October 24, 1914 
LAND AND WATEE 
Width ofrivermizch. 
exofffferaied. Seed. , 
width averages 
ZAW/C//OSrJ \350to 400^ds. 
About lO Miles 
l^TBridffB 
To JarosCav andt 
jBa^e roundLby 
DeSLcca. 
w 
SKETCH OF JIJHCTION OF SAN AND TISTULA EITBES. 
Why? Because if they cross here in any force 
they will be di-iving a wedge between the Germans 
in the north and the Austrians in the south ; they 
will be, to use a metaphor, " enfilading " the line 
of the Upper Vistula; they wiU be upon the north 
side of an obstacle which separates the main Austrian 
armies in Gahcia (to the south of that obstacle) 
from their allies in "Western Poland ; they will have 
but to defend the northern banks of the Upper 
Vistula to separate the two tdlies. And we may 
confidently expect, if a Eussian advance begins, a 
particularly strong effort to seize tliis junction of 
the two streams and to obtain a bridgehead at that 
point. Of course there is no existing bridge ; the 
"tdte de pont " the Eussians would fight for here 
would mean the possession and defence of a point 
upon the left or western bank to which soldiers could 
be ferried over, or to which they might cross by a 
pontoon bridge. 
So much for the attempts of the Austro-Germans 
to force the Eussian defensive line behind the 
Vistula and the San (probably somewhere in its 
centre), and for the Eussian counter-offensive if 
such an attempt fails. 
But the main Eussian effort will not consist in 
merely awaiting the Austro-Germans. It will consist 
in attempting to turn their north flank near Warsaw. 
The Germans know this, and to reach AVarsaw, hold 
it^ and prevent such a turning movement is essential 
to their success. 
To hold New Georgievsk is essential to the 
German plan, for it is the northern fortress, the 
extremity of the line. Nor should we be blind to the 
undoubted fact that political considerations (perhaps 
to an undue extent but not always unwisely) weigh 
upon the German commanders. The capture, or 
rather the occupation, of Warsaw would have a 
great effect throughout all Eastern Europe, and a 
corresponding effect in Gennany and Austria. It 
is for this reason that the greatest mass of the 
Gennan troops is not concentrated for the moment 
- — ^was not concentrated a week ago — opposite any 
one crossing place of the Vistula, such as Josefdw, 
but was concentrated for an advance upon Warsaw. 
Grojec, commanding the junction of so many road.s, 
as we have seen, and the very ante-chamber of 
Warsaw, was seized more than a fortnight ago in the 
German advance. A week later the advanced 
cavalry bodies of the Prussians were almost within 
sight of the city — not a day's march away. 
But the same considerations which have made 
the occupation of Warsaw a prime object in the 
German advance, have made the repulse of the 
Germans in this part of the field essential to Eussian 
success. The political importance of saving Warsaw 
fi'om even a temporary German occupation must have 
had its weight with the Eussians ; but much more 
than that, with any sane commander, must be the 
all-importance of turning the German left in this 
region. If no effort were ultimately to be 
undertaken against one of the two wings, of what 
purpose would be the occupation of this immensely 
long and purely defensive position along the Vistula 
and the San ? And if no flanking action were to be 
attempted upon either of the two wings, what use 
would it be to the Eussians to count, perhaps imme- 
diately, certainly with every week of the future, upon 
increasing numbers superior to their foes ? 
We may take it as certain that the Eussian plan 
has for its principal business the turning of this 
German flank in the north. Of a corresponding 
movement in the Cai-pathians there can as yet be no 
question. And it is trae to say that all the chance of 
a decision in favour of our Allies turns upon the 
success of this pushing back of the Germans from 
before Warsaw, eastward and southward. With 
every mile that the Gennans are compelled to " refuse 
then- left," to bend back their Hne, before Warsaw, 
their chance of a successful offensive across the 
Vistula furtlier south — and indeed their chance of 
deciding the whole action in their favour at all — gets 
less and less. 
By the Eussian account, up to the news which 
had reached London at the time of writing this, 
the Germans had in their advance on Warsaw 
succeeded up to about the morning of last Thursday, 
October 15th. With the 16th the tide turned, and 
on the i7th and 18th, Saturday and Sunday last, 
according to the Eussian version, the German left, 
strong as it was, was here pushed back right to the 
line Grojec-Skienewice — a matter of twenty miles at 
one end of the bend and thirty at the other. 
The whole battle at this stage stood somewhat 
as this sketch map shows, with the attempted German 
Gcoralcvsk 
Cracow 
viria 
Vi 
crossing of the Vistula at Josefow, on arrow (1), and 
the attempted Eussian turning of the German lines 
before Warsaw on arrow (2). Neither effort is yet 
decided, and there we must leave it. 
