LAND AND WATEE 
October 31, 1D14 
here aixl there, or a.^^erc, Tfith orders to do as much destruction 
•^^' I'id nTrito bet on the nltima^ r-pects of their 
6UCCC8S otler than psychologically, but I do thmk that thc-ro 
L every possibility eitler oi the attempt being made, or of the 
rubmaTine transports being used as a menace just as Napoleon 
us'd those " Qat bottoms?' designed to row across in a calm 
when the British warships were helpless. 
In the old days this policy led us into a vast expenditure 
on Martollo towerJand the retaining in England of thousands 
of troops which else had been sent to the Contment. Tne German 
General Stafi has studied history. 
THE BALTIC. 
There is no news whatever from the Baltic, in which a 
species of stalemate seems to obtain. The RuEsians appear to 
be employing against the Germans exactly the same tactics as 
the Gen/ans a^e using against us, and the Germans are at a 
loose end accordingly. , . .... t, vi , „f *o. 
This Russian action (or rather, inaction) is probably of far 
more value to us than we yet realise. So long as the Russians 
adhere to their present policy so long will it be impossible for 
the Germans to attempt an attack on ua— or on some of us— 
"to attack with less than fuU force would be suicide pure and 
simple. One way and another it still looks as though the Russian 
main fleet lyin" inside the harbour at Libau is the real controlling 
aKcncy. It is'probably no exaggeration (wild as it may seem 
to-day) to say that the key of the whole situation lies m the 
Baltic and with the Russian fleet. It sounds hke mcohcreiit 
prophecy : but if anyone considers the question carefully, it must 
be obvious that if Germany concentrates against us she must 
leave the bulk of her sea coast (mostly Baltic) undefended 
against an unbeaten Russian force. ., •, - j j 
Her coastline in our direction is small and heavily defended. 
In the Baltic it is large and very lightly defended. 
In the present state of affairs it is no more safe for Germany 
to abandon the Baltic than it would be for us to desert the North 
Sea Unless Germany is prepared to take abnormal risks she 
dare not attack us in force so long as the Russians are a fleet 
in being " in the Baltic. Hence the presence of German warships 
in the Aaland Islands. . 
It is dangerous to prophecy where Germany is concemeU, 
but strategically she must defeat the Russian main fleet in the 
Baltic before attempting anything serious in the North Sea. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN. 
The Adriatic continues to be the theatre of vague rumour 
and little fact to go on. So far as can be gathered, recent events 
have been very slightly in Austria's favour to date of writing 
(October 26th). We hear of submarines which have moved 
against the Franco-British force off Cattaro ; the retreat of that 
force and the sinking of two or more submarines. Little 
or nothing is officially confirmed, and I ain inclined to fancy 
that in the matter of the sunk submarines it is a case of " the 
wish being the father to the thought." A submarine stands 
very little chance of injury by gunfire from a big ship. 
The retirement is probable. It is certainly logical. There 
is no hurry about Cattaro ; no object in risking anything. The 
Austrians have but eleven submarines all told, and some of 
these are not really efiective. Six is nearer the number in the 
fighting line. The Allies can easily afiord to delay matters for 
a month if necessary till these six are destroyed, as they arc 
bound to be if they have to continue an unsupported campaign. 
Once more I would msist that as the weapon of the weaker pov.-cr 
the submarine is merely a temporary weapon. It is really the 
weapon of t/ic stronger power, and no matter what losses we 
may sufier, I, for one, am absolutely convinced that long before the 
war is over this fact will be demonstrated. The stronger power 
has always a numerical superiority In every kind of arm ; and the 
real or problematical advantage of any given weapon is discounted 
accordingly. Austrian submarines may delay the fate of Cattaro, 
but that is the utmost which they can efiect. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
Eclated ofEcial reports of the Heligoland afiair of August 
28th have now been issued. They add little to what we already 
knew, or had surmised. That little, however, is very important. 
At the time of the aSair I stated in these notes that in 
" Act II " we believed that we were getting the worst of it. 
This is very apparent from Admiral Bcatty's report. 
For the rest, the feature of prime importance is the persistent 
reference to a " largo four funnelled cruiser." This ship was 
Bubsequently reported sunk and what not ; hut none of the ships 
rjiciallij reported hy either side as s"ank had jour junnels. From 
which we must assume that either the R<>on or Yorck was out — 
in any case that the Germans were out in strength — possibly 
their battle-cruisers were not far o£E and their battle fleet no 
very great distance away. 
It now seems absolutely established that the Germans 
were in stronger force than was to have been anticipated in 
the ordinary way, and that the entire issue rested upon the 
fact that Admiral Beatty took risks and chanced everything 
to support our light division, and that on this and this alone 
our success rests. 
^^.5. 
i 
^retlzusa. and. 
I''^ Flotilla. 
O BRITISH 
W7\ GERMAN 
TO ILLUSTEATB TEBT APPF.OXIMATELT THB POSITION OF AFFAIRS 
IN THB EAELIBB STAGES OF THB BIGHT OF HELIGOLAND BATTLB. 
A brief summary of all the ofScial reports pieced together 
is as follows : — ■ 
About seven a.m. some of our destroyers, led by the 
Areihusa, sighted and chased a German torpedo-boat destroyer. 
An hour later our division founi that it had been led into a trap, 
and had rather a bad time from German cruisers — the Areihusa 
being the target of a very superior force. Coincident with this, 
our first flotilla hammered an entirely diGercnt German division, 
and sank one German (F 187). 
Subsequently, all our torpedo-boat destroyers and the 
Areihusa seem to have joined up and nothing in particular 
happened until eleven a.m., when the Germans appeared in 
superior force — the position being roughly that they had got 
far the better of the affair. So far as I can read things— their 
DJog rairL K 
ctv Light c^^^ 
-^^ 
J 
British T.B.D. anxLArethusa 
British. 
Light V 
Cruxsers \ 
I Oeruiaji suLniariitjes , 
/ 
British Battle Cruisers 
□ BRITISH 
GERMAN 
TO ILLUSTEATB THB APPEOXIMATB FOSTTTONS WHEN, EUT FOB 
ADMIRAL BKATTT's ADVANCB THKOCGH TUB EDBMARINES, THB 
BRITISH rOKCB WOULD HATB BEBN ANNIHILATED. 
armoured cruisers entered into the fray, and absolute defeat 
was assumed to be our portion. 
Our position at that time appears to have been very near 
" defeat accepted." On the other hand, the Germans having 
lost V 187 and having been hammered more than we were aware 
of, were ignorant of the advantage which they had secured, and 
11» 
