October 31, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
consequently they did not press their attack as quickly as they 
should have. 
This enabled us to reinforce ; and there followed a mSUe in 
which each side considered itself " vantage out." On the whole, 
I think that the Germans were really " vantage in." At any 
rate, that seems to have been Admiral Beatty's reading of the 
situation. 
Be that as it may, at eleven-thirty Admiral Beatty brought 
in his battle cruisers at 28 knots. He ran great risks from 
submarines ; but he annihilated all that was left of the first 
German line, and saved the day. 
I am inclined to credit this first German line with having 
taken annihilation in order to cover the retreat of the second, 
and of possibly the thii'd and perhaps even the fourth (battle 
fleet) line behind. 
In acting as he did Admiral Beatty turned what should 
have been a British defeat into a British victory, or rather a 
semi- victory, for it now seems abundantly clear that the Germans 
were quite ready for us oS Heligoland on August 28th. 
The situation as I read it is that the Germans were ready 
for us, that they had prepared an overwhelming reception 
for the Arethusa and her consorts, that they had won, and that 
everything was with them when suddenly Admiral Beatty 
charged out of the mist with his battle cruisers. 
The exact German plans we shall probably never know, 
things of this sort are never unfolded till their interest is merely 
a matter of " ancient history." 
But, in a way, I am afraid that the Germans will — as I 
suggested at the time — translate the Heligoland aftair into a 
moral victory for themselves. It is like this : Their presence was 
such that our battle cruisers had to come in earlier than was 
intended. As a result of this their battle cruisers went back 
to the Kiel Canal and so did not get annihilated as we had 
probably arranged, and hoped for. 
If we desire to keep our perspective clear we must view 
things always from the enemy's standpoint as well as from our 
own. Well, we sank four units of the enemy's light stufE, but 
we got no " heavy stuff." And where psychology is concerned 
psychology is all that really matters. 
To describe the Heligoland affair as a German victory — 
their loss four units, our loss none — sounds very ridiculous. 
But psychologically I am afraid that it is nearer the truth. 
The " rats " that matter evaded the trap. 
Our popular Press feeds us on apparent results. Such 
results are admirable for the music hall stage. But from the 
naval war standard, the fact remains that if Admiral Beatty 
had not taken abnormal risks, we should have been badly beaten 
in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28th last. 
My reading of the matter is : We tried a very smart thing. 
We were trapped and failed. Admiral Beatty came to the 
rescue and transformed defeat into victory by taking atrocious 
risks. And he saved us by the skin of the teeth. 
The task before us is no light one. Not only are we faced 
against men able to fight quite as well as we can ; but we are 
also faced by an admiral who has his side of the business very 
much in hand. The British Navy ia up against the biggest 
proposition that it ever has had to face. I hope and I think that 
it will win through. But the fight is going to be a very hard 
one ; and the bombast of the daUy Press about the " skulking 
fleet " etc., etc., is very ill-timed. 
THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY. 
During the period since these notes last appeared the Emden 
and Karlsruhe have both been heard of once more — the latter 
having succeeded in capturing several colliers, and so rendered 
herself independent of German Admiralty arrangements for her 
coal supply. 
As the Karlsruhe has sunk some of the captured colliers, we 
know that she has enough at disposal to last her for a prac- 
tically indefinite period. With armed guards on board, these 
colliers are by now probably distributed all over the ocean 
outside the trade routes, their recapture being a matter of blind 
chance of several thousand to one against, for now there are no 
clues whatever. 
In connection with clues, it seems to have escaped notice that 
German corsairs seldom, ij ever, interfere with merchant ships fitted 
with wireless. 
Although we have had stories of the crews of ships captured 
being allowed only a quarter of an hour to get off, what with over- 
hauhng and what not, it is very doubtful whether from first to last — 
that is to say, from the beginning of the chase to getting clear away 
— the operation of capturing can take much less than six hours. 
A defending cruiser does not and cannot steam about at 
full speed all the time, but we can safely allow her to be able 
to cover from 100 to 125 miles in six hours, so that attacks on 
any wireless fitted ship would be attended with some considerable 
risk, seeing that about seventy cruisers are engaged in the corsair 
hunt, and necessarily mostly along the trade routes. A con- 
spicuous installation is therefore quite possibly a valuable defence 
against a form of commerce attack so cleverly conceived that 
it may well continue for months. 
In view of the Karlsruhe's captures it may become necessary 
to make colliers travel in convoy. A recently issued Admiralty 
statement places our High Seas losses at 1 per cent. This is not 
high. It is, however, quite high enough ; also, imless we can cut 
off the hostile fuel supply, it is bound to rise. 
The corsairs cannot, of course, go on indefinitely. Foid 
bottoms and machinery defects must sooner or later take effect. 
But they will not do so for many months. Hence the gravity 
of the problem and the need of every conceivable " reply ."^ 
ACCURATE SHOOTING. 
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B., late R.E. 
It is impossible to pass 
over the anniversary of 
Agincourt without drawing 
a lesson for immediate appli- 
cation from the extraordinary 
accuracy of shooting attained 
by our ancestors in those 
days. Our archers carried 
about thirty arrows, and 
never seem to have run out 
of them, though they often 
killed and v/ounded up to ten 
men a piece in a single action. 
We carry upwards of 120 
rounds and more, but even 
the best of our recent practice 
in France falls very far behind 
the standard of those days. 
Yet the ojjeration of aiming 
over sights is really simpler 
than getting an alignment for 
an arrow drawn up to the ear 
— and the range at which the 
archers practised, 200 to COO 
yards, was not so much below 
modem individual practice as a layman might suppose. Sir 
Pvalph Payne Gallwey is the chief authority on these subjects. 
and, referring to Turkish archery, he gives instances of ranges 
of over 1,000 yards attained by Turkish archers as late as the 
eighteenth century — indeed, some of the shots he cites were made 
before the Royal Toxophilite Society by the Turkish Ambassador 
here in England some seventy years ago. 
Now the reason why the archers shot so much straighter 
stares one in the face, if one considers the man, bow, and arrow 
as part of a single mechanical whole, the one bracing up the 
other, and in turn being braced by it. 
The initial sketch explains the idea : — 
In order to draw the arrow to the ear, the left arm has to 
thrust against the bow with all its strength. The tension of the 
cord acting through the bow compels the arm to become a 
rigid strut in which no shaking is possible. A man may be 
excited, or blown with running, it does not matter, for the 
moment he draws the arrow towards the ear his arm becomes 
locked into position, and any tendency to shake b mechanically 
suppressed. 
In shooting with a gun no action of this kind arises, we have 
never looked upon gun and man as an inseparable unit, but 
always as two distinct parts, exercising no mutually controlling 
effect upon one another at all. 
In the old days, the gun or musket kicked like a young 
horse, and, unless the fircr pressed the butt well into the shoidder 
he was apt to suffer very severely. But the more you try to 
press the rifle home to the shoulder the more unsteady as a 
support does the left forearm become ; also after excitement or 
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