OctoW 3, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
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German line protecting the Oise Communications 
French line attacking same about Tuesday last 
roerrioss on thb irBsr, iLLuarrEATixo th» captubb or 
FEBONNS AND ATTACK ON I.ASSiaNT. 
from it that line Avliich feeds Laon and then goes 
south itself. It is this line by which munitions are 
brought along the German front after they have come 
by the main German railway line of communication 
down the Oise. 
Unfortunately Tergnier lies in a bay or recess 
of tlic general line which the Germans are holding at 
tliis point to defend their communications ; and it 
will probably be reached later than other more salient 
points ujjon that line, such as Noyon itself, or St. 
Quentin. Tlie holding of the main line and of the 
Oise north of Tergnier would be of great effect — even 
of decisive effect — for it would compel a general 
German retirement back north from the defensive 
position now held to the south along the Aisne. But 
the captiu'e of Tergnier, where all the roads, rail- 
ways, and waterways cross and branch, would be even 
more than decisive : it would be vital. 
(Passage deleted by Censor.) 
that the extreme point of German occupation on 
Tuesday last came as far as Chaulnes. 
(Pas.sage deleted by Censor.) 
The nature and value of this turning movement 
round by the Gennan right, upon which aU eyes are 
now fixed, is best apparent when we remember that 
the line of the Oise and the railway following it is 
the main artery of supply by which the whole main 
German defensive position along the Aisne and across 
Champagne lives. 
In the notes of more than one student of this 
campaign it has been remarked tliat, even if the 
enemy abandons St. Quentin and Noyon and crosses 
the Oi.se, he will find upon the further eastern or left 
bank another series of positions of wooded hills which 
he shovdd be able to maintain at great length. But 
those who put forward this hypothesis, though it 
proves them to have followed the map, forget that the 
whole strength of the German defen.sive position 
depends upon its heavy artillery. The munition of 
that heavy artilleiy, and, for that matter, the retirement 
of it, makes the chief line of railway up to Belgium a 
necessity, and therefore, if the enemy loses the line 
of the Oise, down Avhich that railway runs, he will 
have lost everything. On that very account, the 
fighting for the line of the Oise has been the fierce 
and hai'dly contested thing we have been reading of 
for more than ten days past. The Germans know 
that upon holding it the life of their army depends ; 
tlic French know that upon their reaching it victory 
for them depends. 
If the reader will look at the above map he will 
note the junction of Tergnier. It is a point of very 
liigh strategic importance, and that for several reasons. 
In the first place, it is the junction not only between 
two main lines, but also lietween two systems, each 
with its separate orgaTiisation — the railway company 
called the Nord and the railway company called the 
'E)it. Next, because it lias workshops and repairing 
sheds, and is in every way (so far as the Frencli 
retreat left it intact) a depot for railway material. 
Ijastly, because there runs southward and eastward 
There is another feature in the main Gei-man 
communications at this point which has been a good 
deal neglected in the Press of both countries, and is 
well worth examining. This is the canal running 
along the valley of the Oise and connecting it with 
quite the upper reaches of the Somme near St. Quentin, 
and fuither prolonged so as to connnect the Oise with 
the Aisne. The branch from the Oise to the Aisne is 
undoubtedly supplying the German line on the 
plateau of Soissons. We know by the experience 
of the battle of Meaux that the barges upon the canals 
have been very lai'gely used by the enemy for the 
transport of ammunition. Further, a canal in a flat 
country will probably have been subjected to less 
damage during the retreat Avhen the Allied armies 
were falling back from Mons over this countiy than 
a railway. To carry the line of the Oise would be 
not only to carry the main line communication with 
Belgium and with the bases in Germany : it woiild 
also be to carry the canal communication, and to cut 
two arteries at once. 
THE NEW GERMAN OFFENSIVE 
ON THE MEUSE. 
So much then for the turning movement round 
by the West of the main German defensive position 
and of its progress to the present date. 
But as I have already said, there is a new 
element before us in the success the Germans have 
had during this week at the other end of the whole of 
this theatre of war, when they silenced certain forts 
in the centre of the chain between Toul and Verdun, 
and here began crossing the Mouse. 
Before I deal with that eastern movement in any 
detail, however, it will be well to point out how it 
stands relatively to the western turning movement by 
which the Fi'ench are threatening the Germans along 
the Oise. 
The German advance across the Meuse (as sho^vn 
in diagram on the following page) after breaking the 
Toul- Verdun line would obviously involve, if it were 
pressed far enough and with sufficient strength, a 
rapid and general retirement of the French and 
English line between the Oise and the Meuse : for 
it would come in behind the right wing of that line. 
But it would not be of such vital ill- consequence to 
the Allies, however successful it should prove to be. 
