Mrs. Wright's Travels in the United Stales. 
empty sanctuary into a library, instead 
of a museum of natural curiosities, ora 
mausoleum of dead monsters. 
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT. 
The constitutions of all these dif¬ 
ferent confederated republics differ in 
little the one from the other. The 
legislative power is vested in a general 
assembly, consisting of a senate and 
house of representatives; the execu¬ 
tive in a governor, or in a governor 
with the assistance, or perhaps it were 
more correct to say, the impediment of 
a council. This impediment, at first 
adopted by all the original thirteen 
states, has been abolished by several, 
and has not been adopted by those 
which have been subsequently added 
to the Union. A majority, however, 
of the old thirteen states retain til is 
check upon the will of their chief ma¬ 
gistrate. Considering the short term 
of his authority, and the slender powers 
with which he is vested, many regard 
this check as unnecessary, some think 
it mischievous, as it tends to retard the 
operations of government, while others 
think it salutary on that very account. 
Perhaps the truth is, that it is very 
unimportant. This will more clearly 
appear, if we consider the supreme 
authority of the legislative branch of 
the government, which is, in fact, the 
people speaking and acting distinctly 
and definitely in the person of their 
representatives. The governor does, 
indeed, possess a veto upon the deci¬ 
sion of the two houses; but his veto is 
not decisive; he must, within a given 
time,returnthebill,stating the grounds 
of his dissent; when the question is 
debated anew, and two-thirds of both 
houses are then required to give the 
effect of a law ; hut as this majority 
can impart to if that effect without the 
signature of the governor, it is, of 
course, rarely refused; I know not, 
indeed, that the case ever occurs: 
it is clear that it can only occur where 
the voices of the legislators are pretty 
equally divided, and, consequently, 
when the wisdom of the proposed law 
may be supposed to be more than 
usually doubtful. That the door should 
then be left open for its reconsideration 
must surely be accounted wise; and 
we must farther suppose that the exe¬ 
cutive could never adopt the extraor¬ 
dinary measure of withholding its con¬ 
sent, but on a question of vital impor¬ 
tance, as well as of doubtful merits. 
By the English constitution, a veto is 
granted to the monarch, and thiswitli- 
607 
out a second appeal to the legislative 
authority. If this veto is never exerted, 
it is evidently because the royal influ¬ 
ence can previously affect the legisla¬ 
tive decision, and thus virtually speak 
the will of the monarch, without the 
too apparent and irritating opposition 
of his voice to that of the nation. 
Whatever power the executive here 
possesses, it is direct; its influence is 
nothing; it must simply approve or 
dissent. The governor is as powerless 
to affect the voices of the assembly as 
any other individual in the common¬ 
wealth, they are all powerful on the 
other hand to affect his, or, as we have 
seen, can render it nugatory. The 
powers of the governor vary somewhat 
in the different states; and it is, per¬ 
haps, singular, that in Pennsylvania, 
where there has ever existed an exces¬ 
sive jealousy of the executive, its powers 
are greater than in other states. The 
governor is unshackled by a council, 
holds his office for three years, and is 
trusted with the disposal of many pub¬ 
lic offices, which, according to the 
constitution of most of the other re¬ 
publics, are voted by the joint ballot of 
both houses of assembly. 
Ail public offices, whether in the dis¬ 
posal of the governor or the legislature, 
or the people, are held only on good 
behaviour, and are, not excepting the 
governor, liable to impeachment in the 
house of assembly. The concurrence 
of two-thirds of the representatives is 
necessary to pass sentence, which ex¬ 
tends only to removal from office and 
disqualification to hold thereafterany 
place of honour, trust, or profit, under 
the state.” 
It is always provided, that no person 
holding any office under the state, or 
the United States, shall be a member 
of either house of assembly ; a regula¬ 
tion of vital importance, and without 
which it is impossible to rely upon the 
purity of the representative system. 
The servaut of the people must be in 
the pay of no other man, or set of men, 
or his interests ipay be at issue with his 
duty. Pluralities , indeed, are prohi¬ 
bited in every branch of American go¬ 
vernment, and all the authorities under 
it. This, of course, imparts to it a 
vigour and clean-handedness which no 
o 
other regulations could ensure. 
The house of representatives may 
generally be said to he the more popu¬ 
lar branch of the legislature; its mem¬ 
bers are chosen annually, by the whole 
free male citizens of the state. This 
may 
