ScptcmLcr 26, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
loss. Other particulars arc: Displacement, 12,00 tons; arma;- 
iruent, two 9-2, 40 cal., twelve G inch, and some lesser guns. They 
liad a 6-inch armour belt. Their chief value to us was that 
there was nothing in the German Navy exactly equivalent 
to them. Of the German armoured cruisei-s — excluding battle 
cruisers — only the modern Blilcher could engage them with 
any prospect of success. On that account they had a value 
in excess of their ordinaiy fighting value. 
The real significance of the incident is that Germany is 
steadily pursuing her policy of seeking to destroy our 
supcinority by slow degrees with submarine and mine attack; 
and it is idle to disguise that so far the policy has pi-oved 
successful. She has now inflicted on us far heavier losses than 
wo have on her. She has also demonstrated to her own satis- 
faction that the North Sea is by no means a " British lake." 
All the sam3, however, losses of this kind must be 
expected, as I mentioned some three weeks ago. In Germany 
the incident will probably be hailed as a species of Trafalgar. 
The inference will be drawn that the Ciessies might have been 
Dreadnoughts, and that the three lost might well have been 
a dozen. 
Actually, however, it is greatly to be questioned whether 
the moral effect of the thrco Cressics being sunk counter- 
balances the sinking of the useless little Hela inside Germany's 
'■ front door." There is not the same psychological result. 
The successful attack on the Cressicx proves determina- 
tion. It indicates that at least three German submarines 
are to some extent capable of the peculiar eflort necessary to 
submarine success. But it does not prove them capable of 
the arduous duties which our submarines are performing; the 
torpedoing of warships comes under the head of light and 
inspiriting duties. Also it is yet to be proved whether or 
no the German submarines were acting on " information 
received," a point which will have to be determined at an 
early date. 
THE BALTIC. 
Last week's war and rumours of wars in the Baltic have 
now i-esolved themselves into a fairly reasonable stoi-y of two 
German divisions engaging each other by mistakes. I am 
afraid we cannot put it down to " nerves," as it is an easily 
Tuade error, as manoeuvres have shown before now. It has 
Russian Aurora 
German 
DAY SIUIOUETTE. 
■A. ayC ^ ^ ^ O^ * * 
long been a canon of warfare to fire at any approaching torpedo 
craft unless they make the private signal. 
Torpedo craft approaching a supposed enemy cannot, 
however, do this without drawing attention to themselves and 
so depriving themselves of the most valuable factor of surprise. 
The ship attacked cannot 
])oss.ibly aifford to risk delay by 
signalling — she must open firo 
instantly. Once fire is opened 
there is small prospect of the 
error being discovered till 
much mischief has been done 
on cither side. 
The Germans are pecu- 
liarly liable to make this error, 
because the silhouettes of 
German and Russian ships are 
extremely alike in many cases. 
A large number of Russian destroyers arc Gei-man built 
or of German design, and exactly like German destroyers, 
while the three-funnelled cruisers on either side are none 
too easily differentiated even in the daytime. Regarded 
its silhouettes, the difference is clear enough on inspec- 
tion, but the little details which we do not show at 
night cannot be recognised. The appended illustration will 
clucidato my point. The Adalbert class at night may well be 
taken for the Russian Aurora class, the Boon or Karlsruhe 
classes for the Russian Tioriatijr class, and any four-funnelled 
German for one of the four-funnelled Russians. 
These Russians are exactly the ships which might have 
been cxpee-tcd to be met. 
The story of what really happened, of how much mischief, 
if any, was doTic, will, of coui-se, bo unobtainable till the war 
is over. That the incident occurred sccma, however, to bo 
beyond all doubt, on account of the German offioial statomenB 
referred to last week that " fifteen out of twenty-nine units of 
the Baltic Fleet were engaged in action." Whether tlie fiftccu 
were fighting the other fourteen, or merely fighting among 
themselves, we cannot tell. But as there is a Russian official 
report to the effect that nothing is known of the alleged battle, 
we may take it for certain that the German Baltic Fleet is at 
pi-esent suffering from self-inflicted injuries which aie probably 
more serious than has been allowed to transpire. 
It is possible — though, perhaps, not veiy probable — that 
this particular internal eri-or will give the Russian Fleet soma 
material advantage in the Baltic. 
Following upon this news we have had unofficial details of 
battles between Russian and German ships. On these I place 
no weight whatever. There have possibly been a few 
skirmishes, but it is abundantly clear that the exact game 
which the Germans are playing against us at the front door 
is being played against them by the Russians at their back 
doors. Neither operation lends itself to commemoration on 
Dibdin lines — for all that Dibdin was inspired by veiy little 
more occasionally. But we shall do well to appreciate the help 
which the Russian Fleet is giving us. If the Germans issue 
from their front door the Russians may bo at their back door 
very quickly. 
They cannot capture heavily fortified bases lifce Kiel. 
They cannot achieve various other impossible hypotheses. But 
they can undoubtedly in such circumstances do much to trans- 
form the Baltic from a German Tnto a " Russian lake." 
Once the Russian Dreadnoughts are fit to take the seas the 
Russian menace to Germany is going to be of a quite serious 
nature. So serious, indeed, that it is quite on the cards that 
our fleet will never obtain the satisfaction of a fleet action. 
The old German battleships now serving in the Baltic are no 
match for the Russian Dreadnoughts — German Dreadnoughts 
will have to be detached to meet them or a blockade in the 
Baltic accepted. 
The situation, as I read it, is that (pending some bad mis- 
take) Germany must hold such Baltic trade as she has at all 
hazards. This is the more important in that the Dutch Govern- 
ment has now given unequivocal signs of absolute neutrality. lb 
has cut off those supplies which up till now have rendered our 
naval blockade in a minor note so far as food supplies are con- 
cerned. Henceforward, Hol- 
land has ceased to bo a Gei-man 
supply port. It remains for us 
now to convince Denmark and 
Scandinavia that it is undesir- 
able to play the part of the too 
benevolent neutral. 
It cannot be too strongly 
emphasised that if contiguous 
neutrals all remain strictly 
neutral, the British Navy can 
and will starve Germany into 
an early surrender quite apart 
from the land battles in France, or whatever tliey may produce. 
Holland has adopted the sensible course — strict neutrality 
and a trust in the Triple Entente — a tnist that will be suitably 
protected. To Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, it now i-emains 
to do the same. 
Prinz Adalbert 
NIGHT SILHOUETTE. 
So far as the Danes are concerned, memories of Schleswig- 
Ilolstein probably suffice already. In case of a victory for the 
Allies, Denmark can ask and obtain her price for honourable 
neutrality. On the other hand, Sweden to a large extent, and 
Norway to a lesser one, have in the past been somewhat afraid 
of Russia, and inclined to regard Germany as a set-off. 
A possible sweeping victory for the Russians cannot bo 
regarded with any particular joy for Sweden, with memories 
behind her of the loss of Finland. However, Scandinavian 
traffic is overseas, and supplies vid Scandinavia are not likely 
to reduce appreciably the economic pressure which the British 
blockade in the North Sea is putting on Gennany. 
At (I largely attended meeting of the Jockey Club, held at Derby 
House, it wiia nnaniniously .ngreed by tlio members present that 
it wa« desiialile tliat racing should be continued, when practicable, at 
Newmarket and clficwhero. 
15* 
