LAND AND WATER 
September 19, 1914 
gd in the eternal compromise between mobility and 
weight. One Power tliinks that a ra/h'r lighter gun is 
■worth while on account of its greater niobilit\-. 
Another Tower risks a slight loss of mobilit\- for the 
sake of a raiher heavier gun. 
It is true that the shells dropped by these 
howitzers have produced more effect on foiiifleatiou 
than was expected. It is not true that they have 
always, and will necessarily always, produce a wholly 
uucalculated effect. The heaviest artillery in a modern 
fortress Avill always outrange them, and though the 
howitzer can hide — that, coupled with searching 
trenches, is the whole purpose of its high-angle fire- 
yet, in most cases, only good a>rial observation could 
direct its fire sufficiently accurately from any distance to 
make its effect immediately decisive. It is probable or 
certain that we shall see not only fortresses upon this 
side of the frontier, but fortresses upon the other side, 
yield to howitzer fire more rapidly than had been ex- 
pected by those who theorised in peace time upon these 
machines ; but it is not true that we shall see miracles. 
It is certain that when the history of their lx)nibard- 
ment comes to be written, we sliall find that Naraur 
and even Maubeuge -were not as heavily gunned as 
they might have been, or were not sufficiently provided 
Avith trained men or adequately defended. It is a 
matter upon which we must hold our judgment in 
suspense, because we have not yet full data upon it ; 
but it would seem that the big 420mra. howitzer 
(17 inches or rather less) has liitherto done nothing 
off rails and very little on i-ails. There is no I'casou 
why you should not make a howitzer as big as the 
Sliot Tower, save the loss in mobility ; and hitherto 
the consensus of opinion has been that at somewhere 
less than a foot you had arrived at the maximum 
calibre wliich could be combined with any real mobility 
for this tj'pe of weapon. 
THE QUESTION OF MUNITIONS. 
One of tlie most interesting hints we had from 
the telegrams during ^'on Kluck's retreat upon the 
Aisne was the apparent dearth of ammunition from 
which that General and his command suffered. Tliis 
would seem to have l>een particularly the case with 
his ax-tillery. The action fought along the right 
bank of the Ourcq upon September 7th, 8tli, and Uth 
was, in the main, an artillery duel of peculiar violence, 
and it Avould seem as though, when the retreat was 
imdertaken upon the 10th, throughout that day, as 
also throughout the 11th and 12th, the retiring 
German forces were. short of shells. 
Now we know that they were also, during those 
days, just out of toucli with their main line of com- 
munications \)y rail, winch main line funs along the 
Oise valley by Noyon and Compiegne and Creil ; and 
the incident suggests what commonsense would also 
teach one : the capital importance in a modern cam- 
paign of multii^lying railway communication behind 
one to one's base, jxirticuiarly for the supply of 
projectiles to guns in the field. 
Modern quick-firing artillery can dispose of 
.something like ten times as much auununition in the 
same time as could the guns of twenty years ago. It 
could, at a maximum rate of filing"^ dispose of far 
more ; but in practice it can and does dispose of it, if 
the artillery duel be severe, at thio enonnous rate. 
One of the vital questions, theivfore, that '^^ ill 
probably crop up in the course of the present campaign 
will be this question of the exhaustion of avtiilerv 
sup]ilies._ It is probable that the story of General 
Pau having captured an ammunition column upon his 
left (and the German riglit) during or just before the 
battle of Jtleaux may be accurate ; but apart from 
this, it was the temporary loss of the railway which 
presumably made all the difference ; and, perhaps, not 
a little of the manoeuvring which is going on at the 
present moment upon the western extremity of the 
Gennan defensive line has for its intention not only 
the outliaukiug of that extremity, but the denial to 
that present defensive German line of the main railway 
which here runs direct from the Belgian depots 
throngli Xoyon to Compicgne. 
THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 
In the eastern theatre of war the decisive result 
of last week, when the llussian armies over^xhelmed 
the second Austrian Anny by Lemberg, has not up to 
the moment of writing (Wednesday afternoon) been 
followed up by a corresjjondingly decisive blow, such 
as was promised us, against the first Austrian Army. 
It will be remembered that the second Austrian 
Army, which had been drawn up between Kamionka 
and Halicz, -was after several days' fighting forced 
back upon Lemberg and broken to pieces. The 
victorious llussians in this part of the field then stood 
riglit upon the flank of the first Austrian Arm}-, largely 
reinforced by their Gennan allies, and having their 
right at Tomaszov exposed to the Eussian attack. So 
far as can be gathered from the rather confused 
accounts which have reached us in the west, the 
Russians did damage this fii-st Austrian Anny on its 
flank at Tomaszov, but they did not roll it up, and 
their general attempt, upon failing to do this, consisted 
in a manoeuvre to get round its left wing near the 
A'istula and force it backwards. 
The latest telegrams received point to some 
measure of success in this manoeuvre ; but that 
manoeuvre, be it remembered, is not a decisive one. 
the first Austrian Army is not enveloped ; it is 
onh- being pushed back. The Russians have crossed 
the lower part of the Eiver San, apparently at the 
point and in the direction indicated by the arrow in 
the accomjianying map. They have by their own 
Kussian FotanJ 
G A^titC I A •iw«i«ti» 
h'alic 
y» 
tcalt / Mila 
account already got astride of the railway between 
Cracow and the strong fortress of Przemysl (though 
it seems difficult to understand how they can have 
got so far in so short a time) ; they have — again 
according to the official account — secured the position 
of Gorodok ; and they certainly have reached Mosiska. 
If j-ou draw a line through these places, with a 
hypothetical point for the place in which they shall 
ha^■e cut the railway from Cracow to Przemysl, you 
v.ill .see that the Hussian positions form a half-circle 
round the Austrian Army, which is falling back 
everywhere upon Przemjsl. How far this success 
has been continuous and thorough, only the future can 
show. If even a half -circle can be drawn from the 
mountains to the mountains, enclosing the first 
Austrian Anny round and iu i'rzemysl, with the 
raain railway pass OA'cr the Carpathians behind 
it held b}' the liussiaus at liusko, there should 
at least be a decisi\e result against this fii'st 
U* 
