October 10, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
Belgium is the active pursuit of the Siege of Antwerp 
by the enemy. 
In France, two districts claim our attention — 
the ona upon the extreme East wing, round about 
Verdun, and the Toul — Verdun fortified line, and 
^\j-gonne, where a German offensive has for the 
naoment failed ; the other — the decisive point — the 
extreme Western wing. West of the Oise and North 
of the Somme, of -wiiich we are as yet told very 
little indeed, but where a series of violent actions, the 
decision in which may come at any moment, are 
l>eing fought from Eoye right up to the Belgian 
fi-ontier. 
To take these in their order — 
THE OPERATIONS BETWEEN 
ARGONNE AND LORRAINE. 
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"^%VAR£NN£S 
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MENEHOUWK V- ; 
REVICNY 
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lO JO 
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w. 
The operations in the field which comprises 
the Ai^nne, Verdun, St. Mihiel, and the AVoeuvre 
AvUl have no meaning for us until we can grasp 
some general object the enemy has in mind. 
They can hardly be desiiltory and disconnected 
actions, as at first sight they appear to be ; that 
is not the way of any soldier, least of all of German 
soldiers. 
In my notes of a week ago I pointed out the 
difficulty of determining the motive of the enemy in 
establishing a bridge head over the Meuso at St. 
Mihiel. If he was not able or did not intend to 
advance in force through this gap in the Toul — Verdun 
line of fortifications, why was he at the pains of 
occupying a dangerous salient and of reducing two 
strong permanent works and of attempting, under 
heavy loss (and failing), to establish himself upon the 
other side of the river ? The Germans having opened 
that door have not used it. I said that if they were 
not intending an advance in force through this door 
they had opened — if they had not men enough in that 
region to mask Toul and Verdun and at the same 
time to pour a large force straight on to Eevigny — 
then they could only be attempting a diversion, 
and the whole thing must be regarded as a feint, 
undertaken in the hopes of relicNdng the increasing 
pressure on their M-est wing out beyond the Oise. 
But there is another possibility which would also 
account for those attacks which take place on the 
west side of the Mouse with such regularity and with 
equal regularity fail, and that third possibility is the 
hope or the intention of investing Verdun. It may 
well be that the German General Staff, which has had 
to change its major plans already twice, and must have 
to change details in those plans continually, have 
more than onoe determined that the fall of the great 
frontier fortress line was essential to their success and 
more than once hesitated before the task in view of 
the heavy reinforcement required upon the right vring 
beyond the Oise. Hesitation and fluctuation of tliis 
sort would account for nearly all that has happened. 
The idea that Verdim must be invested, the beg:innin£r 
of that task, its abandonment under pressure from the 
west, then its being taken up again AviU accoimt for 
most or all of wliat has happened in this region. It 
accounts for the attack on the fort at Troyon to the 
south of Verdun before the German retreat began. 
Indeed in those days — ^the second week of September — 
the investment of Verdun was 0}X!nly put for\^'ard as an 
objective in the German official communiques. The 
Cro^^Ti Prince's Army, which was princijially occupied 
in this task and which had its headquarters at Ste. 
Menehould, was compelled to fall back as far as 
Varennes in the general retreat of the Gennan line 
imposed by Von Kluck's peril : the retirement wliich 
goes by the name of the Battle of the Marne. But 
after the Crown Prince's Army had thus retreated the 
counter offensive was attempted several times, and 
both these counter attacks undertaken by the Crown 
Prince from the sides of the Argonne down south on 
to the French positions west of Verdun, and the 
subsequent advance fi*om Thiaucoui-t on to the 
Meuse at St. Mihiel, were presumably combined 
actions liairing for their common object the isolation 
of Verdun. 
The last of these numerous strokes to fail has 
been that of the Crown Prince on Saturday and 
Sunday last and of this the sketch map below gives 
the details. 
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MONTFAUCON 
VARENNES 
While an unsuccessful attempt was being made to 
force the Mouse at St. Mihiel and so isolate Verdun 
from the east, the Crown Prince's Army acting from 
Montfaucon and the open region North of Varennes 
