Gctobor 17, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
Tiiiicli the largest iininber of their effectives were 
upon tlie left, between Tarnow up to and just across 
tlic Vistula — to tlie line of the Vistula itself, and that 
rctii'emcnt is one of about sixty miles. It has been a 
duly organised retreat, made for the purpose of 
concentration, and averaging about ten miles a day. 
Lest there should be a misapprehension as to the 
nature of this retirement and as to its gravity, it is 
most important to appreciate that we are dealing with 
the concentration of at least two Eussian armies. The 
Ivussian army which I have marked in dots iipon this 
sketch map as A — the same which had been going 
forward so successfully through Galicia and towards 
Cracow — was well ahead of the Russian army which I 
have marked B, and which was concentrating east of 
the Vistula at the same moment that the army A was 
advancing through Galicia in front of it. The Russian 
forces which less than a fortnight ago faced the 
advancing Germans along the line Stopnitza-Kielce- 
Pietrokow were advanced forces thrown forward in 
front of the main Russian body upon and beyond the 
Vistula. In other words, while the advanced Russi;in 
bodies on the noiih of the line were falling back 
towards the Vistula, other bodies from the east were 
coming up to reinforce them. 
But note that this necessity for a concentration 
upon the Vistula south of Warsaw, in face of the 
unexpectedly strong German advance, compelled the 
body A to fall back very much further east. It had 
to get behind the River San if it Avas to be in line with 
the main body to the north, and in getting behind the 
River San, A had also to give up the investment of 
Przcmysl. 
At the moment of writing, Tuesday evening, 
•what 30U seem to have in this all important theatre 
of file war is a situation made up of the following 
elements : — - 
(fl) Russian forces of unknown amount but very 
large— certainly over 1,. 500, 000 men — 
hold the line of the River Vistula from 
Ivangorod to Sandomir, and thence 
southwards, holding the line of the 
River San up to the neighbourhood of 
Jaroslav. There are further Ru.ssian 
forces to the south, but I am concerned 
with the immediate battle line alone. 
{i) An Austro-Gennan force of unknown 
amount, but presumably approximately 
equal or a little less, has advanced in 
the last ten days from the line 
Petrokow — Tarnow to this same line 
of the Vistula and the San. The 
German reinforcements are on the 
north, or left; the concentrated Austrian 
forces, both those intact and those 
formed from the remnants of the army 
defeated at Lemberg, form the south or 
right of the allied line, 
(c) The Russian retirement behind the Vistula 
and the San has not been the result of 
any check in the field, still less of any 
defeat. It is quite evidently due to the 
fact that the most rajjid concentration 
of the Russian forces now in southern 
Poland with the reinforcements coming 
from the east, is best effected by a 
retirement of the first to meet the 
advance of the second. It is equally 
evident that the Ru.ssian commanders 
have deliberately taken up the defensive 
behind or upon the Vistida and the 
San. 
{d) In connection with the retirement of the 
one army and tlie advance of the other, 
there have happened a number of those 
incidents whicli always mark a reth'c- 
ment before the enemy. The advancing 
enemy picks up stragglers, bogged guns, 
and so forth ; and the retiring army 
loses them. All that is quite unimjjortant 
to the iiltimate issue, except in the case 
of a disorganised moven:ient. Tlie chief 
point (no doubt exaggerated) which the 
Germans can make in this connection is 
the picking up of 2,000 men, wounded 
and othervvise, in the neighboiu-hood 
of Grojec. 
(e) This concentration upon the Vistula and 
the San has partly relieved Przemysl. 
At least, it has apparently disengaged 
the western section of tlie invest- 
ment. 
It is probable that at the moment of writing full 
contact has already been taken from north to south 
and that the struggle is engaged. And upon that 
struggle, as I have pointed out several times in tliese 
comments, ranch more wiU depend than the fate of 
Polish teiTitory and of the eastern campaign. For if 
or when the Russian forces behind the Vistula and tlie 
San pass from the defensive to the offensive, and if cr 
when the allied Germanic forces before them begin to 
retire, the threat upon Silesia is at hand. In projjor- 
tion to the completeness of such a victory the 
" pressm-e " upon the allied powers, and particularly 
upon the German empire, would be severe. Silesia 
would be in peril, and the western march of the 
Russians woidd be resumed. 
If, upon the contrary, the Russian forces are in 
part disorganised by a German victory, or even held, 
then will come the opportunity for Germany to bring 
both Gennan and Austrian troops westward and to 
attempt a final decision of the campaign in France. 
For among other thmgs that the war has shown is the 
organisation whereby the Prussians can with unex- 
pected rapidity transfer troops from west to east along 
their parallel lines of communication. 
I sum up and say that upon these operations v/hich 
have the Middle and Upper Vistula for their theatre 
depends, more than upon any other, the immediate 
future of the campaign. 
V. 
THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH 
POLAND. 
The great importance of the coming action in south 
Poland belittles what has happened in the north of 
that country. But in view of the rather violent 
denouncing by Berlin of the Russian official com- 
muniques, it is as Avell that we should be clear as to 
what has happened. To be thus clear will sene the 
double purpose of making us understand one import- 
ant detail of the Avar, and also (what is perhaps of 
more value) it will enable us to test the value of the 
German official communique under defeat. It may 
well be that this piece of psychology wiU be really 
useful to us in the near future. Hitherto, the 
Gennan official communiques have been models of 
exactitude. They have suppressed unpleasant truths, 
but they have not as a rule told direct untruths, nor 
have they shown any sign of " nerves." But, as I 
think I can show, the Gennan official commiiniquo 
dealing with the most recent operations in North 
Poland is both disingenuous and full of " nerves." 
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