October 24, 1914 
LAND AND WATEB 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
NOTE. — THIS ABTICLB HAS BBEIf SUBMITTED TO THE PEJtSS BtJEKAU, WHICH DOBS NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION A3 OBNSOaBD 
AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITr FOK THE COB2SCTKBSS OP THE STATEMENTS. 
RIGA 
THE BALTIC ABEA Or CONFLICT SHOWINO THE MOST IMPOP.TANT FOETIFIED POINTS. 
THE SUBMARINE MENACE. 
yA T the moment of writing the Gei-man week's bag — 
/^L by submarines — is one Russian armoured cruiser 
Z__m and one old British protected cruiser. It works 
/ ^ out at two of something for nothing ! And it is 
idle to deny that a species of submarine panic is 
spreading. 
The actual asset remains small. To date no GermAn 
submarine has achieved anything whatever likely in tho 
remotest degree to ailect final issues. But — the Germans have 
secured enough " moral effect " to make everji-hing else seem 
possible. Many of us envisage them, out of the way, lying in 
harbour till such time aa they have sunk by submarines enough 
of our Navy to make a fleet action a " toss up," or else odds in 
Germany's favour. 
So far they have — except in the case of the Pallada — 
merely submarined ships which " don't matter." But we may 
take it that they will pursue this policy steadily until they have 
sunk various capital ships of ours which do matter very much. 
And it is just about here that German calculations seem 
likely to go astray. 
Supposring that they attain their object; supposing that they 
sink some of our Dreadnoughts until battle fleet equality or 
an advantage therein is obtained ? The German fleet may then 
come out at the " selected moment." But — and it is a very 
big " but " indeed — it chances that we have more than twice 
as many submarines as they have, and, as I described in a 
recent article, submarines manned on those democratic lines 
which alone can be relied on for ultimate success in this kind 
of warfare. Whatever risks we may have run, thenr risks will 
bo twice as gpreat. 
That, however, is overlooked. German agents in this 
•country have made a strong but so far only partially successful 
effort to raise a submarine p<anic. It cannot be too clearly 
understood that it is not the loss of ships and men on which 
the enemy relies so much aa " the paaic." It is in tho chapter 
of accidents that not long before tho war Admiral Sir Percy 
Scott, in a letter, and Sir A. Conan Doyle, in a story, should 
have invested tho submarine with a very high potontiaJity. Of 
these entirely extraneous circumstances capital is already 
teing made. 
Presently more capital will be made, because it is reason- 
ably certain that, sooner or later, the German submarines will 
secure some of our Dreadnoughts. The first Dreadnought 
secured we may be certain of seeing tho " panic " sequel worked 
to the uttermost. 
Now, this is one of those few troubles which are best met 
half way. As I suggested some v.-eeks ago, the loss of a dozen 
Dreadnoughts by submarines is among the things that are 
possible. We should meet it by thinking of it as a probaible 
event. Tho more we anticipate it the better, for by so doing 
we shall keep our heads. 
To date, the losses due to submarines have been propor- 
tionately far less than people imagine. For example, here is 
a list of all losses which have taken place in what may be called 
" submarinable waters " : — 
Allies. 
Germans and AnsTKiANS. 
Submarines 
Pathfinder 
Cressy 
Ho'jiie 
Abonkir 
Hawke 
Pallada 
nela 
S 126 
• 
Mino3 
Amphion 
Speedy 
t.b. 10 (Austrian, Accidental) 
Gunfire 
K. Luise (minelayer) 
Zenta 
U 15 
V 187 
Magdeburg 
Koln 
Mainz 
A riiKiiie 
S 115 
S 117 
s lis 
S 119 
1S» 
