LAND AKD WATEE 
September 2G, 1914 
German defensive licre ; but that defensive has not 
found itself eompellcd by the pressure in front of it to 
remain so far buck. . 
The Germans have found themselves sufficiently 
strong immediately in front of llheims to retrace their 
stepslmd to advance well across the Suippe, and to 
lieights that now thi-eaten the great town itself. 
The positions occupied by the Gennans after the first 
week's efforts, successes, and failures is represented by 
the dotted line which in its sinuosity with its recesses 
and salients marks the progress of the Allies and the 
coiTcsponding points where the German counter-offen- 
sive of the Germans has succeeded and the Allies 
have fallen back. 
NO YON 
COMPIEGNE 
86 MiUs 
I 
80 8^<>tg 
VJ 
THE DOTTED LINE, IXDICATINO THE PEESENT APPEOXIMATE VOUITIOS OV THE GERJIAN ARMIES, SHOWS HOW THE TUKNlXa MOVEMEST 
HOUND NOTON WILL COMl'EL A GKNEEJL GEEMAN KETIKEMEXT FKOM TUB ILATEAU OF SOlSbONS. 
"We shall not understand the whole of these 
operations — Avhich may prove decisive, so far at least 
as the first part of the great campaign in France is 
concerned — unless Ave grasp the fact that the Germans 
in the course of the past week attempted, a/id tvere 
partial/^ successful in, a strong counter-offensive in 
this region, which they themselves describe as their 
" centre." 
I shall have occasion Avith this " Eheims " 
limb of the defensive German line (as in the case of 
the first, or Soissons, limb) to discuss the matter in 
more detail later ; but for the moment I Avould beg 
the reader to note the tAvo groujis of heights which 
stand Avell South of the Suippe and close in the 
neighbourhood of Eheims. The one, called the 
height of Brimont, is marked A upon the sketch at 
the head of this ; the other, the heights of Nogent 
and Pompelle, stand right doAvn to the Vcsle, and are 
marked B and C. 
The German counter-offensive in this region was 
so successful during the days Thursday, the 17th, and 
Friday, the 18th of September, that it advanced thus 
near to Eheims, put up heavy artillery on these 
heights, and at the end of the movement (by the 
Saturday, the 19th) Avas m a position gravely to 
imperil the monuments of the town, to bombard it, and 
to malce the position of the French Avithin and to 
Bouth of it exceedingly difficult to hold. 
This successful counter-offensiA-e of the Germans 
just round Eheims Avas not continued throughout the 
Avhole length of this second limb. When one gets 
fm-ther east on to the Upper Suippe Valley (it is 
hardly a valley but rather a A'ery shalloAv depression in 
the naked plain of Champagne) the French offensive 
was in these same days successful in its turn and 
])ushed back the Germans from the line Souain- 
Le-Mesnd-le-Hurlus-Massiges, which they had taken 
up, and threatening a certain railway Avhich, when we 
come to details, we shall see to be of great hnpoi-tance 
to the whole German position. In this advance the 
h rench captured a battalion. 
We may sum up and say that by the end of the 
third week in September, Sunday, the 20th, after this 
imdecided defensive action of the Germans had been 
maintanicd for a f.dl week, the general result can be 
tabulated m the diagram of elements printed beloAV : 
'i'he fii-st even line upon which the German 
defensive relied at tlie beginning of these operations 
IS represented in this diagram by a double black line. 
I have already made mention of one railway, that 
behind Souain. Before proceeding to the details of 
all this great defensive action between the Argonue 
and the Oise, I Avill sa}' a Avord upon the German 
railway communications as a Avhole, for upon an" 
understanding of these dej^ends the A\'hole of our com- 
prehension of the German chances of success and of 
the German peril. 
THE COMMUNICATIONS. 
It is evidently of the first importance to notice 
exactly what the communications are behind the 
German defensive lines, and to knoAV Avhere tho}^ lie, 
and to consider their length, if we are to judge the 
situation con-ectly; for upon a threat to those com- 
munications will depend the success of the Allies and 
the ousting of the Germans from their jiositions 
betAveen the Oise and the Argonne. 
Of roads there are any number ; good roads, 
along Avhich considerable rainy AA'eather might impede 
traffic, but all of AA'hich are open to the use of an 
army. So, far as road traffic is concerned, the Avhole 
district betAveen the Oise and the Mouse may be 
treated as one field, with ample opportunity, even for 
so lai'ge a force as the German invading army, to 
supply itself or to retreat. All that Ave have to 
remember about their numerous roads is the bridges 
OA'cr the main rivers, and these, if the retreat be 
orderly, are fairly replaced by pontoons. 
But A\ith railway facilities it is otherAvise. There 
are only two lines AA'hich ultimately lead to the great 
bases of the Germans — to the depots, the stores, and 
the manufactories and arsenals in Germany, from 
Avhich the Army is fed and munitioned. 
The first of these tAVo lines, that upon AA'hich the 
AA'hole original plan depended, is the main European 
trunk line which taps Cologne and its district, and 
passes through Aix-la-Chapelle, Liege, Kamur, and so 
doAvn the valley of the Oise to Paris. I have mai'ked 
it A, A, A. 
The second line, which I liaA'^e marked B, B, B, 
connects Avith Germany by a more southern route. 
Save for these tAA'O lines. A, A, A and B, B, B, no 
railway leads from the enemy's front in France to 
his stores in Germany. 
This second line is less strong than the Belgian, 
but still is necessary. It runs in a peculiar fashion. 
It taps the TrcA-es-Coblenz region and after going 
through Luxemburg (at which nominally iadependcnt 
4* 
