LAND AND WATER 
October 31, 1914 
Germans advancing on Calais can only compel the 
Allies to do this if they are pressing the Allies really 
badly to the south also. If the line B, the second 
Gennan attack, that west of Lille, could also be 
pushed still further in, then the Allied line lu front 
of Yprcs and Arraentiires would have to fall back. 
But of any such necessity there is little sign. W e 
have lost Boulcrs, but we have gained ground in front 
of Arnicnti6res. We have lost La Bassce (at the 
moment of writing apparently), but the Geman 
advance beyond it is extremely slow and is slackening 
It would seem a mathematical certainty that 
a successful Gennan advance along the sea-coast 
towards Calais was impossible until or if the Germans 
had, by sheer weight, along the main front before 
Yprcs and before Ai-menticres, pushed back the great 
body of the Allies which occupy that salient. 
Eeuiember that nearly all this is flat country ; 
that the main roads lead noiih and south, not east 
and west; that the same is true of the mam 
railways, steam tramway lines and even main water 
courses. In a word, every artificial advantage for 
taking the sea coast in flank exists, none for 
defending the flank of an advance along it, and I 
do not see hoAV it is possible to occupy that coast 
until you have first made certain that the whole 
country to the south is clear of your enemy. Of such 
a clearance there is not even a beginning to-day. 
There is the strategic argument for and against 
the German march on Calais, put as simply as the 
present writer can put it ; and I repeat what I said 
at the beginning of this passage ; it is not a soldier's 
move, it is a politician's move. There are, without 
doubt, at the German Headquarters to-day, men still 
protesting against its being attempted at all, and 
still asking for reinforcements to be sent south of 
Lille, where a real decision is still conceivably 
possible. Moreover, it seems true at this moment of 
wi-iting (Tuesday evening) that the German push 
along the sea coast has been too expensive; that 
exhaustion is already upon it, and its opponents may 
at any moment advance and reverse the whole move- 
ment. 
THE COUNTRY BETWEEN THE YSER 
CANAL AND CALAIS. 
But apart from this presumption that a confusion 
in their objective and too great an expenditure of men 
has compromised this advance, the ground between 
Yser and Calais is bad for advance in general and 
contains in particular a first rate line to hold in front 
of Calais. Let us consider the nature of this ground. 
The study in some detail of this portion of the 
field will repay the reader, though it be spared from 
attack. It is perhaps the most important piece of 
ground we have yet had to deal with ; for it is that 
upon the occupation of which the enemy are gambling 
very high and the occupation of which is directly 
intended to the hurt of this country. Fu-st of all let 
us consider the line which sufiiced for ten days' 
defence — the line of the Biver Yser, or rather of the 
canal lateral to it, which takes most of its water and 
which is the most considerable ditch in this region. 
The canal runs from Yprcs to Nieuport. 
From the town Ypres to the sea at Nieuport is 
nearly twenty-one miles. It is almost exactly twenty 
miles from the Cloth Hall at Ypres to the railway 
station at Nieuport. But the town, of Nieuport itself 
lies somewhat inland and the mouth of tlie canal is 
more than a mile beyond the town to the north. All 
the M-ay from Ypres to the sea runs this canal, 
ai'tlGcial and often straight, so far as Dixmudc, and 
after Dixmude following the contom-s of a stream which 
it has widened. The original Yser river itself or " little 
Yser " is now but a small stream lying to the west of this 
canal ; but the Avord " Yser " is often used for the canal, 
even by local people, because the canal has become the 
most important body of Avater in the neighbourhood. 
It is nowhere very deep ; there are even places 
where it is just fordable. It Avill be seen that about 
four miles north of Dixmude and about six miles 
south-east of Nieuport the caniil makes a big bend 
VOSTEND 
"MIODLEKERKS 
ST PETERS 
CAPELlB 
YPRES 
eastward. This bend is the most obvious point upon 
which the Gemians could concentrate for a crossing. 
They had of course to be attacking everywhere along 
that line in order to occupy their enemies and to 
attack other passages of the water, but the reach 
which bends thus eastAvard in a loop was their prime 
opportunity. The princiijle, as shoAvn in the 
diagram opposite, is quite clear. If an obstacle 
has to be crossed by a force A in the 
direction of the arroAv against a force B, A 
Avill naturally choose some part in the line of the 
obstacle AA'here he can most easily beat B off from the 
other side. Noav it is obvious that Avherever there is 
a re-entrant "angle towards A, in the line of the 
obstacle, there A has his best opportunity for crossing ; 
because he can, from either side of the re-entrant (at 
and C) converge fire upon the force Avhich B has sent 
into the bend to prevent the A's crossing. The forces 
of B inside the bend are in a much Avorse position 
than the forces of B at C and C on the outside of it ; 
B's fire is dispersed outAvards ; while the fire from C 
and C converges iuAvards. It is therefore always at a 
point of this kind that the chief crossing of an obstacle 
is attempted. There seem to have been two such 
attempts, the first unsuccessful, the second successful. 
The Germans coming by the roads from St. Peter's 
Chapel tried to rush, both the bridges, the one in 
front of St. George's and the other in front of 
Schoobakke, Avhile a much larger force came up from 
6* 
