September 19, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
PARIS 
SKETCH BHOWIXO THB POSITIONS OF THE lOrRTS GEBJIAN' 
CKOL'P (t) VNDEK THE CKOW:? PKIXCE i:» FROXT OF VEKDUX, 
AXD OP THB GEKMAX ABUT (5) IN LOERAIXE. 
the mai-shes of St. Gond, next the retreat of the 
Germiua left from Vitry over the flat country of 
Champagne, and histly the neighbourhood of Yerduu 
and the nature of the peril to that fortress. 
THE BATTLE OF MEAUX 
(or of The Ourcq). 
The field of operations which we are about to 
follow imder the general title of the Battle of Meaux 
(the original action which turned the tide of the cam- 
]>aign), runs from Paris on the west to the sources of 
the Petit Morin upon the east, from the Seine and the 
town of Nogent upon the south to the Eiver Aisne 
and the town of Soissons upon the north. 
At some time upon Wednesday, September 2nd 
(and the anniversary of Sedan), or possibly as late as 
Thm-sday, September 3rd, the first German Army,- 
under General vonKluck, numbering perhaps 200,000 
men, perhaps somewhat more, was still facing Paris, 
and advancing toAvards that town from the neighbour- 
liood of Creil, Compiegne, and Senlis. It then got 
wind of a very large reserve which had secretly been 
gathered by the French commanders within and behind 
the fortifications of Paris, and this news alt<;red all its 
an-angements. 
At this moment the command of Von Kluck 
roughly occupied the positions marked on the map by 
the shaded portions A A. 
tSTMNAY 
NOGENT 
SCALe of 2S 
PLAN' SUOWINO THE POSITIO:* OF THE QEBMAX BIGHT WIXO 
(abut VXDEU von kluck) on 8KPTEHBEB SbD. 
It had in front of it three forces which (until 
tlie i-eserve Ijehind Paris could come up) were still 
inferior in numbers to itself. Tliese three forces 
were : — 
(1) Tliat line of the French forces on the 
extreme left which the French call their 6th Army. 
(2) T!ie British contingent which had just gone 
south of the ^Fariie, blowing up the bridge of Lagny 
behind it in its retreat, and which had in front of it 
tke forest of Crccy. 
(3) That Freneli force, known as tlie oth Frerich 
Army, Avhieli lay to the right again, probably along- 
the Seine. 
The general, Yon Kluok, in command of the 
Gei*man Army at A A, finding himself tlireatened by 
this unexpected resen-e in front of him, which had been 
hidden by the fortified zone of Paris, and which had 
been gathered there by the French conmianders witli 
the object of thus tui-ning the tide, determined in this 
difficult situation to act as follows : 
He proposed to march right away across the 
IManie and across the river called the Grand Morin, 
in the direction of the arrow B B, and in two days' 
march to have joined and concentrated up against the 
Gei-man armies to the east of him, which then, Avith 
his forces added, could have pierced the Allied line 
somewhere along the middle Seine — say, beyond 
Nogent. 
It will be apparent that, finding thus unexpectedly 
in front of hmi forces which, when they had all joined, 
would be superior to his own. Von Kluck had no 
choice but either to retreat the way he had come (and 
so leave the other German armies to the east of him 
isolated and exposed upon their western Hank) or to 
decide as he did, and to march along the line B B to 
join them. 
But observe that this march along the line B B 
was one of those hazai-dous operations which every 
elementary text-book upon strategy (and, for that 
miitter, all historical experience as well) defines to bo 
the most dangerous of all. He proposed to march 
ri(/ht along his enemy s front. He risked doing so 
because he under-estimated the power remaining to 
the French and British contingents upon that front of 
tiiking the counter-offensive after the severe experience 
of their recent retreat from the l^lgian frontier. 
He was aware, however, that this big reserve 
behind Pai-is would, while he was hunying south- 
eastward, come up along such hues as C C and D D 
and graduidly reinforce the line of his enemies. He 
was consequently concerned (a) for certain German 
detachments which lay isolated to the north, notably 
in the direction of Compiegne, and {h) for liis com- 
nmnications, which lay roughly along the line E E. 
He therefore left a very strong body upon the 
plateau Avhich runs west of the Biver Ourcq, aud 
particulai-ly large forces around the villages of 
Penchard and Bregy. With the rest of his army he 
undertook that perilous advance in fix>nt of his enemy's 
lines which he, or his superiors, prefeiTcd to the 
confession of failure involved in a retirement. 
Upon Satui-day, September 5th, the columns of this 
first German Army, Von Kluck 's, the largest German 
Army in the field, crossed the Marne at Trilport, La 
Fei-te Sous-Jouan-e, and just below Chateau Thierry. 
The French 5th Army fell back before this advance ; 
and on Sunday, the Gth, the remainder of the Germans, 
with the exception of the lai-ge rearguard which had 
been left to keep off the increasing French pressure 
idong the Oui-cq, had pushed right down through 
Coulommiers to the neighbourh.jod of Pro\-ins. Its 
cavalry patrols had even reached the Seine in the 
neighbourhood of Nogent. 
The situation then upon the Sunday night may 
be summarised in the following map. 
It was in that night, the night between Sunday 
and Monday, the Oth and 7th September, that tlie 
counter-offensive began. The French 5th Army 
attacked with the bayonet and recovered some little 
ground north of the Seine, and by daylight on ^Monday 
both the 5th FrencJi Army and the Briti.sh contingent 
advanced northward against the enemy. The British 
3» 
