The paper has other glaring faults. Ite anonymity, even though it ie published 
under the igprint of the Bureau of Fisheries, ie always suspect, and soientific accuracy 
ie notably lacking in the reporting of the basic data. Fo mention is made of the size, 
age, sex, OF other distinguishing characteristics of the marked animals observed that might 
eliminate the possibility of the same seal being listed on several different occasions. 
fhe dates of capture of at least two marked seals are given incorrectly. Tag No 14479 is 
stated as being recovered on 20 May 1928, whereas thie animal was not tegged until 21 July 
1928. A seal with a sheared patch on the head is reported to have been taken off Muroran 
in May 1926, but no seals were marked by shearing in the Pribilofs in 1926 until June, and 
any evidence of shearing done in 1925 would have disappeared by the following February or 
March. The firet error is clerical, a misprint for 21 May 1929. The second is probably 
misinformation from the fur company in whose possession the sheared skin was found. All 
seals tagged in the Pribilofe in 1927, 1928, and 1929 were branded across the back with 
hot iron. It ie strange that this branding is not mentioned in connection with the tagged 
seals recovered, especially as such marking ruine the market walue of the skin. 
The nost serious omission in the paper is ite failure to produce evidence of the 
number of Pribilof seale visiting Japanese waters. The sole, unrepeated occurrence in ore 
season of three seals all tagged the same year can well be regarded as accidental. The 
svidence of poachers taking some 25 more tagged seale, although probably true, is of course 
insufficiently verified to be admitted as scientific proof. But as only 3200 seals were 
tagged in 1928 on the Pribilofe, the Japanese might well have claimed these 28 aninals to 
be a fair sample, indicating a strong possibility that at least 14 percent of the Pribilof 
seals visited Japanese waters. <A more logical scientific approach to prove their case 
would have been to make an estimate of the number of seals wintering off Japan by actual 
observations and sample counts. Such an estimate, no matter how crude, when compared with 
the known figures for the Robben and Commander populations, would have been of considerable 
significance. But as far as can be learned the Japanese made no effort to obtain irrefy- 
table acientific evidence and made no use of the quasi-scientific material which they ata 
have. 
In 1936 the Japanese Government again requested an international convention to 
revise the 1911 treaty, in preparation for which the Minietry of Agriculture and Forestry 
submitted to the Ministry of Poreign Affairs an "explanatory etatement" for the revision 
of the Fur Seal Convention (Appendix C, Item 1). This remarkable document, which was found 
in the Ministry files in 1946, showa the Japanese actually had no scientific data to prove 
their contentions as they pretended. They built their whole case on the unproved assum- 
tion that the wintering seal population off Japan is composed of most of the Commander pnd 
Robben Island seals, plus one-half the Pribilof herds. From published United States fig- 
ures for the Pribilofs, plus their own estimate for the Asiatic colonies, they guessed that 
wintering population to be about 820,000. They then assumed that all these seals spend 180 
days in Japanese waters and that each seal consumes or "playfully bites" about five potnds 
of fish per day. Simple multiplication of all of these assumed factors, each of which is 
subject to a wide margin of error either way, gave them a total of 730,000,000 pounds, or 
333,610,000 kilograms of fish, At the current wholesale rate of ¥.083 per kilo, this 
amount of fish was worth ¥27,689,630, then equal roughly to $7,000,000. Thus the Japanese 
proved to their own satisfaction that the eeals migrating into Japanese waters in 1935 did 
some ¥27,600,000 worth of damage to their fisheries, whereas their total revenue from the 
seale was only ¥3,600,000. Therefore, it was high time the treaty was revised, Q.E.D. 
Perhaps fortunately for them, they never had the opportunity to present these 
ridiculous figures to the scrutiny of an international convention. The United States was 
willing to discuss the matter with Japan but could see no reason to drag Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union into it, and the convention was never called, which probably suited the 
Japanese foreign policy makers perfectly. . 
Japan finally gave official notice on 23 October 1940 of her intention to abrogate 
the Treaty and, as provided by Article XVI of the Treaty, terminated the Convention on 
23 October 1941, The United States tried in vain to forestall the final abrogation, but 
the Japanese were obdurate in refusing to yield their position, or to submit further 
25 
