LAND AND WATER 
September 19, 1914 
TTowcvcr wc number tliem tlierc were in the nuuu 
three £?reat Oerinau masses, (1), (-'), and (3) advancnig 
into France from the north, and pushin<? back on to 
the line Verdun— Paris the French line with its 
British contingent. This French line one may roughly 
represent, not in size but in position, by the band 
A— B between the fortified line Vci-dun— Toiil (V— T) 
September 9th roughly represented by this sketch, 
m 
^ 
PARIS 
^ - 5 
DUGBAM OF THK KJ.EMKXTS OF THE FRAXCp-GF.KMAN POhlTIOM 
ON SKPTEMBEB OtK BEFORE THE OKBMAN BETKEAT. 
and Paris (P) in which, both as to proportionate size 
and as to position the British contingent is represented 
by the shaded portion. Within and to the east of 
Paris the Frenc-h commanders had kept back a large 
reserve, represented by the square block X. That was 
the position on September 3rd and 4th, when the 
largest of the German armies, No. 1., was at the gates 
of the French capital. Tiie commander of this large 
Gennan army (1) got, wind for the first time of the 
existence of this large reserve in these two days. He 
thereupon attempted with great boldness not to retreat 
but to turn suddenly at right angles to the direction 
he had hitherto been pursuing, join up with Army 
No. 2 along the line C — D, and in conjunction with 
that Army, and with Army No. S break through 
the Allied line and cut it into two. In this attempt 
to march right across tlie front of the French left and 
the British contingent, along the line C — D, Avliich was 
too bold, he ^\•as caught ; and he had to retire the \vay 
he had come, while the men of the great reserve at X 
Avere pouring through and round Paris after him 
along E— F, and the British contingent was pounding 
up behind him. 
That is the whole story which explains the 
change in the campaign, and it is the only story which 
explains it. 
liut once so considerable a change had been 
effected in the [wsition of Army (1), the position of 
Anny (2) and of Army (3) was at once gravely 
compromised. Instead of the three main German 
ma.s.ses forming a continuous line, two-thirds of them 
were now threatened in flank, and the retirement of 
Anny No. (1) upon their right compelled them to 
retire also ; mass No. (2) having to go back somewhat 
more precipitately than mass No. (3). Thus the entire 
Gennan advance was converted into a full German 
retreat, and from being originally in such a position as 
is indicated in the following sketch (where the black is 
SECOND rOSITIOM (SEI'TE.MBEE OlU TO IOtII), WHEN THK GEEJIAN 
KIOKT HAD BECiUN TO KETUEAT, KHOWINQ ISOLATION 01' GERMAN 
CENTRE AND LEIT. 
•which their centre and eastern portions at A and B 
stand for a moment in an exceedingly dangerous, isolated 
position. From this position they could only extricate 
themselves by retiring in their turn and taking up a 
united line again with the anny that had retired from 
Paris, so that by the Sunday morning the whole 
German line was in retreat towards a defensive position 
along the Aisne (60 miles from Paris) after the fashiou 
indicated upon the sketch below. 
^^ 
^.f 
PARIS 
^^;i5 
x^o. 
RESERVE 
BEPTEHBEB Ct». — FIRST POSITION, BKIOKE THE RETREAT OP TUB 
GERMAN RIGHT. 
Gennan and the white the Allies), which was the 
position on September 3rd and 4tli, the Gennan 
armies Avere compelled to jxiss throngh a stage upon 
THIRD POSITION (SEPTEMBER 12th), WHEN THE WHOLE GERMAN 
LINK WAS IN CONCERTED RETREAT TO ITS PEEPAEED POSITION 
ON THE AISNB. 
Now to this general scheme of the retirement, 
which was thus forced upon the mass of the German 
forces, must be added one important modification. 
There was present in the field not only the three main 
masses (1), (2), and (3), but a 4th body (4) which 
had come round not from the north but from Luxem- 
bourg under the Crown Prince, and had already begun 
to bombard Verdun. Should Verdun fall, and the line 
of forts connecting it with Toul, yet a 5th body (5) 
would be present upon the flank of the French line, 
imperilling'its advance and checking the retreat of the 
other three German bodies. 
The task before the French, therefore, was not 
merely the simple one of following up a general 
German retreat. It could not depend upon the 
continuance of that retreat save by holding, until it- 
had driA'cn the German Hue past it, the fortress of 
Verdun, and that fortress, as we know from the 
experience this Avar has given of the lessened resisting 
power of fortification against modem siege artillery, 
Avas in grave peril. 
So much for the general scheme, the sudden 
retreat of the first German mass on the left before the 
French lleserve, the subsequent retirement of the tAva 
other German ma.sses to the east of this, and the peril 
of Verdun. 
I Avill now take each of these in detail and first 
descriljc Avhat took place Avhen the AVestern German 
Army tried to inarch across the Anglo-French front, 
failed in that bold attempt, and was compelled to- 
retire very rai)idly toAvards the north-east. Tliese 
o])eratioiis, the first part of the General Battle of the 
.Alarne, may be called I'/ie Baffle of Meaux (or the 
Battle of the Ourcq). 
Next I shall describe in detail the ground over 
Avhich the German centre retired, and the Frencli 
centre advanced through the j)lateau of Sezanne and 
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