October 24, 1914 
LAK^D AND WATER 
That no more important test of possessing the 
initiative — of " pinning " your enemy and providing 
against unexpected action upon his jjart — can be 
looked for than the discovery of his trying to do two 
things at once. 
When the Germans had the initiative — during 
that amazingly rapid and well-ordered march of theirs 
upon Paris — no subsidiary thing was attempted. All 
was on one idea. But to-day, after they have been held 
in the western field for six weeks, a plain diversity of 
object, already slightly apparent on more than one 
point of the long line of battle, has now quite clearly 
presented itself in the north. 
Tlie German commanders have been tempted (1) 
to break the Allied line anywhere between LUle and 
Noyon : that was not only a principal and legitimate 
object, but one in which they have often nearly 
succeeded, and one consonant with their genei-al 
scheme ; (2) to move along the sea-coast and occupy 
successively Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne : to 
command the Straits of Dover. 
Now such a double scheme would have a plain 
sti'ategical meaning in the case of an enemy strong 
enough by his advance to push back the xohole of the 
Allied forces in this quarter. If he had so great a 
superiority of numbers that he could be certain of 
advancing from the line Lille-Valenciennes on to 
Arras, and at the same time of advancing from the 
line Lille-Ostend to the line St. Omer-Boulogne, then 
NOJITH SEA- 
the double operation would really be a single opera- 
tion ; and an Allied force attempting to hang on for 
a short time to, say, Menin, would at the very begin- 
ning of such an advance occupy a dangerous salient 
from which it would have to retire. It would be 
swept back en masse. 
But it is fairly evident that Prussia commands 
no such overwhelming force either in quality or in 
quantity in this region. It is the Allies who have 
gone forward. It is they who have taken successively 
Estaires, Annentiferes, Frelinghien. It is they who 
have made progress in front of Arras. It is they who 
have pushed even as far as RouUers. And it is self- 
evident that not both of the plans thus undertaken by 
the Gennan commanders can now be achieved. 
I am not saying that they have not unexpected 
reserves which may yet make good some advance 
of theirs south of Lille, as along the arrow (1). 
I am not saying that they have not the power — 
though it socms very doubtful — to advance if they 
choose to undertake that dangerous enterprise along 
the an-ow (2) along the sea-coast. Jiut, T do say 
that tliey cannot undertake both objects, and that 
their objects arc here clearly divided. 
Now, to divide your force is to put both parts in 
peril. And in this ease the two parts in no way 
co-operate. They cannot bring down south from 
arrow (2) any aid in flank of arrow (1) — unless they 
have an overwhehning number. The country between 
is solidly, successfully and progressively occupied by 
the Allies. Still less can they bring up to the north 
aid to arrow (2) from arrow (1). That would 
be suicide ; for it would be the exposure of 
their main communications with France behind 
Valenciennes. 
There is no doubt at all that the two efforts are 
separated. Difficult and usually rash as it is to say : 
" This known situation necessarily produces that knovra. 
future result," it is a fair estimate of the present 
position upon the Franco-Belgian frontier that not 
both of these two separate efforts can succeed ; and 
the chances are more than even that neither of them 
wiU succeed. 
If this is so, it may w^ell be asked for what 
reason this effort along the sea-coast was undertaken 
by the Germans at all ? One might begin the series 
of questions by asking of what strategical use was the 
occupation of Antwerp? Here there is one reply 
quite satisfactory : " Antwerp was occupied in order 
to remove any considerable threat against the main 
communications through Belgium, because the 
moment had come for moving certain German rein- 
forcements — perhaps not very large nor of very good 
quality — through Belgium into France." Even so 
the answer does not cover the field. Antwerp could 
perfectly well have been masked, and was fairly 
efficiently masked for more than a month. But any- 
how, let it go at that. You get something of an 
answer to the strategical question " Why did the 
enemy occupy Antwerp ? " It cost the Germans very 
little in men, and we must also remember that it 
raised the spirits of the civilians behind, which spirit, 
though an , indeterminate factor, is not one entirely 
to be despised — especially in a country which has 
been taught to expect continuous victory and which 
can boast that the gi'eat war has been hitherto con- 
ducted beyond its own frontiers. 
But when one proceeds to ask the further 
strategical question " Why was Ghent occupied ? " 
one gets an answer less satisfactory. Some reply: 
" It was occupied in order to cut off the retreat of 
the Belgian forces from Antwerp along the sea-coast." 
I say this answer is stiU less satisfactory than the 
answer to the occupation of Antwerp, because the . 
German commanders must have known that the 
Belgian army would escape them. They cannot even 
have thought it a very close thing. 
It is not, by the way, one of the least achieve- 
ments of the last few days in a strategical sense, that 
this considerable force should have been safely with- 
drawn. Nor is it, paradoxical though it sounds, a 
discouragement to know that the 20,000 of them who 
were lost by crossing the Dutch frontier, were only 
lost through a blunder and not by the German pressure 
from the south. 
Even let it be admitted that the occupation of 
Ghent had some strategical meaning, when we come 
to the last question, " AVliy were Bruges and Ostend 
occupied? " no good strategical answer is available at 
all. The thing was political. While the great sweep 
on Paris was taking place the coast could have been 
occupied by small German forces at any moment. It 
was not then thought worth while. Now that that 
sweep has failed, the occupation of the coast in the 
ho])c of sonic moral effect upon England has been 
undertaken. The answer is not strategically sufficient. 
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