LAND AND WATER 
October 10, 1914 
kas to fear is a reduction of dividends during the war, and antici- 
pation that once the war is over over-sea trade will be resumed as 
nsnal. They do not believe in the permaacnt capture by us of 
GciTuan markets. 
In this connection a series of remarkable articles which recently 
appeared in The Engineer took a somewhat similar view, that 
ie to say, it was very clearly proved, chapter and verse, that 
unless our traders adopt German methods — and supply what 
customers want without regard to whether it is the best thing 
for them, and take to the metric system for all ti-ansaetions with 
countries usin? it— our capture of German markets will be 
temporarily only. 
This, I am afraid, is much more important than any successes 
fro or con in the commerce war now proceeding on the high seas. 
It is advisable to remember that our cruisers on the 
Indian Station have been busy seeing to it that Indian troops 
get to the front without let or hindrance. This they have done, 
and discounted the Emdeii's efforts to that extent. Had she 
managed to intercept a single transport, it would, so far as 
material effect is concerned, have counted a great deal more 
than the sinking of even a hundred British merchant ships. 
.Morally the Emden has done extremely wefl, hut she has failed 
to interjere Kith the transport of Indian troops to France. She 
bas won with the pennies, but lost with the poimds. It is the 
pounds that count most. 
GENERAL SURVEY. 
On land something like a " stale mate " seems to exist. On 
the water the position is not materially different. This kind of 
eitaation caimot, however, go on indefinitely. 
My reading of the whole situation, at the time of going to 
press, is that on land we have secured a mild advantage, but that 
on the water a similar mild advantage rests with the enemy. Hia 
predatory cruisers are now remarkably well handled, and, unless 
luck be with us, we must be prepared for heavy losses before the 
corsairs are accounted for. They come from the unknown, they 
inflict damage, then they vanish into the unknown. 
The object, of course, is to create panic in our overseas trade. 
This so far they have failed to accomplish. But the attempt is 
none the less serious on that account. 
In everything it is now abundantly clear that Gennan strategy 
is to face the British Navy with the virtually impossible, and 
trust to it that a non-teclmical democracy, finding the impossible 
unachieved, will compel a " show " naval policy instead of a 
certain one. 
The only possible comment is that the German strategy is 
excessively clever, and, given a few more Emdens, it may succeed. 
The precise German target is the underwriters of Lloyd's. 
On land the war is being waged by indiscriminate slaughter. 
On the water finer issues are at stake. The Germans have dis- 
carded all ideas of direct money-making by captures ; everything 
is concentrated on the creation of a trade panic by losses inflicted 
on us. 
This particular campaign is deliberate and well calculated. I 
view it with grave misgivings. The Germans have tricked us into 
beheving that we hold the imquestioned mastery of the seas. 
Now, any number of their cruisers are contesting it on Alabama 
lines. In their doing of it they have scored a goal against us. 
It is folly to minimise that goal. They have far too many agents 
in our midst ready to cry, " Go up to Ramoth-Gilead and prosper." 
The problem before our guardian cruisers is a very heavy one. 
It is practically seeking for the needle in a bundle of hay. And 
it is imperatively necessary to find that needle ! 
We shall find it ; but the naval work entailed is enormous. 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
KOTE. — TUIS ASTICLB HAS BZ£N SCBJIITIED TO TUB FRSSS BUBEAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBUCATION AS CENSOEED 
AND TAKBS NO EESPONSIBnm POB THE COaBECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS. 
AERIAIj news this week is somewhat chaotic. It 
mostly consists on the German side of vague 
bomb dropping — chiefly from dirigibles. The 
general result has been the expenditure of the 
maximum of bombs with the minimmn of effect. 
So far as can be gathered, the Germans, having found it well 
nigh impossible to hit any particular desired object, have given 
up this particular aspect of the air campaign, and arc now 
seeking to create a reign of terror by indiscriminate bombs 
dropped anywhere where habitations exist. 
Aly reading of this circumstance is that the Germans have 
foimd that they had over-calculated as to their '" aerial menace," 
and that they have subsequently panicked more or less. Nothing 
worth mention can possibly be achieved against non-combatants. 
The more that German aircraft attack these the greater we can 
put down their failure at. 
For the rest, British aeroplanes continue to make German 
aeroplane enterprise undesirable. The '" shortage of petrol " 
story is being repeated with variations of a quite realistic nature, 
but every indication is to the effect that we have secured the 
command of the air and that " petrol shortage " is merely a 
convenient exeuse. 
There is a fair amount of evidence that we have taken on the 
air as part of our heritage. For example, the official report of 
the replacement of a propeller blade in mid-air by some of the 
crew of one of our dirigibles—name not disclosed. It does not 
mean anything very special, but it d-ocs spell efficiency. 
Germany's great air effort is yet to come. But to misquote 
an old Armada statement of Drake's, " We have singed the 
Kaiser's moustache," and if and when the Gennan aerial Ai-mada 
docs appear we can rest fairly confident that Wilhem II. of 
Ocnnany will fare Uttle better than Philip 11. of Spain did in 1588. 
It is interesting to note that exactly the same elements are 
present. On the German side we have the same vague threats, 
the same vague stories of invincibihty ; the same vague appeal 
to the Deity. On our side we have the same casual confidence, 
the same individual confidence, the same conviction that wo 
are mostly faced with bluff. 
Personaliy, I think that there will be the same sequel. But, 
sooner or later, I do think that the air invasion will come, and 
we will be very ill-advised to treat it as an empt^ threat. Foot- 
ball has replaced bowls as a popular sport.. Let us go on playin" 
football a la Drake at bowls. But let us take Germany's con^ 
templated aerial A rmada as .seriously as our Elizabethan ancestors 
took the Great Armada of PhiEp of Spain. 
This Armada will not sail till it is very numerous and till 
certainty of success seems clear on paper. To put the fear of 
God into the civil population will, of course, be the principal 
objective ; no very real damage is likely to be achieved. Moral 
effect will be everything. 
The trial before us is probably no light one. London may well 
have to suffer several chapters of the " Book of the Revelation." 
We have no airships to meet a determined German airship attack. 
On our aeroplanes and on our aeroplanes only will victory 
depend. It is of the utmost importance that all concerned are- 
ready to meet this German aerial Armada in the same spirit as our 
Elizabethan Ancestors faced a similar crisis. 
After we have faced it and beaten it will be quite time enough 
to make songs about it. 
Perhaps the most interesting aerial exploit of the week is 
the circumstance that an Italian aeroplane has succeeded in 
locating several Austrian mines. No similar success has been 
recorded in our own latitudes, nor can we hope too much that 
it will be. Our home waters are far more turbid and far less 
smooth than the placid Adriatic. 
All the same, however, this matter is of the greatest 
siguineance. Once aeroplanes can be tangibly employed 
to detect things under water, a great step will have been 
made towards defeating submarine warfare whether fixed or 
mobile. 
For the rest, it would appear that our aeroplanes employed 
in the land warfare are using bombs more freely than at first, 
and that they are well in advance of the Germans in this par- 
ticular phase of aerial warfare. 
Loss and damage from the air is likely enough to befall ns 
sooner or later, but all the indications are that we hold the 
upper hand. 
Given that isolated hostile successes count for nothing what- 
ever. So far as can be gau|;ed, serious aerial warfare is bound to 
mean heavy losses on either side, with victory only to the sido 
which aggregates best, possibly only to the side which has any- 
thing left over after a definite clash. 
The air is still a quite novel battlefield. But in so far as 
the results of the present war can teach us anything, they teach 
Ihat the human element is the determinating factor even more 
in the air than on the water or under the water. 
In the past we have been told ad nauseam that war to-day is 
a " matter of m.aehiuery." Everything seems to indicate that 
With the very latest appliances the human clemcut counts for 
more and more. 
U* 
