LAND AND WATER 
October 24, 1914 
least 20, wliicli lies rougWy triangular a couple of 
days' march south of Eadom. This, though travers- 
able of course by two or three good roads, may be 
rec^ardcd as the soulJiern boundary of the belt over 
winch the Gennaus must advance towards the cross- 
iug of the central Vistula. It cuts off for an 
advancing body the columns working north of 
Sandomir from those working south. To the north 
is the very serious obstacle of the PaHca. Should a 
Russian turning movement by the north be even 
partially successful, then the obstacle of the Paliea 
would afford delay for the withdrawal westward of 
such German troops as might have already passed 
successfully to the further bank of the Vistula between 
New Alexandiia and Sandomir. But an attempt to 
put the main Gennan force over the river north of 
that obstacle would spell disaister «/ the German left 
in the neighoui'hood of Warsaw were seriously 
menaced ; still more if it were turned. The Paliea 
with its marshes would hem in the retreating army. 
There would hardly be time to withdraw the advanced 
bodies that might have approached or even crossed 
the Vistula ; and there is no natural obstacle between 
Warsaw and the Paliea to fend off the Russians 
approaching fi-om the north to cut the communi- 
cations of the bodies that had just crossed or were 
just crossing. 
It is evident that the Germans, while their 
numbers may not be sufficient so much as to threaten 
a turning movement here against the Russians, would, 
by only holding Warsaw, make their advance across 
the central Vistula (should they succeed in crossing 
the stream) secure. They must of course not only 
hold Warsaw : they must also mask, attack, or in a 
paradoxical way repose upon the enemy's fortress of 
Novo Georgievsk (the true name of which is the old 
Polish name of Memlin). They must mask also the 
secondary fortress of Ivangorod. But containing the 
garrisons of these two, without further advance 
east and west there, if they cross the Vistula 
further south at some central point betw^een 
Ivangorod and Sandomir, and if they there break 
the Russian line, such a breach, while Warsaw 
■was held, would decide the action as a whole. All 
this means that an attack upon and an occupation 
of Warsaw and with it the holding of the line 
Warsaw-Ivangorod while a crossing is effected some- 
where further up aboVe Ivangorod is the obvious 
German plan. 
When we look then at the three sections (1 ) the 
San, (2) the Vistula between Sandomir and Ivangorod 
and (3) the Vistula from Ivangorod down to Warsaw, 
we see, as I have said, that the central one of these 
is the mofe-t favourable for the chief attempt of the 
Austro-German allies at crossing the river ; and we 
know that, as a fact, the attempt has been made 
(with what final success or ill-success we do not yet 
know) at one particular point especially chosen therein, 
the point near Jozefdw. 
In order to understand why this particular sjjot 
was chosen the following sketch map may be of 
interest. The Vistula happens at this point to be 
narrower than it is at any place either above or below. 
It is even narrower than at Sandomir. Above, there 
are marshes ; below, islands and the entry of a tribu- 
tary which balks an advance. 
That the Vistula is here correspondingly deeper 
does not affect the problem, because it is not, in any 
case, fordable. That it runs more swiftly is an adverse 
consideration for the Germans attempting to cross it ; 
but this extra current is not sufficient to outweigh 
the great advantages of a passage which can be gained 
0^ (J' 
.^ 
in 
more rapidly (if it is gained at all) than at any other 
point for many days march above and below. 
Nor is this the only advantage of the crossing 
place of Jozefow. It is the nearest point (by road) upon 
the Vistula from the railhead at Osowiec. Further, 
there are two roads leading from that railhead to the 
head of the river bank opposite Jozefdw. The one 
goes north of a bolt of wood at this point, the other 
south of it ; and the total distance from the railhead 
to the right bank is but twenty miles as the crow 
flies — less than thirty by either road. 
The Russians upon the opposing bank have no 
such advantage. Then* railway is fuUy half as much 
again, even as the crow flies, behiiid them ; and they 
have but one road to it— though a longer road 
down the river leads to New Alexandria and a more 
distant point upon the same railway. 
If, as is reported, the German attempt at crossing 
the Vistula opposite Jozefdw has failed, the check to 
the invaders, though not decisive, is heavy. No 
equally good opportunity is to be found for breaking 
the middle of the Russian Hne. 
Upon the San, of course, there are numerous 
opportunities of crossing. That river is not more 
than 130 yards broad in its lower courses, it naiTows 
rapidly as one approaches the mountains, the bridges 
across it and roads leading to these bridges are 
numerous, the opportunities for gun positions to 
defend the crossings are, in such hilly country, also 
numerous. But it must not be forgotten that the 
effect upon the Russian line here Avould be but 
partial. It would be a blow delivered too near the end 
of the line, which can hardly be turned, as it reposes 
upon the mountains ; and the nearer one is to this 
extreme end of the line the better are the Russians 
supplied by the great railway from Lemberg and Kicff. 
Again, below New Alexandria and between 
Ivangorod and Warsaw, the opportunities for 
crossing grow rarer and rarer as one goes down- 
stream. The river broadens out, is marshy upon 
one bank or the other (sometimes upon both), and is 
not served, upon the German or western side, by tlie 
railway. 
There is one last point of considerable strategic 
importance to be watched, and that is the junction 
of the two rivers, Vistula and San. This point is not 
of great importance to the attackers at the present 
)noment. for there is no particular reason Avhy the 
Austro-German s should try to cross near here more 
than at any other place. But if the tide of the 
battle turns, and a Russian pursuit of a German 
retirement begins ; if the main Austro-Gennan line 
is turned round its Warsaw flank and has to retreat 
from the ri\ers, (/ten this i-iver junction will become 
of the very greatest importance to the Russians. 
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