LAND AND WATEE 
Beptember 2G, 1914 
threatening tlic main German comniunications. But 
it is a reserve upon the size and direction of which 
a wise silence is preserved. All we know of this 
fresh French Army at this moment is that it took 
I'eronne last Saturday and is now advancing on 
St. Qvientin. 
Should the C.ermaus break through, either 
between Craonnc and Berry au Bac, or between Berry 
an Bac and Bazancourt— that is, in the immediate 
neighbourhood of Eheims— it is obvious that such a 
counter-offensive woidd mean a great and decisive 
success for the enemy. But in our attemj^t to judge 
the future we can but note that such a success has 
not been approached. For ten days every effort has 
been concentrated by the enemy upon the central 
portion of the line to achieve that success. If the 
centre of Eheims continues to be successfully held by 
the French, there remain the two turning move- 
ments : the operations upon the wings. 
I have said when speaking of the sections in 
detail that the advance along the west of the Argonne, 
if it shall pass and cross and hold the railway line 
from Bazancoui-t to Grand Pre, will have important 
results. It will compel the Crown Prince's Anny 
upon the Meuse to go northwards ; it will narrow the 
gate through which a German retreat could be 
effected ; it may even withdraw pressure from the 
French troops in LoiTaine. But an advance on this 
eastern side of the line would only be decisive if it 
were made in very great force and could count upon 
ultimately holding tlxe German lines of commimication 
here. Now these go directly north from Eheims to 
Mezieres thi-ough Eethel, and are far from even a 
successful advance of the French in the east. More- 
over, of a decisive aocumulation of nimfibers upon the 
east, or French right, there has been no sign. The 
chief operation is upon the French left and along the 
valley of the Oise. It is here that, of the three possi- 
bilities which the general position suggests, the most 
probable of all must be loolced for. It should be bg the 
turning movement here round Nogon that the Germans 
should be compelled to abandon the Soissons plateau. 
As we have seen, the main line of communication 
by which the greater pai-t of GeiTnan stores and 
artillery munitions comes is that which runs directly 
from the Belgian frontier down the valley of the Oise. 
After the fall of Maubeuge that line was open through- 
out, save of course where such bridges as the British 
contingent and the French 5th Army had destroyed 
in their retreat from Mons have been re2)laced by 
pontoon bridges and trestle bridges which caimot bear 
the weight of a ti-ain. But, at any rate for the most 
part, this line can be used and is being used by the 
Germans. Conversely, if that line be cut permanently 
and held by the Allied troops, retreat is imposed upon 
the Gei-mans, and if that retreat were then delayed it 
would be converted into disaster. 
Supposmg, therefore, that the French centre is not 
pierced, everything would seem to tui-n upon the 
success of the French troops which we kno^v to be 
operating in the Oise valley near Noyon and pushing 
up northward there, and the appearance in sufficiently 
large numbers of other troops before St. Qucntin, 
coming we may presume from the direction of Amiens. 
There is a French Army there — marching, as I have 
said, from Peronne since last Saturday. Upon what 
it does, and upon what the other forces further to the 
south round Noyon can do, mainly depends the issue 
of this general action : whether it shall be decisive of 
the first phase of the Avar in the Avest or no. 
It is just at this point, when one is summing up 
the whole position, that there comes in an element 
which, from the present onwards, will be of 
increasing importance : I mean what the French 
call the moral — the mental attitude which is closely 
bound up with the physical condition of an army. 
AVhenover two forces apj^roximately equal meet, 
and whenever neither has succeeded in outmanoeuvring 
or tricking the other, the spirit turns the scale. That 
supreme clement is not of decisive importance in the 
first days of a camjiaign, unless the campaign was 
begun Avith the opposing forces in very different states, 
of mind — the one desj^ondcnt, the other confident. 
Here there Avas no such difference apparent 
between French and Germans. Neither party out- 
marched the other : neither party showed diu-ing the 
first three Avceks of heavy fighting (from the Sunday 
A\hen the Germans Avere successfiU on the Sambre to 
the Sunday Avhen they took up the defensive position 
on the Aisne) any lack of confidence or any doubt of 
success. The German Army of invasion, as a A\liole, 
like its commanders, Avere still confident of ultimate 
victory : so Avere the French and the British con- 
tingent AA'hich stood Avith the French. 
Now, it is an uuAvise thing, in the examination 
of any human acti\ity, but particularly in folloAving a 
campaign, to force a judgment of the future beyond 
the limits of A'ery cautious conjecture. But it does 
seem as though, in this element of moral, time was at 
last Avorkinjj against the invasion. 
The counter-offensive has, indeed, been A-ery 
vigorously taken by the Germans over and over again. 
They have not slackened theii* heavy and accurate 
artillery Avork ; they have lost no conspicuous number 
of prisoners in these operations as a AA'hcle. But their 
position is not one in which an army noui'ished iipon 
the tradition and led by the aims cf the Prussian 
serA'ice can feel its former confidence. To begin Avith, 
the initiative has passed to the Allied side. Next, 
the threat of a decision is against the Germans. If 
the position on the plateau above Soissons is turned 
it must be abandoned. That it may be turned is noAV 
an obvious and increasing peril. If, being turned, 
the plateau is not abandoned Avith sufficient celerity, 
it must be abandoned at a cost AA-hich may vary 
from heavy losses of materiel to disaster. 
It must further be remembered that the initial 
efforts imppsed upon the greater part of the German 
forces, especially those towards the AA-est of the line 
(which is precisely the point where the Allied efforts 
are now concentrated), Avere particularly designed for 
an immediate success. The enormous ex2)enditure of 
energy demanded of these men presupposed the rapid 
reaping of a rcAvard. True, there Avas little sign 
of exhaustion in the retreat after the Battle of 
!Meaux upon the Aisne. But a defensiAC Avhich is 
threatened upon its wings, and after many days has 
failed in every attempt at a counter-offensive, is of its 
nature a weakening thing. The spiritual factor 
Avhich is ultimately the decider of all warfai-e — Avhere 
the material factors ai-e more or less equal — faA'ours 
the Allies. 
THE EASTERN FIELD OF WAR. 
In the Eastern theatre of Avar there is no ncAva 
of moment this week, save the occupation by the 
Eussian Army of Jaroslav. 
We cannot predicate anything decisive of the 
position in Galicia, nor conjectui-e even upon the 
broadest lines a date when a victorious Eussian ai-my 
might ap2>ear in Silesia, until Ave haA^e more definite 
ncAvs of what is really happening to the Austria^ 
forces with their German reinforcements noAV upou 
the defensive along the San. 
12* 
