LAND AND \VATER 
SeptomLcr 19, 1914 
Geman communications tlirongli Belgium and Luxem- 
burg into France as they appear upon the fket^t-li map 
at the head of this section, 
and also in the diagram 
upon the accompanying sketch 
LOUVAIN 
The German Armies in the field occupied last 
week-end, at the moment when their retirement was in 
full swing, an area in Noi-thern France which may be 
dianrammatically represented by the shaded arCca 
A — B — C — D. Supplies of food and of ammunition 
could, as long as Yerdun (at B) and Toul (at C) held 
out, and the line of forts B — C between them, only 
reach this area through the line A — B. Now to reach 
this line A — B you had, of course, a very great number 
of excellent roads, but ammunition in large quantities, 
especially for artillery, demands in modern times the con- 
trol of i-ailroiKls as well : and of railroads there were but 
two main Hues upon which the German armies during 
their gi'cat advance could depend for supply. The one 
was the main line L — N — M — F, which is the gi-eat 
European line between Paris and Berlin, and in 
which L stands for Liege, N for Namur, M for 
!Maubeuge, and F for La Fere. The other was the 
great line through Luxemburg, X ; Longwy, Y ; 
and Mezieres, Z. In the retreat from Paris the 
French Cth Army has so out-flanked the German 
1st Army that it can no longer depend upon the main 
line of supply from M to F, the extremity of the 
German line being pushed back east of the line jVl — F. 
But there are ])lenty of railways between M and /, 
which I have indicated by dotted lines, and there is 
also one between N and Z. So long as Liege, Namur, 
and Maubeuge are in German hands, these subsidiary 
lines branching south from Maubeutje and Namur 
can contiime to feed the amiy, and the pressure upon 
them is relieved also by a side line from G (Givet) 
running through Marienbourg at K. What import- 
ance the Germans attach to this connecting line is 
proved by their nervous destruction of ^larienbourg 
the other day. It is one of the now too many points 
in Belgiiun where their policy has been to establish 
a mere terror. 
So long, then, as the first great line of communi- 
cations L — ^I — F is held by the Germans up to and 
beyond M they can feed their amiies through their 
original main line, and pressure upon it is further 
i-elieved by a subsidiar}- line running from L (Liege) 
through Louvain and Brussels to Mons, where a 
branch connects again with Maubeuge. It was this 
subsidiary line which the Belgians just managed to 
reach, and for a moment to cutdm-ing their operation.s 
of last week. They did not get near the main line 
L — M, but they did make the defenders of it anxiuus. 
As for the second great line of sujiply X — Y — Z 
running through Luxemljurg, liongwy, and Mezieres, 
it is perfectly safe, even while Yerdun holds out ; for 
it is beyond the striking distance of that fortress, and 
there are no French forces to the south sufficient to 
menace it for some time to come. Should Yerdun 
fall, thei-e would be open another new line of the 
utmost importance to the Germans. It is a lino 
coming straight from their depots at Metz (the line 
-which I have marked upon the sketch S — T) and with 
the breakdown of the Yerdun-Toul ban-ier (B — C) ' 
further lines, as I explained last week, will provide. 
" ample and short communication from Germany and 
the Bhinc bases through Als;;c '-Lorraine. 
From all the above it will be evident that so long 
as the two main lines L — M, X — Z and the subsidiary 
liranoh lines are open to the Germans thn' can be 
fully supplied, and they would but strengthen theui- 
selves in their retreat by shortening their lines of 
communication. If the French forces could (which is 
unlikelv) get round on to the subsidiary lines south of 
i\[ in "the direction of the aiTOW marked upon the 
sketch, the Germans would only have (so long as 
A'erdun holds out) one railway line to depend uj)on 
and would be in a very difficult position. 13ut failing 
this, a continued Belgian menace to the line L — M 
gi-avely incommodes them, and if it were really cut 
they would be in as difficult a position as though the 
French had got round in the direction of the arrow. 
That, as briefly as one can put it, is the menace to the 
German communications from the north to-day, and 
the explanation of these and subsequent Belgian 
operations from Antwerp. 
SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS 
IN THE WEST. 
The whole of the above mav now be sunnnarized 
as follows : 
L.tife, 
to Atj( -l^-CXa^eils 
OCTLlXIxa EOUGHLT TUE I-RESE-tT POSITION' IS THE WESTEUN 
AREA. 
The German line which upon September 4th 
occupied the positions (1) (1) (1) and was within a 
march of Paris, with the Crown Prince's army P, 
trvinsr to break through the Yerdun-Toul barrier at 
Troyon, now occupies the positions (2) (2) (2) from 
near Compiegne, along the Aisne, round north of 
Plieims to tlie Argonne, while the Crown Prince's 
ariny at P has retired to Q. There has l.)een a general 
German retirement pivoting on the Argonne and 
amounting at its maximum to GO miles. From a line 
convex against the centre of France it is now a line 
concave near the Belgian frontier. 
ia« 
