LAND AND WATER 
Scptcml)er 19, 1914 
but not easy to move fonvard from ; particularly upon 
what would bo the workiui^j wing of a uow advance, 
tliat part of tlio line which lies between Craonue 
and tlio Valley of the Oise beyond Soissons. 
Another interest of the German jwsition is 
■whether it is in peril upon either of its wings. In 
other words, whether the Germans can lie mana3uvred 
out of it by a French movement around their west — 
beyond Conipiejjne, or round tlieir east — between the 
main army and the CroMu Prince's. In the latter 
case there would be disaster. It would mean the 
separation of the German force, as a whole, into two, 
and the piercing of its centre by a French advance 
directed due north, along the valley of the Upper 
Aisne. The disaster would not necessarily be 
immediate. But the separation would mean the end 
of all offence in France and the beginning of a 
defensive war on German-Belgian soil. If the French 
get between the Cromi Prince on the Mouse and the 
main defensive German line noiih of Eheims, that 
must follow. For though both sections of the retreat 
would reunite towards the Ehine, they Avould have 
lost the initiative for good. 
But such a gap between the Crown Prince's 
Army and the main defensive line presupposes negli- 
gence or inability on the part of the enemy. It 
presupposes that his forces here are not linked vip with 
the forces of the Crown Prince, though far romid the 
north of Argonne ; and to pi'esupjjose negligence or 
inability in an enemy avIio has conducted so masterly 
a defence and so rapid and inexpensive a retreat is 
surely foolish. AVe cannot presuppose without better 
evidence any chance of the French working round by 
the east through such a gap. 
The other question, whether the Allies may not 
be able to work round the left or icest of the German 
line is much more open. It is possible that they here 
have fuiiher troops. It is probable that they have 
the use in a rather roundabout way of hitherto 
undamaged railways. It is certain that nothing is 
held by the enemy in any force, if even by patrols 
(which I doubt) west of the Oise river, and it is 
therefore conceivable that a French manoeuvre round 
by the west may be attempted and possibly that it 
may succeed. The Germans have large bodies of their 
Cavalry here posted to watch and prevent it. But 
even so, when the Allied line does overlap the Avestern 
Gennan flank, or even before it does, while it merely 
threatens, the German Ime, having got its convoys 
away eastward and having built its bridges across the 
two rivers Aisne and Meuse, can retire in order and 
intact. 
One truth must be borne in mind in these critical 
days. It is the truth to which these notes are always 
recurring. So long as the army of either opponent 
remains in no marked inferiority to the other that 
opponent will not remain permanently upon the 
defensive. Even if the German army does not 
attempt a counter-offensive from its jn-esent positions 
(the least likely of the two alternatives), even if it 
continues its retirement north and east, it none the 
less awaits, and has somewhere prepared for, a counter- 
offensive later on ; and the retirement, so long as it is 
caiTied out in good order, means nothing one way or 
the other to the ultimate issue of the cam2)aign iiulU 
one or other of the combatants has forced his opjwnent 
to a Decision, and has, in that Decision, achieved his 
piu-pose of largely weakening in numbers, or destroy- 
ing in cohesion, the organised force resisting him. 
The nuiin German line, then, is standing upon the 
defensive from about the nuddle of the Argonne, 
round to the north of Hheims and along the Aisne! 
It is composed of the concentration of the three main 
German bodies, the lirst and largest body under 
Yon Kluck from in front of Paris, the second 
from in front of Sezanne, the third from in front 
of Vitr}'. So far as the telegrams Avhich had 
reached London b}' Wednesday afternoon inform us, 
this German concentration on the defensive lino 
was .still very actively maintaining its defensive at that 
moment ; it was vigorously counter-attacking the 
offensive Allied line, and everywhere holding its own. 
If it had not new reinforcement (as Avas probable), it 
had at least received new munitions, and, if it were 
only lighting to cover a retirement of convoys, it Avas 
giving those convoys every leisure t<i retire. 
But the defensive line occupied by the Germans 
north of liheims and along the Aisne docs not 
exhaust the field. Iliere is a fourth body west of 
the Meuse, and east of the Argonne, a somewhat 
isolated body, which is of peculiar importance to the 
fortunes of this camjiaign. The ])osition and chances 
of this fourth body I Avill attempt, from the A'ery few 
indicati(ms avc have received, to describe. That 
fouiili body is, as we have seen, the anny of the 
Crown Prince, formerly in front and to the Avest and 
south of Verdun ; to-day to the north of that toAvn. 
THE CROWN PRINCE'S ARMY. 
SCALt Of HILCS 
SKETCH SHOWING THE VKRDUX-TOTIL LINE AND POSITION OF THB 
CKowN i'bince's aemy bkfoeb the gekman ketkeat began. 
We luvA'c continually seen in these notes hoAV a 
fortified Hue, running from the great fortress of 
Verdun to the great fortress of Toul, bars the move- 
ment of an in\'ading anny from the east ujion Paris, 
and hoAv in particular it prevents the use of Kues of 
communication into France from the great depots in 
Alsace-Lorraine ; for one of the main railways passes 
under the guns of Verdun, two others converge under 
the guns of Toul, and the railway connecting the tAvo 
fortresses is everywhere under the guns of the forts 
that unite them in a line along the A-alley of the 
Meuse. We have further seen that in this war (so 
far) the German cLiini to reduce modern fortification 
quickly by modern howitzer fire has been A'ery largely 
successful. It was alrao.st immediatelA' successful at 
Liege, wholly successful at Xamur, and successful 
after about a week or nine days at ^faubeuge. 
If \'erduu had fallen, or if the line of forts 
between Verdun and Toul has been 2>icrced, the cam- 
])aign Avould have changed altogether in aspect. The 
Germans Avould no longer have had to feel nervous, as 
they uow do, about their long communications through 
Belgium : they would ha\'e had immediate shoi-t; 
