LAND AND WATEB 
September 2C, 1914 
ytRX \Ta3 declared the Eonlngslerg docs not appear to have 
been iu commission anywhere. 
This cruiser happened into Zanzibar, where she found our 
old third class cruiser I'egMus, of the Cape Station, lying by 
iu the open roadstead sweeping boiler tubes. The German 
ajinc<I with a broadside of five 40 calibre 4.16, opened fire on 
the I'esdiiis, which could only reply with a broadside of four 
old 27-calibre 4-iuch of short range and high trajoctoiy. 
The German cruiser, according to our oilicial accounts, 
killed twenty-five of the crew of the Pef;asus and wounded 
iifty-two out of a total of 234. There are also ten missing. 
If the Gei-man cruiser had any sense at all, her corresponding 
loss was absolutely nothing. She had merely to steam to and 
fi-o at long range and fire at a stationary target which could 
not reach her with replica. 
The rfgasiis is reported as having been beached— she 
probably drifted ashore a blaaiug wreck. The German cruiser 
was last seen steaming south. 
So far as wo are immediately concerned, this means that 
simultaneously with the Emden's performances in the Bay of 
IJengal we have to look for a German cruiser on the Cape of 
Good Hope station, where wo have nothing regularly stationed 
capable of catching a 23i-knot cruiser. 
Gut of which we may expect to hear of German activities 
in that direction. 
The third incident is that, also on Sept. 14th, the British 
armed liner Carmania encountered the German armed liner 
Cap Trafalgar (or her sister, the Berlin) off the East Coast of 
South America. This battle between two enormous liners is 
certainly the most curious conflict of modera times. Their 
very bulk protected them against the small guns with which 
they were each armed in this " battle of haystacks." 
At the end of one and three-quarter houiV firing the 
Berlin (or Cap Trafalgar) capsized and sank. Her return fire 
killed nine men in the Carmania, seriously wounded five, and 
slightly wounded twenty-one. The survivors of the German 
ship, whose losses are not known, were picked up by a collier 
from which she had been coaling. 
The British losses indicate that the battle must have been 
engaged furiously on both sides, but that our shooting was 
much the better. 
This is the second German armed liner to bo disposed of. 
Both w-ere caught coaling — apparently the only chance of 
bringing them into action. The mission of a commerce 
destroyer is not to fight if she can possibly help it; even a 
victory may impair her utility. The problem, of adequate 
repression of coi^sairs is thus considerably amplified. 
From the public point of view the circumstance that the 
British Navy has so far only eliminated two of the commerce 
raiders may seem to suggest a certain inadequatencss. Such a 
view, however, is entirely incorrect. The German raiders 
appear to be kept supplied with coal from vessels which may 
be lying anywhere. These come out as required and coal the 
raider at sea or in any convenient bay. The exact problem 
befoi-e our Navy is best to be expressed popularly by getting 
someone secretly to select a certain letter on this page and for 
the reader then to endeavour to discover what particular word 
that letter is in. Just a little something can be done along the 
line of probahlo words to be selected, but veiy little. Blind 
chance must of necessity be the predominant factor. 
Elsewhere, yet. again on Sept. 14th, an attempt was made 
to blow up H.M.S. Dwarf in the Camei-oon River. The 
attempt failed. Two days later the Dwarf was rammed by a 
German mei-chant ship, but slie was only slightly damaged, 
while the German ship was driven ashore with some consider- 
able loss. The incident has, of course, no bearing on the 
general issues of the war, but it sci-ves to illustrate the tenacity 
with which the Germans are conducting operations, and also 
that they are by no means unfruitful in "' dodges." 
THE NORTH SEA. 
From further details to hand it appears that our sub- 
marine E9 (Lieut.-Com. Jlorton) succeeded in torpedoing the 
German cruiser Ilda within six miles of the Gennan coast. 
The Utla, it may be stated at once, was no material 
loss to the German Navy. She was a very old tub armed 
with four 15J pounders. Reconstructed and rcboilered in 
1910, she was possibly capable of some 21 knots, although IS 
knots is the most ever officially recorded of her. Beside her 
our old Speedy (mined by Germans) was a moro efficient figh<> 
ing unit, albeit though of less than half the size. 
Physically, then, the Ilela was no loss whatever to Ger- 
manj-. Psychologically the submarining of a Gennan Dread- 
nought in the North Sea would have been of less value to u.<;. 
Up till now tho Germans have generally regarded our 
blockade as something up by Scapa Flow and the Orkneys in 
the Aorth Sea and behind the Straits oi Dover in the South. 
The submarining of the Ilela has now taught them; that 
eur effective blockade commences inside their " front door ' 
that is to say, well inside the impregnable fortifications ol 
Heligoland. According lo calculations, German ships insida 
the Heligoland area might come and go as they listed. British 
tubmariuo E9 has now indicated to them that this is a mis- 
taken calculation on their part-, and it is difficult to overesti- 
mate the iiupoi-tanco of this. Wo do not know the exact, 
location of the High Sea Fleet, but it is probably not at its base 
at Wilhelmshaven. If it be at Cuxhaven, or in the Canal, it 
is virtually blockaded thei'O and cut off from its base by our 
submaiiues. Whether our submarines are there or not their 
presence will have to be assumed. It might bo claimed by 
some that the High Sea Fleet is " bottled in." 
Personally, however, I do not incline to this opinion. 
When all is said and done, a submarine is not a vessel which 
can stay under water for more than a limited time. For 
that reason modem makes of submarines arc now all armed 
with guns, as a protection against any gunned enemy waiting 
till they come to the surface. 
Wo must not, therefore, eocpect miracles out of our sub- 
marines which form the inshore blockade. Rather we may 
expect that if jind when the Germans come out at the 
" selected moment " for " Dor Tag," they will have to precede 
HAMBUR^i 
THE DOTTKD LINE EBPEE8EKTS ASSUMED ISTEMOB GEBMAN 
DXFEXCB LINE. THE BLACK BARS EEPRESENT WHAT OKKMANY 
HAS TO LOOK FOB ON ACCOUNT OP THE ENTEBPEISE OF 11. M, 
EUBUAGINE £9, 
the movement by a considerable force of armed submarines and 
destroyci-s. 
With submarines the " macliiuc force " is absent. All 
depends on individual initiative. 
I have no exact knowledge of the German submarine 
service, but I can pretend to some fair knowledge of the 
German Navy generally. On the strength of that knowledge 
I confess to blank surprise that the Ulo managed to get where 
she was when she was sunk by the Birmingham, or that any 
subiaarine should have sunk the Pathfinder where she did. 
I am inclined to regard these boats as having been com- 
manded by ecsceptionally able officers. There probably rcniiaJu 
one or two others equally able with whom sooner or later we 
shall come into contact. But — so far as my knowledge can 
take me — there is nothing in the German Navy's oidinaiy 
routine suitable for the peculiar morale required of an effective 
submarine. To explain, a submarine to be effective must, 
essentially be — for want of a better word — " democratic." 
The old " master and man " idea is utterly unworkable in a 
.submarine. The " ego " of the officers and that alone counts 
for anything. 
On Tuesday afternoon it was officially announced that the 
A hoii7,ir had been submarined at a spot not stated, but pre.sum- 
ably off the Dutch coast, as survivors were landed at Yuminden 
and Amsterdam. Her sister ships, tlie Hague and Cressy stood 
by her, and presently shared the same fate. Thug already 
have we heard of those " other GeiTnan submarine officers " 
of whom I had written above before this news came to hand. 
As fighting units none of the three lost cruisers were of 
any particular value. They were verging on the obsolete. 
Originally designed for 21 knots, some fifteen yeai-s ago, they 
were capable of little more than 17 knots at the time of their 
14* 
