Yet Japan had no imspelling reason to cooperate in efforts to protect seals on land 
during the greater part of this period, for she had no rookeries of her own worth protect- 
ing until 1905. The seale which foreign hunters had extirpated from her Kuril rookseries 
in the early 1880's have never returned, undoubtedly because sufficient protection to en- 
able them to do so has never materialised. But when the 1905 treaty of Portsmouth terni- 
nating the Russo-Japanese War gave southern Sakhalin to Japan, she joined the ranks of the 
“have nations with the acquisition thereby of the fur seal rookeries on Robben Island. 
Steps were taken inmediately to protect this newly acquired resource. The nation- 
al law of 1895 controlling sea otter and fur seal hunting was extended to be effeotive in 
Sakhalin 25 April 1907, and all land killing of seals on Robben Island was prohibited for 
an indefinite period (Bibl 163). 
But at the same time pelagic operations in other waters apparently were encour- 
aged, and the Japanese sealing fleet continued to expand. By 1910 Japan had 53 pelagic 
sealing vessels in operation, Their uncontrolled activities were instrumental in stimu 
lating the United States to try once again to obtain international cooperation for the 
protection of the rapidly vanishing fur seals, this time successfully. 
The 1911 four-power convention in Washington for the protection and preservation 
of fur seals accomplished ite purpose after so many previous failures largely because of 
the sudden change in the attitude of Great Britain. This may have had political overtones, 
but undoubtedly the most important reason for Britain's change of policy wae the failure 
of the Canadian sealing fleet, which by 1909 had been driven completely from the seas by 
the Japanese competition. ]1/ At any rate, British policy swung into line with the Ameri- 
can and Russian proposals to outlaw thie evil, Its abolition was made the first and most 
important article in the resulting treaty. 
The Japanese Government representative, Mr Doke, presented his nation's official 
position, which was in essence that Japan wae perfectly willing to give up pelagic sealing 
but must have some compensation therefor. Local opinion at home in Japan, as revealed by 
editorial comments at the time, was somewhat divided. The pelagic sealing interests natu- 
rally were violently opposed to any curtailment of their activities (Bibl 186, 187, 188, 
203, 205, 209, 210, 214). All local sympathy, however, was not entirely in accord with 
them, for calmer heads realized drastic steps were needed if the industry were not to van- 
ish. Likewise the moral question was raised, indicating a realisation of the adverse 
effect Japanese poaching activities were creating on the good will of other nations toward 
Japan (Bibl 189, 191, 198, 199). However, concern for the questionable ethics of poaching 
was probably of minor importaiice compared to the political expediency of placating other 
_Mations, and to the economic considerations which are frequently the most rerenee re of all 
arguments in such matters. 
In the light of subsequent developments the absence of more active Japanese oppo- 
sition to the treaty is quite understandable. Although the recent acquisition of Robben 
Island undoubtedly was inetrumental in influencing Japan's decision to sign, of greater 
importance was the fact that Japan stood to gain far more economically than she was giving 
up. Her 15 percent share of the annual Pribilof catch awarded by the treaty promised a 
greater monetary return than her pslagic sealing operatione could anticipate. But also in 
the minds of the diplomats and the leaders of the influential large fishing interests may 
have been the philosophy, so incomprehensible and repulsive to democratic idealism, that 
international treaties are only scraps of paper and future obedience to their tenets can 
always be tempered by political or economic expediency. 
ll/ Cf Hayden, S. S., The International Protection of Wildlife, New York, 1942, pp 114- 
136. 

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