LAND AND WATER 
OctoLer 10, 1914 
from 50 to 150 miles, yet tlic essentials wliicli dis- 
tiiij,nusli a battle and a field of battle fi-om a campaign 
and tlic "theatre" in wliicli that campaign takes 
place still distingnisli the very extensive lines along 
-vvhicli to-day a decision is readied. You have the 
two fronts, the contact of one ^vith the other, the 
cohesion of either party, the attempt of the one 
either to break or to envelop tlie other. And the 
whole action is tactical, not strategical. 
Using then the term " battlefield," greatly 
extended as it has become in time and space, lor the 
scenes of these protracted modern actions you have, 
I say, in the Eastern theatre of war two distinct 
battlefields wherein it is sought by either party to 
reach a decision upon the soil of Poland. Tliese two 
battlefields arc independent of one another. They 
are occupied on the Gennanic side by two separate 
cohesive bodies. 
(1) The body which has been struggling to 
obtain possession of the Vp]ier Kiernen and the 
crossings thereof between CIrodno and Ivcnno. 
(2) The body which is concerned to arrest and if 
possible to thrust back the great Ihissian Ai-my, 
which, since its victory at Lcmberg has been pressing 
westward through Galicia towards Silesia. 
It will be remembered that it was remarked in 
these notes last v.cek that the Southern of the two 
fields was the more important. 
AVhcn you have two separate actions of this sort 
going on, one well in front of the other, the ultimate 
ilccision which will aiTect the fortunes of both is most 
likely to arise in that field which contains the larger 
total number of combatants. If you have a situation 
such as that presented in the accompanying diagi-am, 
where an action is going on between black and white, 
A— B and C— 1) with 
A C 
Commutticationsl 
E G 
B D 
Comtnumc^tions 
F H 
V 
A-B attacking C-D and having the initiati\e, 
while at the same time another action is L'oino- on 
betu^en two otlier sets of the same oppponents at 
h—F and a— II. then either the success of A- B 
against C-I) ^-iU ultimately threaten the ccmmuni- 
cations of the successful G—II against B—V or the 
success of G — H against E — F will iJtimately 
threaten the communications of A — B. In other 
words, when two actions like these are being fought 
out, not abreast of one another on one line, but criss- 
cross, one of the two will be the master action con- 
trolling in the long run the results of the other. It 
must nearly always be the lai-ger of the two sets of 
bodies involved ^vhich so controls the action of the 
smaller set. Supposing A — B to be succes.sf id against 
C — D, A — B will none the less ultimately have to 
turn back if G — H has been successful against the 
much larger body of A — B's fellows at E— F. 
The elements contained in this diagram are 
precisely those governing the general operations in 
the Eastern theatre of war. It will be apparent that 
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v-"'?'^^^:^'"- '"■ 
'^risrs 
tit 
in the Northern battlefield you had in front of the 
Niemen a successful advancing German bodv, A B. 
pressing upon a defending Eussian bodv, C -1),' 
while down south near the Upper Vistula vou had a 
much larger body, G— H, advancing against corre- 
spondingly large Germanic forces, E~F. The result 
of the action, E— F, Cr— H, woidd ultimately control 
the movements of the action A— B, C— D. For, 
however successful A— B might be in the north,' 
G—II and E— F were really deciding the issue of the 
war in the Avhole of the Eastern theatre. They were 
the principal forces engaged. If E-^F wins, for 
instance, and pushes G--H back, the success of 
A— B becomes of comparatively small importance. 
If G— H wins he will bo threatening by his large 
numbers the communications of the "smaller bodv 
A — B and compelling its retreat. 
All this is supposing that A— B in the north 
continues to advance, but, as a fact, this smaUer 
Gei-man army which has been attacking the IJussians 
on the Niemen, and advaiu'ing to cross that river, 
has failed and is no\v in retreat. Meanwhile, the 
much larger Austro-Germanv Army which is pre- 
paring to provoke a decision upon the Upper A'i.stula 
has not yet reached that decision— and upon the 
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