October 17, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
To foi'ccast a single deTelo2)ment in war is 
impossible, but to state necessaiy alternatives is 
possil)le euougli. 
Now, among all the tlieoretical possibilities of 
the situation, among all the ways in which the block 
may break up to oiu: adA^antage or disadvantage, two 
are very much the most likely — (a) in tlie v.est the 
alternatives lie with far greater probability between 
the Allies brealcing the German main communications 
and the Germans iurning the main Allied line ; {h) in 
the east — that is, in the Vistula — the alternatives 
o]:)viously lie between an action, however prolonged, 
which wiU idtimately release German troops for the 
west or will ultimately call for German reinforcement 
from the west eastward. No great action upon the 
Vistula — M'ith wet weather coming on and cold, with 
very poor roads, and hardly any railways — can be a 
draw. It may be prolonged but it wiU not be a draw. 
You will certainly have the initiative passing to the 
one side or to the other of the hosts that face each 
other to-day in southern Poland. 
Observe the consequences. If the pressure upon 
Germany here ceases, or is relieved, German brought 
back forces returning to tlie west may pass througli 
the gate on the Meu.se that is still open at St. Mihiel 
and may so force back the whole right of the Allied 
line and open those shorter communications with 
Germany which I have alluded to so often in these 
columns. If, on the contrary, pressure on Germany 
and south Poland increases, Silesia is in danger and a 
withdrawal of troops from the western Held, the 
maintenance of a mere defensive in that field, will be 
imperative to our enemies even if they have gained 
successes hitherto against the Allies in France. 
The whole position may simply be put thus : — 
The Germans having failed to break the Allied 
line in theii* attacks in the western front in France at 
Arias, at Albert, and at Roye, have a better chance of 
iurning it by bringing down their reinforcements 
(following on the fall of Antwerp) upon the flank of 
the Allies, that is, between Lille and the sea. Already 
their cavalry are threatening such a move. Already 
they are in Lille. 
The Allies, on their side, have no opportunity of 
turning a Grerman line, which now extends right up to 
the Dutch frontier, and may, at any moment it 
chooses, touch the sea. But they may break it ; and an 
obvious place for their efforts is in the neighbourhood 
of the Franco-Belgian frontier. 
Jtleanwhile, whichever of the forces in north- 
eastern France now in movement has the better of 
the other, what happens in southern Poland will be 
the final and decisive thing. For if there is hero an 
action which releases existing and victorious German 
forces, those forces can in a few days appear A\here 
they ■will in the western field, and particukrly- 
through the gate of St. Mihiel, which is being kept 
open at a great effort. But if the Russians are 
victorious in south Poland, then, no matter what 
happens in France, the menace overhanging Silesia 
will be of such weight that the Germans will certainly 
turn to a defensive in the west, and will use every 
rmm they can spare for the defence of the valley of 
the Oder. 
Upon the upper part of that valley lie the wealth, 
the mines, half the industrial life of modem Germany. 
To threaten this with destruction is like threatening 
the destruction of Lancashire and the AVest Eiding. 
Ill the lower part of that valley lie the pro- 
perties of the very class, the Prussian military caste, 
which is at the heart of this war, and whose claims to 
over-ride the public kw of Europe, and to destroy the 
lesser nations, is the spiritual motive maintaining the 
whole of this disastrous business. 
The elements of the problem are, therefore : — 
(1) The effect of the fall of Antwerp, the number 
and quality of the troops thus released ; 
(2) The appearance of these and other reinforce- 
ments upon the Western-German front bet\veen the 
Belgian frontier and Noyon ; 
(3) The way in which the gate at St. Mihiel is 
being kept open by the Germans ; and 
(4) Tlie positions in south Poland, with their 
chances of victory and defeat, upon which, more than 
upon any other factor, the future would ap]^)ear to 
turn. 
Each of these foui* main elements has, in. the last 
few days, developed with great rapidity, and I 
proi)Ose, in conclusion, to examine each. 
I. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
FALL OF ANTWERP. 
When the German effort was first opened against 
Antwerp it was certain that the fortress must fall, nor 
was it Aerv difficidt to set limits within wliich that 
fall must come. 
One of the three or four very great conclusions, 
hitherto disputed, now established by this war, is the 
conclusion that modem howitzer fire dominates modern 
j)ermanent works — at least, the modem permanent 
works of the type which all the great ring fortresses 
had. After the fall of the fort Camp des Romains 
and the consequent German occupation of St. Mihiel 
just below, it was no longer possible for anyone to 
believe that Li^ge, Namui-, Maubeuge, and the rest 
had each suffered on account of some peculiar local 
cii'cumstance. 
We can even give a time-table. ManonviUIers, 
a very strong isolated work, fell (seven or eight weeks 
ago) after not less than seven and not more than 
eleven days' bombardment ; the last of the Liege forts 
after seven ; the last of the Namur forts after two or 
three ; the last of the Maubeuge defences after eight. 
Troyon successfully resisted for five days, and was 
then relieved. Camp des Komains appears to have 
succumbed to two or three days of the same form of 
attack. 
The weapon, therefore, by which Antwerp was 
accounted for was simply the 8-inch and perhaps also 
the 11 -inch howitzer. 
The forts of the south-eastern section (Waelhera, 
Wavre St. Catherine, Lierre) were silenced in more 
than forty-eight and less than sixty hours. A short 
chance of resistance lay in the mobile defence of the 
garrison, especially along the line of the Nethe. But 
the numerical superiority of the enemy over the 
remaining garrison enabled him to cross after a 
three days' resistance. Then the howitzers were 
further brought up to bombard the city itself, and 
there was no particular military reason why it should 
continue to hold out. The value of a gamson 
numerically inferior to an Investing enemy lies in the 
fact that behind fortifications it can employ and divert 
from other fields the more numerous forces opposed 
to it. AVlien the fortification has gone, and it can no 
longer serve this purpose, its only proper place is 
the open field. The gaiTlson of Antwerp ■withdrew 
somewhat late, but more than half seem to have 
re-establLshed contact by the western road with their 
fellows and with the Allies near the sea coast. 
Now there are two points in connection with 
these events. The first is only of academic interest 
