September 19, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
This lino is oiilv ja>t in toncli, if in toucli at all, 
with its old main line of communications between 
Comjnegne and Maubeuge ; but it still has its subsi- 
diary line of communications (S) (S) (S) dependant on 
the upper part of this old main line above Maubeuge, 
and it has a second line of communications through 
Miziens, Longwy, and Luxemburg. 
The defensive positions which it occupies along 
the Aisne and Suippe rivers (2) (2) (2), are hardly of 
a sort that can be pierced. They may be turned 
round the western end at W., or, far less probably, 
round the eastern end at E. The Germans may 
intend a counter-offensive from this ridge (2) (2) (2), 
but more probably they are holding it in order to 
protect the retirement of their convoys across the 
Aisne and the Meuse behind them. Such a retire- 
ment, if it takes place, with its Avings at W. and E. 
intact, can be effected in good order, Avith the Gennan 
army unbroken and as strong as ever it was prepared 
to take the counter-offensive when it so chooses, when 
it is thoroughly restored and remunitioned, and 
rejiosing perhaps upon the gi'cat fortress of Met?. 
But such a retirement if it is hampered by movements 
ill flank by the enemy round W. or even round E. 
may have to cross the rivei-s on too naiTOw a front, in 
which case its lines of convoys, artillery, Avaggons, and 
marching men would be caught in the defiles of 
the bridges, and it Avould probably suffer heavy loss. 
Meanwhile, everyone shoidd repeat to himself that 
fundamental doctrine Avhich was so contmually insisted 
upon in these notes before the French took the 
counter-offensive : 
Of two opponents in arms, one has not defeated the 
other until he has hrovjht that other to a Decision. A 
Decision is not achicced inilil the armjj of one of the 
two opponents is pierced or enveloped. 
The German anny has been neither pierced nor 
enA^elopcd. It is to-day Avhat it Avas three Aveeks ago. 
It has lost far less in projx»rtion than the Allies liaA'o 
lost ; and if, though it be the less probable alternative, 
it again takes the offensiA'e after holding the ridge 
(2) (2) (2), only, that Avould be an operation quite 
consonant to the history and nature of Avar. 
On the other hand, if the Allies are in sufficient 
numbers or possess sufficiently rapid means of 
moving troops round the western extremity of the 
line (2) (2) (2), then the German retirement may be 
rendered difficult indeed, and jwrhaps disastrous. 
I AviU conclude this part Avith some mention of 
three points which are now clearer than they Avere 
earlier in the war — a point concerning the prisoners, a 
point conceniing the German siege artillery, and a 
point concerning the supply of munitions. 
THE PRISONERS. 
There is a factor in the issues of this war AAhicli 
will be considei-able even if large fractions of the 
Gennan forces should be enveloped and suiTcnder in 
the course of it, and which Avill be much more 
important if successes of this kind do not take place. 
This factor is the factor of the prisoners now in 
Gennan hands. 
The official list is.sued by the Gennan GoA-ern- 
mcnt bears every mark of accuracy. In the case of 
the British contingent the numbers are suqn-isingly 
low, less than half the total of " missing." It may 
be lio])ed that these indicate the presence among the 
" missing" of many who will later find their rogimonts 
again. But at any rate, judged by this test, Avhich 
is a fair one, the Gennan figures are not above the mark. 
We must remember that in a retreat, and almost 
in proportion to the rapidity of tbat retreat, the 
retiring body automatically loses groat numbers of 
men. So slight a thing as a blister on a man's foot 
means, in a rapid retirement, a big chance of his 
capture. Nearly all Avounded fall into the hands of 
the enemy, as do that large proportion of men in a 
conscript army — men only just called up from 
sedentary ocimj^ations of all kinds — a\1io fall out in a 
pressed march. 
It is, by the Avay, one of the most remarkable 
things about the first four daj's of this rapid retirement 
of the first German.armj' and part of the second upon 
the line Soissons — Eheims, that it seems as yet to have 
lost so few men. We have not yet the full tale, but 
in the first four days the records sent in did not 
account for 7,000 prisoners, even adding to the 
ofiicial figm'es the unofficial accounts of surrenders. 
Well, the figures of French prisoners in Germany 
on this same list come to nearly 1,700 officers and 
nearly 87,000 men. And this does not include the 
prisoners from Maubeuge, in the fall of Avhioh the 
Gennans claimed the very large total of 40,000 
prisoners. 
In this last item there probably /* exaggeration. 
Many of the older men in Maiibeuge Avill have been 
pressed mto the A\-ork of defending the city, and the 
estimate must have been a very rough one taken in 
the excitement of success. But even if you halve it, 
it brings the total number of French prisoners for 
Gennany at the present moment to Avell over 100,000. 
I repeat, if considerable bodies of the Germans 
now in retreat are ultimately rounded up, if there are 
general surrenders due to the cuttings off of com- 
munications and the barring of the line of retirement, 
we shall soon haA-e an equal batch of prisoners to set 
against this very large number. It is conceivable, 
though improbable, that an exchange might take place. 
But if no such disasters overtake the Gennans for some 
time to come, there AviU be a big preponderance of 
this asset upon the Gennan side. Put the matter as 
gently as you like, but acknoAvledge that the Prussian 
theory of Avar will regard these men as hostages : that 
is at once the strength and the Aveakness of Avhat is 
called the " Frederician tradition," and the conclusion 
is that the Allies must Avholly disregard all threats 
and all bai-gains connected Avith this gi-eat body of 
prisoners. It is certainly the French policy to dis- 
regard that very graA"e sentimental AA'eapon in the 
hands of the enemy. We may presume that the 
policy AviU be carried through in spite of eveiything, 
but Ave must be prepared for A'ery bitter sacrifice unlens 
corresponding numbers of the enemy fall into our 
hands. 
THE GERMAN SIEGE ARTILLERY. 
The telegi-ams, hoAvever confused, sensational, and 
occasionally absurd, AvhIch we recelA^e in regard to 
German siege work can, if aac compare them one with 
another, give us some information as to the measui-e 
of success obtained by the enemy in this direction. 
It is, in the first place, quite clear that the real 
work that has been done against fortifications so far has 
been done by the Gennan 11 -inch hoAvItzer. Now 
this gun is nothing abnonnal or new. It cone- 
sponds to the Frenclx howitzer Avhich, if my memory 
serves me aright, is a 275 mm., or thereabouts: a 
calibre differing by less than one thirtieth from the 
German. If I am not mistaken there is in the 
British service a corresponding gun of about nine- 
tenths of the French calibre, or rather less, and about 
nine-eleA^enths of the German. In other Avords, all the 
great PoAA'crs possess a gun of this type. The only 
difference between them is the difference you alwa}s 
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