^32 Historical Memoranda , by Napoleon. [Jan* 1, 
pital, and in some other great cities of 
the empire. Soon afterwards false re¬ 
ports and alarming intelligence were 
circulated among all classes. This 
state of affairs placed me between two 
lines of almost insurmountable dan¬ 
gers, those of the interior and those from 
without. The affair of Leipsic and 
our retreat on the Rhine, put the finish¬ 
ing stroke to our misfortunes. 
France was invaded; affairs however 
were not yet desperate, and the soil of 
France would have become the grave 
of the allied armies, had the French of 
1814, been only the French of 1812! 
But treason had provided for all. Par¬ 
ties were formed under the influence of 
several chiefs: irresolution and in¬ 
quietude passed from the citizens into 
the administration ; from thence a ho¬ 
micidal indolence in the supplies of the 
armies, and effeminacy in the mayors and 
prefects in the recruiting of them. The 
government, overcome with stupour, 
knew not what it did, nor what it had 
to do; the army alone well performed 
its duty. These platoons of warriors, 
whose valour and patience were a pro¬ 
digy, were at that time struggling 
against a million of men ! 
The campaign of 1814 was a master¬ 
piece of the kind : any other general, 
less broken down than I was, could 
have made as well as myself, an im¬ 
mortal campaign of it. Could it be 
otherwise with soldiers who valued 
neither the number of their enemies, 
nor fatigue, hunger, reverses, nor even 
death itself? 
Those men are much mistaken who 
believe that I rejected terms of peace 
at Chatillon, out of pure obstinacy. 
I had but too powerful motives for re¬ 
fusing them. Dispatches, seized three 
months before at Missenheim in the 
Hunds-Ruck, had informed me of the 
measure of outrages reserved for me, 
if after having once submitted to the 
yoke, I should not have sufficient force 
to struggle against one of the three 
northern powers, which England would 
have protected with its gold. 
I was conqueror of Europe during 
fifteen years, ten of which I had the 
honour to sway the sceptre of a great 
nation, and my consort was the daugh¬ 
ter of kings. Was it with all these 
titles that I could accept of disgrace 
and infamy ? 
And the allies also had their reasons 
for offering me peace at Chatillon. The 
more they advanced into France, the 
more they feared they would not be 
able to get out of it. The fate of my 
troops in Spain alarmed them in sucfi 
a w ay that they marched tremblingly 
and with the greatest precautions, "in 
that they followed the instructions of 
Bernadotte, w T hich, had they always 
been constantly followed, w’ould have 
given me time to annihilate the allied 
army. Not that the counsels of Berna¬ 
dotte w 7 ere foolish, but they were out 
of season, as the French w 7 ere no longer 
what they had been. I shall give an 
extract of these very instructions. 
“ Prudence and moderation ought, as 
much as force, to direct the operations of 
the allied Sovereigns on the French terri¬ 
tory. Care must be taken not to exaspe¬ 
rate the inhabitants. Although not subject 
to acts of desperation, yet, if in conse¬ 
quence of bad treatment they are reduced 
to it, the armies of their Majesties w ill have 
much to suffer. If the enemies, which 
Napoleon has in the interior, do not take 
advantage of circumstances to alienate 
from him the hearts of the people, it is not 
unlikely that numerous battalions will 
join him. How ever few in number may 
be the army under his command, the allied 
sovereigns will not forget to keep them¬ 
selves on their guard against the boldness 
and the desperation of his manoeuvres.”— 
Extract from the Note remitted by Berna¬ 
dotte , Crown Prince of Sweden, to their 
Majesties the Allied Sovereigns , the 15 th 
of December, 1813. 
In offering me terms of peace at Cha¬ 
tillon, the allies being uncertain of their 
ground, had no other object in view 
but to postpone their intentions for a 
year, in order to have more time for 
reflection, and then to return to com¬ 
plete my ruin. I knew their inten¬ 
tions and wished to defeat them ; the 
more so, as I had yet the means of do¬ 
ing so with honour. In fact, although 
it has been obstinately denied, I was 
on the eve of giving to the w T orld the 
spectacle of a single pow r er, annihilat¬ 
ing on its own territory, all the ar¬ 
mies of Europe. I had succeeded, by 
manoeuvres which military men can 
alone appreciate, in turning the posi¬ 
tions of the allies : a few days later and 
their communications w T ould have been 
intercepted; all the garrisons of the 
north were to receive intelligence of 
the day and the hour for a general 
movement to co-operate in such a w 7 ay 
with my principal manoeuvre, that it 
w'ould have been a miracle for the al¬ 
lies to have escaped: add to this, that 
a great movement was to have been 
effected in a part of Champagne and of 
Lorraine, a movement which, in the 
position 
