LAND AND WATEE 
September 26, 1914 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
By FRED T. JANE, 
IT NOW seems abundantly establislicd that at the front 
British aviators have secured a considerable nwral 
ascendancy over the Germaa ones. This circum- 
stance is all the more interesting owing to the fact that 
German machines, if not better than oui-s in all 
respects, are fully equal to them, and genei-ally faster. 
The 100 h.p. Mercedes cugiuei, with which most of them are 
fitted, is probably the best acriaJ engine in the world. In any 
case, our ascendancy has not been caused by the machine, but 
by the man. 
Even here, however, a curious circumstance arises. The 
bulk of the best records have been made in Germany, and, 
putting aside national prejudices, one is constrained to admit 
that the average Gennan aviator is the more skilful pilot of 
the two. There ai-e exceptions, of course — for example, so far 
as I can ascertain, Germany has no pilot equai to our Captain 
Longcroft. But in matters of this sort it is the average which 
counts, and the better average in the matter of pure technique 
is in favour of Geirmany. 
How comes it, then, that the ascendancy is ours? Well, 
£0 far as I can gather, it is what is vulgarly known as " a 
matter of guts " 
Piecing together all that one can glean from official 
reports, general Press items and private correspondence, the 
iret result is as follows : 
The German aviator's psychological attitude on g[oing into 
aerial action is — 
" I'll kill you, once I get half a chance." 
The British aviator, on the other hand, mentally replies : 
" Bloia your chancei. You may or may not kill me, but 
I am going to kill you." 
This particular mental attitude is one which the German 
m.ind cannot attune itself. 
The German aerial pilots are sportsmen right enough up 
to a certain point. But they are not mentally constituted to 
stand against the — to them — •" unsportsmanlike " conduct of 
British aviators. From the German point of view — as I read 
it — reckless " exchange of pieces " is one of those things best 
left alone. It is not done on land or water, therefore, it ia 
improper in thi> air. 
Our fighting aviatoi-s — tliank God — think otherwise. 
Victor and vanquished to die together is too tough, a proposi- 
tion for most of the enemy. And so, when a German pilot 
meets a British one in the air, he ia mostly concerned about 
getting back to somewhea-e where recognised militai-y war game 
rules obtain. 
There are no " rules of the game " for the air. There is 
not a pilot in the British air service prepared to conform to 
land conventions. Our pilots just go out "to kill the enemy." 
The result is that they generally do kill him, unless his superior 
speed allows him to escape. 
" Victory or death " has been laughed at often enough as a 
music-hall phrase; but ita practical application has certainly 
put the fear of God into German aviators. 
A curious war incident is that while motoring somewhere 
in Franco Commander Samson, R.N. (of the British Naval Air 
Service), met some Uhlans, and scooped the lot without loss to 
us. The German Press Bureau will probably presently explain 
that the motor-car was armoured, and the chances uneven. 
That is as it may be. But the fact remains that our five 
Hying men, against five Uhlans, secured an easy victory. 
A rumour is current to the eJIect tiat German aircraft are 
short of petrol. This is by no means improbable. England 
just at present is the easiest market for those who supply petrol 
from overseas, and our aerial demands on motor spirit must 
liave been very materially increased of late. Tliero is— or at 
any rate recently was— danger in proceeding to Dutch or 
Danish ports owing to the indiscriminato laying of mines by 
the Germans in the North Sea. Consequently those who ssil 
the seas with petrol take no unnecessary risks in proceeding 
to those neutral ports which are now Germany's supply 
harbours. 
It will certainly be poetic justice if by this mine laying the 
Germans have made a petrol famine for themselves. It is 
extraordinary that the German machine— so absolutely perfect 
in many ways— should break down over side issues which 
should easily have been detected as dangers at the outset To 
bo sure, a proverb to the effect that war cannot be made by 
machinery dates from the Peloponnesian Wax of over 2,000 
years ago. Here, as elsewhere, the German plans appear to 
have been absolutely complete save for one thing — that the 
human element was not taken into account. 
We shall be well advised, however, not to build too much 
on Germany's present aerial inactivity being entirely due to a 
shortage of petrol. Germany must, in any case, have enormous 
resci-ves which she does not wish to touch till ncccsbary. There 
is probably a bad shortage of normal petrol supplies — but just 
as probably, that is all. 
Rather I am inclined to attribute the present marked 
diminution in German aeroplane activity to stomachic troubles 
produced by the " I'm going to kill you whatever happens " 
tactics of our warlike aviators. 
Zeppelin alarms still continue to reach us via Holland. 
"We have had circumstantial tales of a mine layer convoyed by 
a Zeppelin. Zeppelins, which taJte at least nine months to build, 
are being turned out at the rate of one a week. The necessary 
sheds for them (which are at least as large as Eheims Cathe- 
dral) are presumably being produced at the same rate! Aero- 
planes, we are told, are being turned out at the rate of seventy 
a week; for all that the utmost normal capacity of the entire 
German aeroplane industry is between half to one-third of that 
amount. And over -10,000 Gemians have volunteered for the 
air fleet. 
No doubt intentions exist. But the best of intentions 
cannot make even moderately efficient pilots inside six months. 
Now, according to the official statemjent of the Federation 
Aeronautique Internationale, the number of pilots qualified 
and still alive up to the end of March, 1914 — since when no 
learners are likely to have acquired enough knowledge to count 
for very much — is aa follows : 
Gebmax ... 699 British ... 694 
Austrian ... 1-18 French ... 1,273 
Bklqian ... 84 
847 KussiAN ... 215 
2,205 
These figures are very approximate, because in every case 
the certificates obtained include a certain number of men who 
merely secured their certificates and then gave up flying. Also 
there are many military fliers who, for one reason and 
another, have not troubled about aero clubs. But, putting one 
thing with another, the trained aeroplane flyers of the Triple 
Entente are, roughly, two to one against the German 
combination. 
Six months hence, if they train in the meanwhile, the odd 
9,000 of the German volunteei-s will become dangerous, if 
machines can be found for them, and if they are prepared to 
face British' methods in aerial warfare. Otherwise they are 
unlikely to affect the situation. 
A big proportion of these 10,000 aerial volunteers will 
probably quickly arrive at tho efficiency required to drop bombs 
from dirigibles on defenceless towns. But I do not think that 
any raw material — especially German raw material — is going 
to be of value for any fighting in the air. 
Also there ia the question of Zeppelin sheds. On account 
of pressure of other matter I have not space this week to illus- 
trate where the Germans, <tc., sheds are in relation to this 
oountry---and attacks on it. Next week this map will be given. 
Meanwhile, it is well to remember that it takes something like 
a year to build a Zeppelin shed, and that to pull it down and 
re-erect ifc elsewhere can hardly be accomplished insiide two or 
three months. Also, that German tenure of French and 
Belgian soil is still somewhat " uncertain." 
TtCB reissue of the book On War, by Clauscwitz, th« founder, 
practically, of modern German strategy, by Messrs. Kegan, Paul, and 
Co., Ltd., at the present time, is particularly appropriate, and th« 
guinea eet of three volumes gives appropriate fonn to a work of intense 
interest for its own sake, aa well as the interest attaching to tlie book 
in -inew of the prceeni European eituation. Writing before 1840, 
Clausewitz is regarded as tho Darwin of modem stra.tegy, liis one 
defect being a failure to comprehend tlie Napoleonic ideal of initiative. 
His theory that the defensive is the strongest form of strategy haa 
been abandoned perforce by the German strategists of modem times, 
for the only hope of Germany in war lay in th« offensive; yet there 
can be no doubt that Claiiscmtz was right in his conolu.';ions. Clauee- 
i\itz w'orked always on the idea of tho snnival o! the fittest, and 
since his doctrine did not admit that the fittest for survival was always 
tho best in an ethical sense, ho stands as the founder of modem 
German mthlessnees. His work, (however, is reasoned and sincere ; it 
Ftands for all time as the groat nineteenth- century analysis of the life 
hisstory of nations, and, while not a book for the light reader, is of 
permanent value to the student seriously inclined. As a military text- 
book, Clausewitz's On War as too well known to need wcoaunendation. 
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