September 26. 1914 
LAND AND WATEB 
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THB TWO MAIN QERXAN LINKS OF COMITOXICATION. 
town and behind it the Germans have done every- 
thing in the way of platforms, accumulation of 
rolling stock, doubling of lines, &c., to facilitate* 
their advance), the continuation of railway supply 
to the present German front — while Verdun still 
stands — is compelled to foUow a very devious route 
which we must carefully note to understand the 
future of the campaign. Should Verdun fall, or 
should the line of forts between Verdun and Toul be 
pierced, a whole set of new, short and excellently 
provided communications woidd be opened (as I 
remai'ked last week) to the Germans. But meanwhile 
this line of theirs through Luxemburg is their only 
second line beyond that main one through Belgium. 
Now this second line is over long and twisted. 
It cannot go through Veixlun, so it has to run 
through Montmedy, down the Meuse as far as 
Mezieres, There is no opportunity for tui-n- 
ing back south to feed the army imtil Mezieres 
is reached. There is a light railway crossing the 
Forest of Mazarin and the Eiver Bar, and so uniting 
the main railway from Eheims to the frontier with 
the main railway upon the Meuse. But there can be 
no continuous traffic along it, both on account of the 
difference of gauge and on account of the very small 
rolling stock of this light railway. Supply must 
therefore come right up to Mezieres and then 
painfully down again to llheims, past Bethel. 
Upon these two main railway lines — the chief 
one down the valley of the Oise, from Belgium 
through Namur, Le Gateau, St. Quentin, Noyon ; 
the secondary one from Luxemburg to Mezieres and 
then back from Mezi5res through Bethel to Eheims 
— the existence of the German army (and in par- 
ticular of its heavy artillery !) depends. A great 
number of cross lines — especially the main line from 
Tergnier Junction to Eheims and the very valuable 
cross line from Busigny Junction to Hirson — relieve 
the pressure on the main lines. But for the supply 
of German material to the ai-mies and for the 
converse evacuation of wounded and wastage home 
onl^ these two main lines exist. 
The cutting of the line along the Oise, even so 
low down as St. Quentin or Tergnier itself, would be 
a disastrous thing for the German army if it had not 
before that moment succeeded in piercing some part 
of the French line. The other secondary main line 
Luxemburg-Mezi^res-Eheims is not as yet aj)- 
proached anywhere by an Allied force, but being 
tortuous and long, it is therefore, if or when it is 
approached, more vulnerable. Now the whole peril 
of the present position of the Gennans lies in the 
threat extended by a French advance from Amiens 
upon St. Quentin, and by the French advance from 
the south upon Noyon against the main Oise line. 
And aU the anxiety for the Crown Prince's army is 
due to the fear for the Luxemburg-Mezicres line. 
Bail way communications dominate tlie issue. 
One point will at once occur to the reader, and 
that is, how far a railway, cut at its main bridges 
at least by the retreating Allies, can still be used by 
the Gennans who have followed the Allied retreat ? 
Of the conditions of the railways now behind the 
German position we know nothing. But even if at 
certain points the time has been too short to provide 
temporary bridges sufficient to cany rolling stock, the 
inten'uption at such points does not prevent the 
general use of the system. Unless by some accident 
(which has certainly not taken place in so rapid and 
unexpected a retirement) the whole rolling stock of 
one section isolated between two cut bridges were 
lacking, and unless such a section were innocent of 
locomotives, the whole system can be used by the 
invaders ; and the only delay in the use of it is in the 
trans-shipment of munitions wherever a permanent 
breach in the line still exists. 
I wUl now take, section by section, the attack 
upon the German defensive position, with its various 
results, adverse and favourable, since the Aisne was 
reached upon Sunday, September 13th. 
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