October 31, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
KOTE. — THIS AKTICLX HAS BKKS SUBMITTED TO THB PBKSS BUSaAU, WHICH DOBS NOT OBJBCT TO THa Pa3LI0ATIO» A.3 CIN30S1D 
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ABBA AND THE DOTTED LINES THE FIYE-FATHOM. 
IN THE affair known as " The Battle of the Coast " the 
German Army has clearly had an uncommonly bad 
time at the hands of our inshore gunboats. In this 
connection it is curious that these boats were built 
originally for Brazil for use in the Amazon, but for some 
•obscure reason the Brazilians tried to get out of taking them 
over. They were hesitating when this war came along, else 
the boats had left for Brazil. The boats have now shown them- 
selves of incalculable worth to us and incidentally proved how 
correct Lord Charles Beresford was, when, some years ago, he 
agitated for an " inshore squadron." There is every reason to 
believe that the entire military situation at the sea-end of the land 
campaign was entirely governed by the fire of the inshore 
squadron which, owing to its light draught, was able to creep 
into waters normally inaccessible to warships. 
These \hree boats — renamed Ilumber, Mersey, and Severn — 
displace about 1,200 tons with a draught of 8^ feet. Their 
principal armament is two 6-inch forward and a couple of 4.7 
inch Howitzers aft. It is these howitzers which rendered the 
German positions untenable, and incidentally proved that — 
•whatever may happen inland — no Power which docs not command 
the sea can accomplish anytliing on the sea coast. Hence the 
persistent efforts of the German submarines to attack. At the 
time of writing no success has attended these efforts, nor is 
much success to be expected. 
In the first place to torpedo a vessel drawing only SJ feet 
needs considerable skill, in the second place, no submarine can 
manncuvre in a couple of fathoms or less. Submerged and in 
fighting trim a submarine needs nearly as much water as a 
Dreadnought. If operating within the five fathom line she runs 
grave risks of nmning into the mud and remaining there ; or 
else slie must work more or less awash and chance the fate 
which has already befallen one German in these operations^ 
being rammed by a destroyer. 
This destruction of a submarine by our torpedo-boat destroyer 
Badger, following closely upon the loss of our £3 under mora 
or less similar conditions would seem to indicate that on both 
sides the " menace of the submarine " is no longer what it was. 
As I indicated last week, " every bane has its antidote," and there 
is now very fair reason to believe that this war wUl see the 
submarine relegated to a position of less importance than it 
occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. The difficulty 
of combating the submarine has lain in the fact that it is a new 
weapon, equal — shall we say — to the introduction of some 
equivalent to the card " joker " on to the chess board. 
As yet, of course, matters are merely in the transition stage, 
but detailed information which has become available during 
the past week, seems to demonstrate very clearly that both 
against swift moving big ships and against light draught inshore 
squadrons the submarine is, relatively speaking, rather impotent. 
This, curiously enough, was the conclusion theoretically arrived 
at by the Germans some years ago, when they refused to build 
submarines at all, and on account of which they have compara- 
tively few to-day. 
INVASION PROJECTS. 
Neutral reports continue to arrive as to the German 
" pontoons " for invasion. They are now represented as very 
large submarines designed to carry invading soldiers. 
I am inclined to attach the fullest credence to this latest 
story of the pontoons — absurd though the idea may at fi*st sight 
appear. It is an absolute bringing to date of Napoleon's " flat- 
bottomed boats." There is nothing at all impracticable in an 
unarmed submarine capable of carrying a hundred men or so for a 
short trip. 
To build enough sufficient to carry an invading army or even 
a big raiding force is impracticable. But it is practicable to 
land by submarine a hundred men — motor bicyclists probably— 
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