LAND AND WATEE 
November 7, 1914 
stream, altliougli such crossings had been actually 
accomplished in more than one pliice. . ,, r, l 
Since this throwing back of the line in the tirst 
Eussian successes, the Eussian pursuit has been 
methodical and contmuous. It is ridiculous to use 
the word " rout " of the German retreat, which lias 
been orderly, and in which everything essential 
has been saved, which apparently has lost no very 
larsjo body in prisoners compared with its size, and 
wliich still maintains a perfectly intact _ formation. 
But though it is an orderly i-ctreat, it is a retreat 
none the less, and one which renders more and more 
certain as it proceeds the fate of the campaign m 
the East. 
It is here that the importance of the fighting 
upon, and afterwards \\est of, the middle Vistula 
appears, and the subordination of the effort further 
east along the San to this mam effort of the Austro- 
Germans. For, as the Austro-Germans fall back 
westward and south-westward, it becomes clear that 
the eastern effort cannot be prolonged. The line is 
still intact, and beyond Sandomir is continued up tlie 
San Valley ; but all the north-wTstem portion of it is 
bending backwards and farther back towards the 
south, and the prolongation of such a strain upon the 
main forces of the enemy by the Eussians must 
involve the withdrawal of the Austrian forces opera- 
ting further south to the east. If these were to 
maintain their positions (they can hardly hope to 
advance — and even advance would be of no value) the 
line would ultimately find itself bent into a bow from 
Cracow, along the Vistula, and then up the San. It 
would not even be covering Silesia — the keeping of 
the Eussians out of which, much more than the 
keeping .of them out of Galicia, is the prime object 
of the German Empire in this field. One may put 
the matter diagi-amaticaUy thus : — 
If the shaded portion S represents Silesia, then 
the Eussian pressure has already bent back the 
northern joi'^'on of the Austro-German line and 
is bending it back further still. From W X P 
(Warsaw, Sandomu* — at X — Przemysl), which was 
occupied nearly three weeks ago, the Austro-German 
line is bent back to L X P (Lodz, Sandomir, Przemysl). 
Should it be bent back to C X P (Cracow, Sandomir, 
Przemysl) Silesia would be uncovered, and any Eussian 
success between X and P (the Eussians can throw 
their perpetually arriving reinforcements where they 
choose) would be not only the r*in of Silesia but of 
the whole Austro-German line. It seems certain 
therefore that such a line as A B, falling back again 
to A D, will be the result of the Eussian pressure. 
But in order to maintain such a line the Austrian 
eastern advances in Galicia, now holding X P, will 
have to fall back first to B, and then to D. 
It is therefore upon this continual advance of the 
Eussians from the middle Vistula south-westward, and 
the as continual retreat of the Germans and Austrians 
before them in this region, that the fate of the 
campaign depends ; for it involves with it an ultimate 
retii-ement from the San and from East Galicia as well. 
How far this retirement has proceeded at the 
moment of writing (Tuesday evening) the Eussian 
official news informs us. The main German bodies 
are out of Lodz, though we have no news as yet that 
this town is occupied by the cavalry of the Eussian 
pursuit. Piotrokow is apparently entu-ely abandoned 
by the enemy, and already occupied by the Eussian 
advanced cavalry. So is Opocsno. So is Osowiecs, 
and apparently even Opatow, though here there has 
been strong resistance. Sandomir is still the pivot of 
this great retreat. 
The whole thing singularly resembles the corres- 
ponding German failure in the West, generally called 
the Battle of the Marne — with Lodz to stand for 
Soissons and Sandomir for the pivot at Verdun. But 
there is this difference : that the marching wing or 
extreme of the retreating enemy's hue has had to go 
more than double the distance it had to go in France, 
and, much more important, with the inability of the 
enemy so far to make a stand. For there is this great 
difference between the German retreat through 
Eussian Poland from in front of Warsaw and the 
German retreat through north-east France from in 
front of Paris — that the pursuers greatly outnumber 
the pursued, and that the numbers of the pursuers axe 
increasing every day. Wlien von Kluck turned back 
from in front of Paris on the discovery of Joffi-e's 
reserves, he carried with him indeed the whole 
German line as far as Verdun. It all had to fall back. 
But the troops that pressed it back ^through Chateau 
Thierry and Vitry were less in number than the 
troops they were pursuing. It was possible for the 
majority that was retreating to spare men for the 
preparation of a position, to rally there, and to begin 
a prolonged resistance. A corresponding resistance 
has not yet taken place in Poland, and it is the whole 
object of this methodical Eussian pursuit, compara- 
tively small as its results in men and material captui-ed 
have yet been, to prevent such a resistance. Only the 
future will show whether it has been found possible 
to prevent it or no. 
Meanwhile an exceedingly important point, upon 
which judgment must be held in suspense, is, tcJiether 
i/i tJiis pursuit the Russians have managed to divide those 
v)hom they are pursuing into two separate bodies. ^If 
they have, a very great deal has been accomplished. 
Certain unofficial telegrams maintain that they have 
done so ; but I cannot, from a study of the map, see 
that the trick has really been done. VvTiat that 
separation would mean, and how it might be effected, 
may be grasped from the next diagram. 
Here is an army in two portions, A and B, 
retreating in front of another army, also divided into 
two portions, E and F. It has right across its retreat 
an obstacle M N, which separates its two portions 
A and B. It has further two great avenues of com- 
munication along which its retreat is facilitated, 
(1) and (la), both leading to C. But from (1) a 
secondary avenue of communication (2) diverges 
towards K. A — B is divided by the natural obstacle 
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