I82J.] Historical Particulars of Napoleon. 4^3 
They are facts which ignorance and 
bad faith have taken pleasure to muti¬ 
late. To restore them impartially as 
they happened, is to labour for the in¬ 
terests of all. 
To estimate a public character by 
the scale of the private individual is 
the great secret of forming false judg¬ 
ments ; and this is what oyr age has 
the most need to defend itself against. 
The executions ordained at Pavia, 
Leghorn, Arquata and in the Marches 
have been charged to me as crimes. 
1 nese executions were imperatively 
commanded by circumstances and by 
the safety of the French army. Had 
I balanced, it was lost; there was no 
alternative. Had not that been the 
case, would I have ordained those ex¬ 
ecutions,—I, who for my ulterior pro¬ 
jects, had more than ever occasion to 
raise men from the people of Italy ? In 
Europe, and in our day, the blood of 
men is not shed in vain. 
At the time of the revolt of the 
imperial vassals, I found myself in a 
position eminently critical; 1 leave 
those to judge of it who know the 
country and the spirit of the inhabi¬ 
tants. 
I occupied, it is true, the city of 
Milan which was republican in appear¬ 
ance ; but this imperfect republic was 
the work of only a small number of 
men, which my presence alone rendered 
strong, being more tormented with 
ambition than with the passion of li¬ 
berty. 
Dazzled by my first success, I 
committed a great error, the conse¬ 
quences of which might have been most 
fatal for my glory, and the safety of the 
French army. I wished in a season in 
which the heat is excessive in the en¬ 
virons of Mantua, at once to take that 
city without heavy artillery, to annihi¬ 
late the enemy’s army, conquer the 
Roman states and subdue Venice. This 
was, I repeat, an error, a very great 
error; but I made no mention of it to 
any of my generals, although I knew 
all the extent of it: nevertheless to 
have repaired it, absolves me from one 
half of the blame. I never yet think 
of this epoch of my life without some 
palpitations of the heart, so much had 
an excess of ardour accumulated perils 
around me. 
Mantua defended itself with cour¬ 
age ; the Pope and Venice were under 
arms; the King of Naples had all his 
forces ready; Romagna menaced to rise 
up, as it did a few days after in so ter- 
Monthly Mag. No. 361. 
rible a manner; the greater part of the 
imperial vassals were in full revolt, 
and, to complete my dangers, General 
Wurmser* suddenly arrived to put him¬ 
self at the head of the Austrian army. 
At the news of his arrival, the Tyrolese 
aroused from their stupor, showed 
themselves quite ready to crush me. [ 
appeal to my contemporaries, if my 
position was not sufficiently critical. 
The least feebleness on my part, and 
all was lost, my glory and my army. 
Had my troops conceived my danger, 
it would have been a great misfortune. 
I knew the French soldier; he is not 
fond of being in peril: to disguise from 
him his situation in such a case, is the 
best thing to be done. 
Of all the dangers which surround¬ 
ed me, the most urgerft was the revolt 
of the people in my own army. Tt was 
not a common repression that I had to 
effect; it was a terrible chastisement 
which I had to inflict, in order to spread 
a salutary terror. Time pressed upon 
me ; the chastisement was as prompt as 
it was dreadful, and the inconceivable 
effect which followed, is a victorious 
answer to the accusation which my 
enemies have wished, and would still 
endeavour to bring against me. 
After exposing the conduct of the 
Directory, he thus proceeds : , 
The French are all fire for a hero 
of whom a brilliant action entitles him 
to that appellation: but should this 
hero return to domestic society, there 
are only a very few honest men who 
think of him ; witness Moreau. 
I had mounted too brilliant a 
courser to suffer him to perish uselessly 
in the stable. Europe presented no¬ 
thing worth, my attention; I then 
planned the expedition to Egypt. It 
served me only at first as a last resource: 
involving myself always in idea into 
the consequences which this enterprise 
might produce, if brought to a good 
termination, I was agreeably surprised 
to see that France found incalculable 
advantages in the plan. The English 
were persuaded of it, and posterity will 
be of the opinion of England.” 
* In the margin of the page containing 
this paragraph, is a note in the hand-writ¬ 
ing of Bonaparte, and is conceived thus : 
“ Wurmser has suffered great defeats, but 
never, that I know, has he committed 
great faults. Beaulieu knew better than 
he, the art of positions, and the w(jr of 
defiles, but Wurmser excelled him in the 
general management of a decisive affair.” 
3 1 To 
