September 19, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
comnmnications open tliroiiijli Alsace-Lorraine. The 
French forces along the Moselle and the INIeurthe 
would have been imperilled and perhaps cut off. The 
French line from the Argonne to Paris woidd ha\"e 
been taken in flank by the existing German forces in 
LoiTaine, -which forces, reinforced from the (lerman 
centre, miglit have been strong enough to roU up the 
French line west of the Argonne. 
As a fact, Yerdun, Toul, and the line between 
them, held. But it was the particular mission of the 
Crown Prince's army to reduce one of the two for- 
tresses, Verdun or Toul, or better, because more 
economic, to break somewhere the chain of forts 
between the two strongholds. With that object, tlie 
Cro^^^l Princetook uj) his headquarters at St. Menehould 
just at the western gate of the Argonne (so as to be in 
touch with the main Grerraan ai-mies in Champagne) 
and began to operate with liis separate army against 
the Toul- Verdun line. 
It is important to note that this army teas separate, 
and not a true portion of tbe general German line. 
That general line ended at Eevigny, on tlie edge of those 
woods which bound the Champagne j)lain to the east. 
The Crown Prince M-as acting almost iudepcndently 
of this general German line (the extremity of which 
lay south of him), though no doubt he was keeping in 
touch with it. His function was not to help to break 
the Allied line in Champagne, or even on the edge of 
Champagne, but to do the particular and local work 
of isolating Veixlun, by breaking the line of forts 
between Verdun and Toul. Tlien, presumably, he 
would proceed to the reducing of Verdun itself. As 
I have said, the value of the Crown Prince's task, 
should it be achieved, lay in the fact that it would 
eliminate the barrier protecting the flank of the 
long French line from Toul — ^^erdun to Paris and 
would open new, good, and quite short lines of 
communication for the invaders from their depots 
in western Germany : a relief as Avelcome as Avater 
to a thirsty man. 
We have no indications as yet to tell us precisely 
when all those dispositions had been taken which made 
it possible for the Crown Prince to begin his attack on 
the Toid — Verdun line of forts which blocked the 
easy communications from Gemianv. 
His army appears to have been somewhat Mated 
and never very fortunate. Perhaps he interfered. 
It was twice thrown over the Meuse in its first 
attempts to cross a fortnight ago, and, even after the 
general French retirement in front of the general 
German advance to the west left the Meuse open, the 
Crown Prince's ai-my (with which we should, perhaps, 
.^ include that of Wurtemburg) advanced with diflficulty 
through the wooded and hilly countiy to the west 
and north of Verdun. 
At last (and, it would seem, not earlier than a 
week ago) it was in a position to begin operations. 
It possessed, we may be certain, ihe 11 -inch 
howitzers with which hitherto all the serious siege 
work has been conducted (of these I will speak agam 
in a moment), and there could have been no more 
difficulty in getting them down by rail and by road 
to the middle Meu.se valley than there was in getting 
them in front of Muubeuge. It was only a question 
of another day or two's travel. But it woxild seem 
that the fortifications of the eastern frontier were 
more thoroughly held than those of Maubeuge. At 
any rate, they have been more successful. Tlxe first, 
and, as matters tunied out, the only, attack was 
delivered on the work at Troyon, and the selection 
of this point was as wise and as thoroughly thought 
out as lias been every part of the German scheme — 
until some unexpected accident has come to impose 
new dispositions upon the German commanders. 
Troyon was chosen because if it fell Verdun 
would be isolated from Toul, the line would be 
broken, and the frontier open to the invaders. It is 
true that no line of railway here crosses the Meuse, 
nor even any principal road, but with Troyon captured, 
the victors would be astraddle of the line between 
Verdun and Toul, they would have cut the road and the 
railway between the two places and, much more 
important, they would have cut the line of forts 
between the two places. Troyon was well chosen 
because it commanded the widest gap in that line of 
forts coming between what is called the Fort of Parodies 
and the Fort of Geuicourt. If Troyon had been taken 
the German forces just to the east could have advanced 
from their rail-head at Thiaucourt by Vignculles to 
cross the Ideuse under the captured work (there is a 
road all the way, though it is not one of the principal 
roads), and this advance would have been free from 
disturbance by the garrison of Verdun on the one 
hand and the garrison of Toul on the other. Further, 
Troyon is, of all the works along the Meuse, pcrhajis 
the strongest, and yet (under the circumstances of 
this campaign) the most vulnerable ! ■ 
This ])aradox is due to the fact that these forts 
along the Lleuse between ^'erdun and Toul have been 
built for an ex2)ected assault, not through violated 
neutral territory, but from the legitimate and existing 
Franco-German frontier. Troyon is admirably situated 
to withstand an attack from the east. It is not 
similarly well situated to Avithstand an attack in 
reverse from the west. It is dominated by the 
heights above Woimbloy on the edge of the woods 
T'Uy' 
S-oTLffes ill, ErLffLisK YuucdLs 
SKETCH SHOWS THg yi7LSKBABILrrT OF TOBT TROTOX TO ATTACK 
rEOM THB WEST. 
of which there are positions CO ft. above the works 
of Troyon : and it is doubtless upon this escarpment 
to the west of the Meuse that the Gei-man howitzers 
were emplaced. 
Troyon was relieved by the necessity under 
which the Crown Prince found himself of retiring 
when the third gi'cat German body — that stretching 
from Peronne past Frere and Vitry through Cham^ 
pagne to Eevigny— had itselE retired past the edge 
of Argonne and had left St. Menehould behind 
unsupported. 
9» 
