence of an immaterial 
power. Why then is it implied that it must not express itself 
through an organism] Force does. Why not intelligence? If it 
then express itself through an organism, is it not just as reasonable 
that its expression should be perfect or imperfect according as the 
organism is sound or unsound, as that the powers of a splendid 
pianist should be regulated in expression by the perfect or deficient 
