political Errors of the Spanish Warfare, [Nov. 1 ^ 
^44 
tjressed on to attack^ and again appear- are scarcely sufficient to extricate a body 
ing in tlieir rear. Taefarinas thus in- of foot, encompassed on an open plain 
suited and despised the wearied and by superior numbers of horse.* The 
disappointed Romans.* The French guerilla service would therefore be more 
should have been harrassed in passing advantageous, if a larger number were 
lono-and narrow defiles,f w hich appears cavalry. I« short, the system by which 
to have been sometimes, but not sutii- Theodosius exterminated the Goths, ap- 
cientiy, done. If the Spanish soldiers pears highly deserving attention, in the 
were dispirited, they should be wearied present case. “ The Romans, being 
with drudgery and labour, an expedient of placed in secure stations, w ere thus in. 
Sylla, that they might give the preference sensibly emboldened by the confidence 
to danger. S'ertorius, instead of stand- of their own safety. From these secure 
ing still, w'as always in motion, and stations, they were encouraged to make 
making new levies'; he harrassed the frequent sallies on the Barbarians; and, 
rear of the Romans, and cut off their as they were seldo.m allowed to engage. 
convoys. He made no use of retiring 
to towuis and enduring sieges, but when 
he wanted to secure a sate retreat for 
his troops, and time to raise fresh forces. 
He made his appearance at different 
pilaces almost at die same time, and by 
drawing the Romans from one action to 
another, obliged them to divide. By 
Occupying woody and marshy countries, 
the Spaniards could elude successful 
pursuit.; Wasting the country is a des- 
p'erate, but most effectual, method of 
defence.§ The exclusive use of animal 
food would he productive of s-ffid ad¬ 
vantages. Corn is a bulky and perish¬ 
able commodity, and requires carts and 
horses, but cattle can follow in flocks 
and herds.}! 
This idea has not been sufficiently 
acted upon, so far as concerns the re¬ 
moval of cattle, upon which the French 
must principally of course subsist. Un¬ 
willing to repose on so momentous a 
subject, upon mere hypothetical grounds, 
I beg to adduce some passages from Gib¬ 
bon, which appears to be in point. They 
vindicate the system adopted by Lord 
Wellintrton, and show that it has sue- 
ceeded ni enterprives fully as desperate. 
“ A people ruined by oppression, and 
indolent from despair, can no longer sup¬ 
ply a numerous army with the means of 
juxurv, or even of subsistence.’ ^ If so, 
it is not improbable that the difficulties 
of the French may ultimately become 
insuperable. ^ “ The Roman generals, 
whose army would have been consumed 
by the repetition of severe contests, em¬ 
braced the more rational plan of destroy- 
inir the Goilis, by the want and pres¬ 
sure of their own multitudes.** The most 
skilful evolutions, the firmest courage, 
^ Tac. Ann. iii. ‘21. t Plut. in Lucullus. 
; Css. B. Gall. L. 5. § Gibbon, c ‘24. 
?! Id: c. ^ id. c. 11. ** Id. c. 26. 
without some decisive superiority, either 
of ground or numbers, their enterprizes 
were for the most part successful, and 
they were soon convinced, by their own 
experience, of the possibility of van¬ 
quishing their invincible enemies. The 
detachments of those separate garrisons 
were gradually united into small armies; 
the same cautious measures were pur¬ 
sued, according to an extensive and 
well-concerted plan of operations; the 
events of each day added strength and 
spirit to the Roman arms; and the art¬ 
ful diligence of the emperor, who cir¬ 
culated the most favourable reports of 
the success of the war, contributed to 
subdue the pride of the Barbarians, and 
to animate the hopes and courage of his 
subjects. The republic had formerly 
been saved by the delays of Fabius, and 
while the splendid trophies of Scipio, in 
the field of Zama, attract the eyes of 
posterity, the camps and marches of the 
dictator among the hills of Campania, 
may claim a juster proportion of tlie 
solid and independent fame which the 
general is not compelled to share, either 
with fortune or with his troops. The 
deliverance and peace of the Roman 
provinces, was the work of prudence 
rather than of vaIour.”f Good too 
might be derived from bringing the 
French to action during the Siesta. 
The inundation of the Emperor Na¬ 
poleon, will doubtless consist of burning 
Lava; possibly the extermination of 
the Spaniards is medit.nted, and tlie 
Fabian system is undoubtedly the most 
eligible to defeat his views. The expul¬ 
sion of the French from St. Domingo, 
was effected by the following means: 
Trie blacks compelled them to fight for 
two or three hours, during the heat of 
the meridian sun. The next day, at the 
* Gibbon, c. 26. T C. 26. 
SStn* 
