November 14, 1914 
LAND AND WATEK 
against the coast, wliile the British ships were silhouetted against 
the sunset. Both squadrons then steamed south, gradually- 
approaching each other. The Germans fired at long range and 
missed. The Good Hope did not reply till the range was about 
6,000 yards (roughly 3J land miles). 
The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (incidentally the Scharnhorst 
has for years held the German gunnery record) concentrated 
first on the Good Hope, and then having disabled her, on tho 
Monmouth. 
Both the range and the weather conditions were such that 
the affair was necessarily one of big guns. 
The forces engaged were as follows: — 
Bkitish. 
Good Hope 2 9-2, 16 C-in. 
Monmouth 14 G-in. 
Glasgow 2 C-in, 10 4-m. 
GKSMAir. 
Scharnhorst 8 8-2, 6 C-in. 
Gneisenau 8 82, 6 C-io. 
Leipzig 10 41-in. 
Kurnberg 10 41-ia. 
The respective broadsides work out as follows : — 
British. German. 
2 9-2 12 8-2 
19 C-in. 6 C-in. 
6 4-in. 10 4-ia. 
Which makes twenty-six British against twenty-eight German 
guns. Translated into approximate terms of relative value, 
whereby (very roughlj^) each 4 in = 1, each 6 in. ■= 2, each 8.2 = 
4, and each 9.2 = 5, we get a paper value of about fifty -three 
British to seventy German. 
But this paper value is absolutely worthless for comparative 
purposes, because owing to the weather conditions only upper 
deck guns could be fought. 
Consequently the effective broadsides work out as follows : — 
Big 
Medium 
SmaU 
Beitish. 
2 9-2-im 
9 G-io. 
6 4-in. 
Gkrmas. 
12 8-2-iii. 
None. 
10 4-ia. 
Six inch guns, however, are practicallj- useless over 4,000 
yards, and 4,500 is understood to have been the smallest range. 
So, only the big gims really counted. The Monmouth probably 
merely represented a target. Whether she did or did not, the 
relative real fighting values were approximately forty-eight 
German to ten British, or if we take it in weight of metal per 
broadside, really effective at the range, 2,904 lb. German to 
760 lb. British — say, 4 to 1 instead of about 5 to 1. 
Therefore, even assuming equal skill at gunnery, the result 
was a foregone conclusion. As things were, however, it was 
the crack gunnery squadron of the German Navy against British 
ships manned mostly by reservists. The odds against Admiral 
Cradock can, therefore, in a perfectly sober estimate, be put at 
10 to 1 at least ; and for once in a way the headlines of the half- 
penny press about " fearful odds " are literally true ! 
Pending further information it is undesirable to inquire as 
to why Admiral Cradock " asked for trouble." My own surmise 
is tliat he did not ask ; that the Germans caught him, not he the 
Germans, and that questions as to " Why was the Canopus 
absent 1 " are ill-timed. 
The Germans have obtained a very material victory — it is 
folly to deny it. They have obtained it by precisely the same 
means which we employed in the Bight of Heligoland — by 
irresistible odds. Elsewhere in this article I have suggested that 
just as the moral victory of Heligoland was German, so here in 
this Chilian affair the ultimate moral result may be in our favour. 
Hitherto we have always had the crushing superiority which 
long ago Admiral Sir Cloudeslcy Shovell described as the only 
real recipe for victory. In the affair off Chile the tables were 
turned. Our officers and men proved themselves every whit as 
game— and perhaps a little more so — than did the Germans in 
the Bight of Heligoland affair. 
I do not wish to elaborate my peculiar views imduly, so here 
for the present I will leave the matter, save to reiterate my 
opinion that the battle of Coroncl will ultimately prove to have 
been a result in our favour. 
Modern warfare is essentially a matter of moral effect. It 
has nothing to do with the sinking of ships, but only with the 
way in which men fight in those ships. That is the essence of 
" new conditions." 
THE NORTH SEA. 
On November the 3rd a German squadron made a raid into 
the North Sea. 
Shots were fired off Yarmouth and Lowestoft, aimed 
apparently at nothing in particular — at any rate, no damage 
was done to anything or anj-body by this " bombardment of the 
coast defences." 
In the course of these operations the British gunboat Halcyon 
was discovered and a hundred rounds fired at her. Only two 
hits were registered, and the damage done by these was trivial. 
From which, seeing that the Halcyon was at anchor we can in the 
first place deduce very bad shooting, and in the second place 
gather that presumably only small guns were fired at her. 
The Halcryon was able to call up assistance, but the Germans 
did not wait for any action. They retreated, dropping mines 
astern, and our submarine Do, striking one, was destroyed. 
In Germany this raid has been received with extraordinary 
enthusiasm, altogether out of importance with the results. As 
to why the raid was made, there is some obscurity. Considerable 
risks were run both in coming and returning, and in connection 
with the return the armoured cruiser YorcJc was lost. 
According to the German official statement the Yorch 
accidentally struck a German mine at the mouth of the Jahde, 
but there is a suspicion that the mines were laid by us or that she 
was submarined. Probably, however, the German official 
statement is correct]; they would hardly attribute to their own 
mismanagement anything which could be put down to the enemy. 
Be that all as it may, however, the Yorck has been sunk with 
the loss of about half her crew, and the loss is more serious than 
the intrinsic value of the ship as a fighting unit. As a unit she 
was somewhat superior to our Monmouth, though of slightly less 
displacement. Her armament was 4 8.2, 10 6 inch as against the 
14 6 inch of the Monmouth. The armour in both cases was the 
same — 4 inches. Both were of about equal date, but beyond 
that differed radically ; the Yorck being gunned at the expense 
of speed (she could barely do 21 knots), while the Monmouth was 
given speed (23 to 24 knots) at the expense of guns. 
Where the blow falls Ijeaviest on Germany is that she has 
lost another cruiser out of a fleet already badly depleted by the 
detaching of several of these vessela for commerce warfare and 
the losses inflicted by our ships at Heligoland. A fleet without 
^ernxan^ 
fvcvt^^ 
MAP TO IKDICATI TH« APPROXIKATB ABEA Oy THB NOETH SEA 
MOW PaOHIBmD BT THE ADMIBALTT, 
sufficient cruisers is more or less blind, and it is also in heavy 
danger from destroyer attack. Consequently we could well do 
with many more German " raids " — provided they reproduced 
the one in question. 
Thus, for the German loss. We have now to consider the 
German gain. The only material advantage that I can see is 
that they have learned something of our defensive arrangements 
and sunk one of our submarines. But as this was purely a 
matter of chance, they can no more claim it as a result secured 
than we can put in a similar claim for the Yorck. The damage 
done to the Halcyon is trivial ; for that matter, had they sunk her 
it would have been no advantage worth mention. 
Matters, therefore, are reduced to the moral advantage. 
Here the Germans believe that they have scored heavily ; but 
between belief and fact there is occasionally a great gulf fixed. 
As a matter of fact — except in so far as it may cheer up their 
own men — this raid appears to me as a bad moral defeat for tho 
Germans, and that quite outside the loss of the Yorck. 
Their moral loss is three-fold. In the first place, the raid 
entirely failed to create any panic, which was obviously what it 
was primarily intended to accomplish. 
18» 
