October 10, 1914 
LAND AND WATEE 
lesiilt of its action, favourable or disastrous to Austria 
aaid Germany, will turn the first pliase of the war in 
the East. Moreover, if the action is really decisive, it 
will violently react upon the campaign in France. 
Before taking these two fields of battle in detail, 
I woidd insist on this last point, upon the very grave 
effect upon the max as a whole that the first decisive 
results in Poland must necessarily have. It is agreed 
that the " pressure " which Russia may be able to 
bring upon Germany will be of capital effect upon the 
the eastern "pressure" upon Gennany upon which 
the west so eagerly counts. 
Now, it is because a decision one way or the other 
appears to be imminent that the operations in Poland 
at this moment have resumed their interest for us. 
Having said so much let me turn to the ■two 
battlefields in detail. 
THE ACTIONS IN THE VALLEY OF 
THE NIEMEN. 
campaign in the "West. Tlic date at whicb this 
" pressure " might begin was voiy foolishly advanced, 
and too many organs of public opinion, in this country 
especially, v.rote, at tlie opening of the war, as though 
Berlin were to be menaced in a few days. It was 
impossible, unless the mles of arithmetic were to be 
suspended, for any such " pressure " to be felt before 
the third week in 'October, even supposing the 
maximum success conceivable on the part of the 
Eussians, and the collapse of their opponents. As a 
matter of fact, it is already apparent that the 
" prcssm-e " will come in any case later than this 
most favom-able date. Further, it is equally apparent 
that the first " pressure " wliich our common enemies 
could be put under by the Russians would be applied not 
in the heart of the German Empire, nor at its capitjil, 
but in Silesia, because Silesia is the nearest populous 
and wealthy province exposed to a Russian advance. 
Now, a decision reached within the next few 
days or in the next week or two by the Russians over 
the Germans in the eastern theati-e of war would 
mean the beginning of that " pressure " upon Silesia, 
an advance along tlie valley of the Oder, the turning 
of the Eastern fortresses of Prussia hi Poland, notably 
Posen and Thorn, and the way open to a march upon 
industriiU Saxony and the capifcU itself. 
Conversely, the success of the Germans, should 
they arrest the Russian march through Galicia, and 
still more should they thrust back the Russians in 
that field, would mean the indefinite postponement of 
On the above skeleton map the reader will 
discover the size and to some extent the nature of the 
field of operations in Northern Poland. It must first 
be obsei"vcd that the artificial frontier between the 
Russian Empire and East Prussia, which here cuts 
through Northern Poland, has long "been crossed by 
the advancing Gennan forces, and that these have 
been advancing directly upon the Niemcn with the 
object of crossing that stream. 
Tlie Nicnicn is the great natural obstacle to any 
invasion of Russia from the west ; at least if such an 
invasion tiike place upon the northern pait of her 
western fi-outier. "When Napoleon was occupied in 
re-erecting Poland as a nationality, he had imposed 
npon the Russians the Niemen as a frontier between 
Russia and Poland, though, as a matter of fact, the 
Pohsli nation extends its tenitory far to the east of 
that river. It was across the Niemen that Napoleon 
marched his gi-eat force in June, 1812, and one 
that the Niemen was to the 
in liistory what the Meuse is 
France. To obtain possession 
its crossing places, then, was 
the object of the Gennan advance in this quarter. 
All the countiy between the East Prussian frontier 
and the Niemen (a matter of over 50 mUcs even at 
the naiTOwest point between the two lines in this 
region) is a mass of water and wood and marsh. Some 
few of the lakes I have set down in the sketch map, 
but the total number appearing upon any detailed map 
might almost say 
fortunes of Russia 
to the fortunes of 
of this liver and 
8» 
