LAND AND WATER 
October 17, 1914 
oneuin<r of this door at St. Mihlcl (upon the Upper 
Meuser while it has not yet become important, might 
at anv moment become important. , ^^ , ,. 
Here you have the German line A— B from tlie 
Belgian frontier of France to Noyon, B-C from 
No?ou to the neighbourhood of Verdun, taeed by tiie 
Allied lino. Verdun and Toul are two strong for- 
tresses with a wall or barrier of forts between them 
On the wrong side of that wall, to the east of that 
wall, is a German force M : on the right side of that 
wall to the west, is a French force N : at b, halt way 
between Verdun and Toul, is St. Mihiel— a town right 
on the barrier of forts, protected by two of these 
forts, and standing on the River Meuse, which is the 
obstacle those forts protect. A couple of Y^eks ago 
the Gei-mans quite unexpectedly attacked and reduced 
the two forts (Paroches and Camp des Romains) com- 
manding St. Mihiel town, and in an attempt to cross 
the river (which now tm-ns out to have been a femt) 
they were thrown back by the French force opposite 
them at N. • l mi i 
But here comes in the important point : lltoutih 
the altempted crossmr/ at St. Mihiel was but a feint and 
did not succeed {for the Allies loithdrew none of then- 
troops and tccakened no part of their line under that 
menace) the gap in the line of furls, the occi/jmtion of 
the toicn of St. Mihiel, and the power that occupation 
(/ives of crossinj the river whenecer sufficient forces come 
vp, is still jcalouslij retained hy the Germans. 
success in Poland, pour troops through the gap and 
take the Allied line in reverse— supposing she has not 
up to that moment been able to relieve the pressure 
upon the west or right flank of the Gemian armies in 
France. If she is not acting with some such object, 
ultimately involving the investment of Verdun or of 
Toul, the re-establishment of communications through 
Alsace-Lorraine, and the pouring of great masses 
through which shall force back or take in reverse the 
eastern end of the Allied line, then her action is 
meaningless. And meaningless action is not the 
Prussian way in war. 
But such action as the bringing up of krge new 
hordes through the St. Mihiel '• door " presupposes 
the release of great numbers from the eastern theatre 
of war. It is upon the result of the fighting in 
Poland that all ultimately turns. 
IV. 
THE MAIN ISSUE IN POLAND. 
'Radius cf action j 
from V'erdan.J 
ot. MlLuel ie-KWW*«t»ww*w«^«»t*w-M <n i i ii m « > 
llajJwa/tDMetz 
%idivis oF action 
from Toul ^ 
xrv 
Now this is surely of capital importance. Here 
in Diagram XIV. you may see the importance which 
Gennany attaches to the crossing. Her forces 
occupy, and have occupied for now so many days, 
a position apparently perilous and quite abnormal in 
■war. She has thrust a v.-edge in between the radius 
of action of the fortress of Toul and the radius of 
action of the fortress of Verdun. She keeps that 
gap open as a sort of roadway, very narrow, but just 
wide enough for her purpose. All the efforts of the 
French to advance from Toul on to the valley where 
the railway leads from Metz to Thiaucourt — which 
valley is called the Rupt du Mad — she concentrates 
forces to repel and succeeds in repelling. She similarly 
repels all efforts on the part of the garrison of Verdun 
to get south and to close the issue from the northern 
side. She anxiously and successfully maintains her 
railhead at Thiaucourt, which is the end of rapid 
communication from Metz, and which, through Metz, 
communicates Avith all central Germany behind Metz 
and with all the great depots of the middle Rhine. 
Though she makes no further effort to-day to cross 
the Meuse at St. Mihiel, she yet holds tenaciously to 
St. Mihiel town and bridge, and is not driven from it. 
I suggest that Germany is here keeping open a 
door ; and that in the expectation of victories in the 
east of Europe and of consequent reinforcements she 
means to hold that door open until she can, tlu'ough 
.cT VRVSSIA 
^ >^-^«^"'».-'" 
rs. 
PRZ£MYSL 
AUSTRO -HUNGARIAN EMPIRE 
XV 
Let us turn, then, to what we may justly conceive 
to be the most important theatre of all, the basin of 
the Middle and Upper Vistula. 
It is necessary in time of modern war that news 
officially permitted to the public should be cut dov.n 
to very simple and terse expression. But an inevitable 
consequence attaching to this necessity is a mis- 
apprehension of the enemy's strength in any particular 
field. Until things begin to go ill we tend to under- 
estimate his strength ; and when things go ill, to 
over-estimate it. And this simply because in the 
lack of sufficient bases for judgment the emotions 
of hope or fear take the place of calculation. 
If a full story of what has happened in southern 
Poland during the last ten days were permitted, the 
public would be alarmed ; but they would be unduly 
alarmed. 
Briefly, there has been a very considerable set-back 
of the tide, if we are merely considering the ebb and 
flow of the line. The Russian forces, which had been 
advancing almost uninteniiptedly through Galicia, 
first discovered that very considerable German re- 
inforcements had come up to strengthen the Austrian 
armies, and next that they could effect no proper 
concentration upon their own side if the Galician 
army were to continue its western march. The 
adcanced parties (only) of the Russian forces therefore 
have fallen back from just in front of the line 
rietrokow^-Kielce-Stopnltza-Taruow — upon which line 
10* 
