September 19, 1914 
L A X D A X D WATER 
This position which the German amiics (with the 
exception of that of the Crown Prince, isolated beyond 
Ai-gonne upon the extreme left) took up upon last 
Sunday niglit and Monday morning is naturally 
divided into two quite different sections. The first, or 
eastern, section runs from a wood called " The forest 
of the Eagle," or " de L'Aigle," just north of 
Compicgne to the large village of Craonue, a distance 
of about 30 miles. 
This first half of the German position, the 
western half, is everywhere parallel to the river Aisne 
and it follows the first ridge to the north of that 
river, a ridge in which the short northern tributaries 
(which are no more than brooks) t<ike their rise. Tliis 
line of heights is nowhere more than five miles from 
the river, and nowhere less than three. It is a good 
deal cut up along its front by i-avines, for the northern 
brooks tributary to the Aisne run in rather deep little 
trenches with steep sides. • It is an even plateau, 
more or less, exactly following the valley of Braisne 
below, and only broken by these short lateral clefts 
which greatly aid its defence by their steepness as 
also by their wooded slopes. 
The second, or eastern limb of the position 
crosses the river Aisne near to and just south of 
Neuchatel and then runs along a low, flat ridge 
admirably formed for artillery and parallel to the 
course of the river Suippe. This ridge runs, as does 
the Suippe, below it in a gi*eat curve north-west and 
north of the town of Kheims. This second or eastern 
section of the German defensive line is of a length 
which Ave cannot discover from the telegrams. If it is 
properly linked up with the CroAATi Prince's anny on 
the east it is not less than forty miles long, for that is 
about the distance from Neuchatel to the Argonne 
across the great plain of Champagne. If it is not 
jjroperly linked up with the Crown Prince's army 
on the east (a very unlikely chance !), then there 
is a gap somewhere nliout Monthois of which the 
French will certainly take advantage ; and in that 
case this eastern line is only as long as the first, or 
about 30 miles long. 
You have, then, the German annies taking up 
this defensive line, certainly 60 — more probably over 
70 — miles in length, and awaiting the assault of 
the Allies. 
It must de remembered that the enemy s armies 
are intact, that tliey have lost liille in prisoners or guns 
— nothing comparable to what the Allies lost in their 
rapid retreat from the Belgian frontier — and that 
they are still in numbers certainly equal to their 
ojiponents and probably superior. 
Now of what natui-e is this defensive position 
which the Germans have taken up ? 
The very first thing a student notes about it is that 
it has been carefully thought out. It is not a chance 
position taken up haphazard or under the stress of 
some too rapid retreat which has at last been given 
breathing space. It is a line upon which, in case 
of retreat, the Gennan commanders had dctennined 
to stand, and it is the line on which they can best 
stand between Paris and the Meiise. It has been 
studied thoroughly by spies dming peace, and it is 
very good. 
Considei- first the character of the heights held 
between Craonne and the Forest of the Eagle (or 
de I'Aigle). They are everywhere unifomi, save 
in the ravines of Morsain. The open ridge rarely 
rise5 to more than 300 feet above the river; it 
only falls to less than 200 ft. above the river upon 
its western edge towards the forest, ami this fall is 
everywhere gradual. Tb.e line of the plateau is every- 
where fairly even. It is, as I have said, cut up on its 
front by the ravines through which the northern 
tributary brooks of tlie Aisn > fall ; and these ravines 
are steep and wooded. But though such a disposition 
of the land a little interferes with the homogeneity 
and evenness of the defence, it is much more of an 
obstacle to the attack. It is here from Soissons along 
the Aisne for about 20 miles that the British 
contingent is at Avoi'k. 
So much for the western section of the German 
line along the Aisne. But the eastern section of the 
line, which runs from Craonne across to the woods of 
the Argonne in a flat curve across the plains of Cham- 
pagne, is even better suited to defence. 
It is a line of low woodland on a crest upon 
wliich a wide shelf of plough land falls down to 
the shallow depression in which runs the white and 
inuddy water of the Suippe river, a tributary of 
the Aisne. The slope in front of this ridge of 
wood is quite bare, save for a few artificial plantations. 
It consists, as I have said, of huge stretches of jilough 
land, now stubble ; and from this almost uniform line 
of slight elevations it sinks southward and eastward 
doAvn to the Suippe in a perfect natural glacis. On 
the further or southern side of the river rises a 
corresponding but longer slope of perfectly bare and 
open land which can be swept in all its breadth by 
artilleiy on the opposing ridge. This line north of 
the Suippe, commanding a glacis before it and 
dominating a slight and long rise beyond the water, 
is perfect, and that is the eastern section of the 
Gennan line. 
The two sections of the line, therefore, that from 
Compicgne to Craonne, and that along the Suippe in 
the north Champagne country are each in different 
ways exactly suited for defence. I repeat, it was no 
haphazard which made the German retirement halt 
precisely along this series of positions. It was a plan 
known and studied. 
The interest of the action now engaged on this 
excellent line has many aspects, but the first is 
the question whether the Gennan armies intend a 
counter-offensive, or rather intend to cover the 
retirement of their convovs across the Meuse ? 
Ever^-thing in war must be conjoctm-e in the 
shape of alternatives. The best and surest com- 
mander himself in the field does not know from day 
to day wliat the hazard of war Avill bring. He doe.s 
not know (if it brings victoiy) exactly what form the 
victory Anil take, nor hoAv it can best be used : he is 
ignorant of it until it has come about. He does not 
know (if it brings defeat) hoAv that defeat A\-ill come 
or how it may best be i-etricA'cd. 
It is not possible, therefore, to say that the 
position taken up by the Gennans does not mean a 
counter-offensiA'e in the near future. It is impossible 
to say this for the simj^le reason that, even if the 
German commanders do not intend it upon this 
Wednesday (when I am Avriting the present lines), 
they may have an opportunity for intending it (and 
may therefore take it up) by the time these lines are 
on the machines upon Thursday. 
But on the balance of i)robabilities it Avould seem 
that they rather intend to cover a retirement over the 
Upper Aisne, and later OA*er the Meuse or into Belgium, 
than to attempt an immediate counter-offensiA^e. Their 
forces uj)on the left or east, those of the Crown Prince 
and those of the Genuan armies in LoiTaine, are 
certainly moving northward and eastward — that is, 
retiring. Further, the opportunities for a counter- 
offensive are Aveak along the line which they have 
taken up. It is essentially a line difficult of assault 
