September 20, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
PLAN BROWISa THB POSITION lAST OF TH» ARaONNI. 
another attempt to pierce the fortified line between 
Venlnii and Toul, with all the consequences that 
■would attach to such a German success : the 
sudden provision of shoi-ter communications, the 
taking of the French advance through Champagne 
in reverse, etc. 
The attack on the fort of Troyon was made this 
time not from the western side of the Meuse (as was 
that of a fortnight ago when the Crown Prince was 
still holding on) but from the east. The foi-ts along 
the Meuse here (of which the principal arc the works 
of Jenicourt, Troyon, and Camp des llomains with an 
outlying fort at Liouville) stand upon the isolated 
summits of a bare crest which overlooks the trench 
through which the Meuse nms. To the cast of this 
crest lies a wide belt of hilly and wooded country 
falling at last rather shai-ply into the basin of the 
^Moselle. From the plains of that basin and against 
the line of these hills and woods a serious German 
attempt would seem to have been made against, or 
i-ither towai-ds, that work of Troyon which is the 
central and most impoiiaut work of the barrier series, 
and the advantage to the enemy of takuig which I 
described last week. 
Tiie headquai-tors of the Gennan Army during 
this attack were at Thiaucourt. A difficult region of 
•wood and lake to the south protected it from the 
attack of the French forces round Toiil and Nancy 
f ui-tlicr south still ; and the German assault was made 
from all along the line running throiigli Ti-esauvaux 
and Yigneulles, to Heudicoui-t ; that is, it proceeded 
everywhere from the plain at tlio base of the hills up 
the first wooded slopes. The French report that it 
was evci'ywhere repelled. 
SUMMARY OF THE WHOLE 
DEFENSIVE POSITION. 
If we now put together tlicse five sections of the 
line which the Geraians are holding against the Allies 
from the Oise to the Ai'goune and examine the matter 
as a whole, what Ave see is what we might have 
expected from the routine imposed both by tradition 
and by national necessity upon French and upon 
German strategy. 
You have here in the main lines and on a some- 
what reduced scale a repetition of the position of three 
weeks ago, just before the Battle of the Marne. 
Save tbat the Germans are technically upon the 
defensive instead of just having ceased an offensive 
moveiuent, and save for the fact that the line as a 
whole is straighter than was the line between Paris 
and Verdun three weeks ago, the main features are 
repetitions of the featui-es we then noticed in the 
struggle between the two forces. 
For there is (a) a determined attempt upon the 
pai-t of the Germans to break through the centre, in 
the former case at Vitiy, in this case at Eheims ; 
(b) a resistance offered at this centre by the French 
coupled with an attempt to work round the two 
German wings ; this attempt being weakest and 
pressed with least men on the French right or eastern 
extremity of the line, and strongest and pressed with 
most men on the French left or western extremity of 
the line ; (c) the use of a reserve by the French is 
also apparent. It is not an unexpected or hidden 
reserve like that which did so much to decide the 
retirement of Von Kluck from I'aris. We know that 
the reserve is acting against the Gemian right and 
n» 
