METHOD OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BACON. 383 
and the way in which the various. colours always stood in compli- 
mentary relationship. The action of various crystals was explained. 
Huyghen’s Jaw of the rotation of the extraordinary ray of Iceland 
spar, was experimentally demonstrated. In conclusion, the extreme 
delicacy of the eye as a recipient organ was shown. The marvel- 
lously small differences of wave length that were capable of being 
altered into nerve force to be appreciated by the brain. 
METHOD OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF BACON. 
ABSTRACT OF DR. WILLIAM H. PEARSE’S PAPER. 
(Read March 25th, 1875.) 
He commenced by giving a statement of knowledge and method 
prior to Bacon, with a general outline of Bacon’s grand aim in the 
language of his axioms. The first part of Bacon’s method was to 
cleanse the understanding, by removing the hindrances to know- 
ledge. These difficulties flowed from the imperfection of the senses, 
the remoteness of nature, and from man’s haste to assert, where he 
should rather have a suspension of judgment. The varied idols, 
or false views of the mind were pointed out; haste to assertion was 
second to none other as a.cause of human error. The danger to 
truth from use of words was illustrated. Words were born to 
express common wants; but when with such. meanings they were 
extended to wider and more exact subjects, error was created and 
established for long periods. Bacon confuted the different schools, 
such as the sceptical, empirical, and theological ; all of which had 
hindered the growth of knowledge. Danger to truth from “ affirma- 
tive instances” was glanced at. The doctrine of final causes had 
corrupted philosophy ; ‘‘final causes. were plainly of the nature of 
man, rather than of the nature of the universe.” Bacon’s creat 
practice and method of Instances were dwelt on and illustrated ; 
in this part of his philosophy Bacon had ranged over nature and 
gathered truth from every part; he had anticipated many of the 
great generalisations of modern science, both in the physical sciences 
and in natural history. His doctrine of Forms was shown to be 
that of ideas and truths of the widest generality. ‘Forms were 
the true object of knowledge, but these Forms must be confined 
