LAND AND WATER 
October 3, 1914 
-withdraw forces they really need elsewhere, (2) a 
serious effort to turn the Allied right and establish 
those new short and convenient lines of communica- 
tion direct to Germany through Mvtz and Strasburg 
which Avoiild greatly increase the strength of the 
German Army. 
In other words, eil/ier the Germans are here 
attempting no more than to turn off the attention of the 
Allies from the Oise, to make them nervous about theii- 
extreme eastern flank, and to make them withdraw 
men from the west (where the chief peril to tlie 
German Army now Ues) ; or, they are intending— 
with larger masses than we had supposed to bo present 
— a very serious operation : pushing in between Toul 
and Verdun, taking or masking these fortresses, and 
so threatening the rear of the French line between 
Eheims and Argonne that it will be compelled to fall 
back. With it will then fall back, as rapidly, and perhaps 
Avith disaster, the troops on the Upper Moselle — that is, 
in the region of Nancy and facing the Yosges. 
It is further evident, as I have said, that the 
success of the lesser object might very well lead to 
the prosecution of the more serious one. 
Though the thing Avas begun as a feint in order 
to distract the Allies and to make them withdraw 
men from the west, yet if it went through successfully 
it might assume such importance that it would be 
worth the German while to bring men round to this 
eastern point upon the ^leuse, to push forward 
threatening the rear of the Allies, and to make the 
whole of the French line now in Champagne between 
llheims and the Argonne fall right back, dragging 
Avith it all the troops now in the IMoselle valley soutli 
of and beyond Toul. 
The elements of the business should be clear 
from the following diagram : 
Here you have the Allied line A^ — B, with the 
German line in contact with it E — F. These stretch 
from east to west right across from the Eiver Oise to 
the forest of Argonne. To the right or east of these 
two lines you have a German force G — H of unknown 
size proposing to get through the parallel opposed 
by Verdun— V and Toul— T and the forts XXX 
between them. It is evident that if this German 
force G— H could get to M before the Allied Ime had 
turned back to save itself, that Gennan force G — H 
Avould have turned the Allied line and would have 
brought its right wing to disaster. If, therefore, 
G — II is iu sufficient force to go forward and if he 
has^ not in fi-ont of him at K — L French forces 
sufficient to stop him, he can at the most destroy the 
right wing of the Allies, and, at the least, compel it to 
fall back from A — B where it now lies to say A 0. 
But if the Allied bne should fall back on to 
^I — N it Avould leave the remaining French armies, 
1'— Q. which are watching the region of Toul— t' 
and Nancy — N, and the Upper Moselle Valley — Z, 
separated from their fellows and doomed. Therefore, 
to avoid disaster these armies also, P — Q, Avould have 
to fall back to some such jjosition as S — T, and the 
general result Avould be, after a German success of this 
kind, not only that the Avhole mass of the French Army, 
east of Bhcims at least, Avould have been thi-ust risht 
aAvay from the frontier and have suffered all the 
consequences of a rapid retreat, but also that the 
Germans Avould, after their success, be able to use the 
ncAV great lines of communication, X X — Y Y, which 
had hitherto been blocked to them from the fact that 
their tAvo chief railways, fj-om Metz the one, from 
Strasburg the other, run through Verdun — V and 
Toul — T respectively. 
We may sum up this first point, then, our 
conjecture as to the object of the German move, by 
saying that it is either a movement in force designeel 
to threaten the right rear of the general French line, 
to isolate and force back the French armies on the 
Upper Moselle and to establish new and much better 
lines of communication from the German bases to 
the German armies in the field ; or it is a feint, 
undertaken as yet Avith no sufficient force, intended 
only to distract the French commanders so that 
they shall Avithdraw troops from the Avest Avhere 
the existing German communications are in peril. 
But Ave may add that if the insufiicient forces, 
used merely for a feint have rapid and unexpected 
success, it may be Avortli the German while to 
reinforce them and turn the feint into a serious 
effort. 
Such being the only possible alternatives, the 
only possible two objects the Germans have in making 
their new nioA'e, let us next consider what forces they 
can use to achieve either the one object or the other. 
If their purpose be only a feint, a comparatively 
small force would be sufficient. One-tenth of their 
total effectives in line between Alsace and Picardy 
Avould do the business — say six divisions or a little 
more. With these they could maintain the defensive 
Avhich they have so carefully prepared in the difficult 
Yosges country ; and they could fend off dm-ing the 
days in Avhich the feint Avas in progress, even if no 
longer, attficks from the gamsons of Vei-dun and of 
Toul down from the north and up from the south 
of tlieir forward western movement. 
The reduction of the forts upon the j\Ieuso 
• — the opening of a breach through the ban-ior does 
not affect this discussion — it Avould have had 
to be done anyhow, Avhether for a feint or for a 
serious effort. 
It was not a question of numbers, but of the 
poAver of the big howitzers against modern fortifi- 
cation ; and the piercing of the line by the silencing 
of the forts, though a necessary preliminary to the 
success of such a feint, is not in itself equivalent to 
the success even of that feint, let alone of a serious 
bloAv. It may be compared to the forcing of a door in 
a wall Avlien you have some unknown number of 
opponents on the other side of the door after it is 
forced, and two bodies of opponents to the right and 
to the left of the door to threaten your men as they 
go through. You have opened the door as a ruse to 
distract or really intending to go through — but you 
have done no more. 
If, therefore, the Germans have not collected 
here any considerable mass of men (" considerable " 
as the Avord may be used in the present gigantic 
campaign — for forces that Avould have been great 
arniies in the past are to-day but fractions of the 
millions engaged), if, I say the Germans have not 
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