LAND AND WATER 
November 7, 1914 
historically no great force has ever taken it, though 
there may have been Arab movements of which I am 
ignoi-ant; but the Roman, the Egyptian of Pagan 
iimes, the Assyrian, the Greek, and the Frenchman 
have all chosen the sea route. 
In aU this analysis of the difficulty in approach- 
ing Eoypt from Syria (and the Akaba route has 
become the more difficult as I write from the now 
reported destruction of the Akaba stores and foi-t by 
a British man-of-war), it must be remembered that 
rapid modem transport would, for small numbers, 
have no such problems to face such as I have 
mentioned. On either route right up to the neigh- 
bouriiood of the canal petrol traffic coidd move at will, 
aaid carry such armament as petrol will carry within 
a day for light vehicles, within forty-eight hours for 
heavy ones. But petrol vehicles, save in very great 
numbers, though they may seize important pouits 
ahead of an army, will not convey an army. 
I will conclude my notes this week by a thorough 
examination of a subject on which I have not yet 
touched, or touched but superficially, and which is yet 
of prime importance to the judgment of the campaign. 
I mean, the factor of wa&tage. At what rate is the 
enemy losmg men ? The reply to such a question is of 
vital consequence to the future— for other things being 
equal, numbers are the deciding factor in war, and to 
disarm your opponent — no matter how— in greater 
numbers than he disarms you is the ultimate end of 
strategy. 
ESTIMATE OF WASTAGE. 
This factor of wastage has three important 
bearings upon one's judgment of a military situation. 
First, a comparison between the wastage of one 
side and the other gives us a record of relative strength 
at various moments in the campaign. It is the only 
way of estabhshing such a record. We know at the 
beginning of a campaign how the numbers stand. 
We can only judge by some estimate of comparative 
wastage how they continue to stand as the campaign 
progresses. 
Secondly, the rate of wastage of both parties 
combined give one some power to judge the approach 
of exhaustion. Such figures are, though but a vague 
indication, yet some indication as to the maximum 
possible length of a campaign, or at any i-ate its 
maximum possible length on the scale to which it was 
planned and begun. After a certain proportion of 
waste upon both sides, though the campaign may 
drift on, it win not be what it was in its first fury. 
Thirdly, the proportion of wastage (and this is 
the most impoi-tant point) is also an indication of 
success or failure according to the type of campaign or 
action which is being fought. For instance, any one 
taking the losses by wounds, death, and capture of 
Napoleon's advance into Eussia in 1812, and con- 
trasting it with the corresponding v/astage upon the 
Russian side, would have had little in the mere 
figures to guide him as to the probable result of the 
whole movement. But when those figures were made 
alive by a consideration of the nature of the cam- 
paign, when one remembered the steadily increasing 
numerical strength of the Russians, the immense and 
as steadily increasing length of commmiications upon 
which the French depended, the bad roads, the late- 
ness of the season, &c., then one could compare. 
One could say that if the wastage had been nearly 
equal upon both sides, that was for the French a very 
bad omen indeed. 
Take a converse case : The immense wastage of 
the German armies in 1870-71. No one marking those 
figures with any judgment would have thought the case 
of Germany any the worse, at any rate up to November, 
1870. She was attacking to win at once. She was 
undergoing a very heavy strain with that du-ect 
purpose. She had undertaken many very severe 
marches. She was fighting late in the year. She 
had, after the first few weeks, no regulars against 
her. While she was fighting regulars she had 
sacrificed men without couutijig because she thought 
or knew that the blow could be driven home at once. 
But if the French had succeeded, as they so nearly 
did, in pinning the German effort in the late winter, 
then the later figures of German wastage would have 
been very significant indeed. 
Beariag these three points in mind as to the way 
in which wastage is an indication as to the trend of a 
campaign, let us try to get at approximate figures. 
Our basis for such a calculation is very crude and 
insufficient. We have to guide us nothing but the 
official Prussian lists of killed, wounded, and missing, 
the official German statements of the prisoners they 
hold, a rough — and now old — unofficial estimate of 
the German prisoners in France, British official and 
miofficial statements of loss in the British contingent, 
some knowledge of the type of fighting upon each 
side — and, for the rest, nothing but the application 
of common-sense to all these fragments. Never- 
theless such an application will lead to appreciable 
results. 
Let us begin with the German accoimt of their 
own wastage. Tlie lists of which we have hitherto 
had notice inr this country (1) apply to Prussian losses 
alone and (2) cany us no further than the middle of 
September. 
lliese lists give 36,000 kiUed, 160,000 wounded, 
and 55,000 missing. 
To con-ect these official figures with regard to 
Prussia vre have no counter check save the unofficial 
IVench estimate of 65,000 German prisoners iu France 
somewhat earlier in September. This one check, 
however, is not without its value, for it corroborates, 
roughly, the Prussian figures of missing. For the 
difference may well be German reticence in counting 
as certainly missing many who may yet (it is hoped) 
appear, and captives not notified at the moment their 
lists were made. But though we have no counter 
statistics with which to check these Prussian lists, we 
cau apply to them a general criticism which should 
enable us to arrive at tolerably accurate inferior and 
superior limits. 
For the principles of this criticism let us first 
remember that it is the characteristic of German 
oficial statements in this war at once to suppress news 
which the German Government happens to think 
weakening to its cause, and to be singularly accurate 
in the news it does publish. 
It is very important, in this connection, that we 
should not confu.'^e the various types of information 
furnished by German agency to the world. There 
is plenty of German falsehood, some of it fantastic. 
But the falsehood is calculated and organised. There 
aie, as it were, zones of information. The Germaa 
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