Sqjtomber 19, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
THE end of last week brought us alarming luiiiours 
of a Germau Ztppeliu iuvasiou of Euglaud cid 
Calais, prccwled by a bombardment of Dover 
from across the Cliauuel by monster guns. The 
guns Ave can dismiss; the suitable gun is not yeb 
built. As for the Zeppelins, sheds for them ai'e 
not available at Calais, and a Zeppelin without a shed is a 
very harmless sort of thing. It is like the crawling wasp of 
the autumn, in full possession of its sting, but not in a position 
to use it e.^cept in special circumstances. 
Vei-y wisely, however, the responsible authorities did not 
take the llueat as an idle one. A naval airship was ordered 
to cruise over London, and at the same time a request, of the 
nature of a command, was issued as to the extinction of all 
prominent sky sights and similar leading lights. 
All of which is to the good. The " aerial menace " to us 
so far exists merely as "newspaper yarns" or ''speculations 
of fanatics."' All of which is very good in its way, but it does 
not nullify the possibilities of such attack. As I mentioned 
last week, Germany's air suijcriority is probably regarded by 
lier as her trump card. It is probably also a card to be held 
back and not played till the psychological moment. 
The new type aerial searchlight now in full use is likely 
)o make surprise attacks exceedingly difficult, and also every 
place that matters is by now well supplied with anti-aerial 
guns. There is consequently not the least occasion to panic. 
But all the same the danger is renL Germany iu the air is 
just about in the same relation to us (or more so) as we are to 
Germany on the water, and it is idle to imagine that in her 
own time Germany will not use or attempt to use her 
superiority. 
Wc have no occasion to fear her aeroplanes. Even from 
the shores of France they cannot well act from a French base; 
and even if they did, the damage that they could do is more 
or less trivial. Zeppelins, however, arc quite another affair. 
Once a base is established in France, London's danger will be 
acute. It may come to-morrow, or not till ne.xt week or the 
week after, or later still. But the danger is there, and it 
should not be ignored. 
Germany in her own time will seek to panic us. She 
hoped to do so with the commerce attack. This operation did 
not come off. The attempt left our traders cold. North Sea 
mines have been little more successful. The third vial is 
likely to come fromufhe air. If so, it will rest with the people 
of London not to accept the Kaiser as the insti-umcnt of the 
Almighty. They wiU have to accept things with philosophical 
calm — no easy task. 
It is inadvisable to discuss what waj's and means we may 
liave of meeting this possible aerial attack. ;^or that matter 
no one knows for certain what will happen when aeroplanes 
attack airships. We are far too prone to seek the analogy of 
torpedo craft attacking battleships. The analogy is easy; but 
it may be absolutely delusive. For all we know the positions 
may be x-evcrsed entirely. 
In any case it is idle to speculate too freely as to what 
an Hcroplanc can accomplish against a Zeppelin. It can cer- 
tainly in the last resort ram her and destroy a gas bag— with 
•luck, two gas bags. But the average Zeppelin has seventeen 
bags, and what are two among so many ? At any rate, and 
in order to minimise possible future panic, it should be remem- 
bered that — according to German calculations — a Zcppclia 
can take a great deal of punishment without suffering much 
for it laitil she hud achieved her object. 
This, of course, is identical with the theory about 
destroyers charging a battleship. According to the theory the 
battleship will very probably inflict deadly wounds on an 
attacking destroyer, but these wounds will not take effect 
until the destroyer has managed to achieve her especial pur- 
pose. Rightly or wrongl)', German aerial ideas run along 
similar lines. It is held, that a Zeppelin cannot be destroj-cd 
without a time intei-vaL In that time interval she should 
have been able to do her work. It is along these lines, it 
may bo noted, that German regiments are handled — without 
regard to the ultimate loss so long as the initial object is 
achieved. 
Hence the danger. The public in London and other large 
cities can only defend themselves by implicit obedience to all 
orders as to the display of lights, and by keeping calm vihat- 
ever happens. The actual damage to be effected even ]-y a 
Zeppelin is comparatively small; the main object aimed at 
is " moral effect." 
General French has now issued a report of the Royal 
Flying Corps, which emphasises the fact that in actual air 
fighting five German aeroplanes have been destroyed. 
The report, with the expression '' fired at constantly 1 y 
both friend and foe," draws attention to ono of the dangers 
to which our airmen are exposeel. At the present time there 
is with aircraft no such thing as the " obviously British " or 
"obviously German" which obtains on the sea. All aero- 
planes are pretty much alike (indeed, the Germans have some 
of British make, and we some of German, make), and although 
they are marked on the underside, it is rarely possible to see 
those marks under war conditions. " Shoot first and inquire 
afterwards " is about the only workable order where aeroplanes 
are concerned. 
It is persistently reported that we, the French, and the 
Belgians, are adopting an-ows for use against troops. The 
arrows are so designed that they will spread in falling, and 
it is c^alculated that a bunch of 400 (the regulation supplv) 
would do more mischief than bombs, since dropped from' a 
heiglib they would pierce men like bullets. 
Bombs from aeroplanes have so far achieved very little 
— real utility wor-k consists in scouting, directing fire, and in 
fighting any of the enemy similarly engaged. This last is 
cei-tainly more effectually done by actual coufiict iu the air 
than by rifle fire directed from below, both as regards greater 
certainty of result, and also because the thousands of bullets 
discharged into the air must all fall again someuhere. No 
casualties whatever have so far been reported from this cause, 
but circumstances in which a friendly force might sustain 
heavy casualties from returningi bullets is great. The 
theory that a bullet shot upwards burns itself up in the 
air like a meteorite is inadmissable. All such bullets 
must fall somewhere, and if several thousand chanced to 
fall on a friendly regiment, there would be little of that 
regiment left. 
The only proper place in which to meet aerial attack is 
in the air. 
A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE 
WAR ZONE. 
By E. CHARLES VIVIAN. 
Bar-te-Duc or Bar-sur-Ornata. — The principal 
tj)wn of the di'partniont of Meusf, France, situated on the river 
Oruain, a tributary of the Meuse. It is in the immediate vicinity 
of the .Marne-Rhine canal, and is a station on the Paris-Strasbourg 
lino of rail, being also connceted by rail with the fortress town 
of Verdun. Its population is about 17,()0(). The town was 
founded by Frederick the First, Duke of Lorraine, in the tenth 
centurj-, and in mediaeval timojj was strongly fortified. A few 
traces of the old foi-tifications, which were dismantled by 
Louis XIV. in 1670, still remain, and Bar-le-Duc of the present 
day is an educational centre with considerable trade in wool, 
wood, and wine. 
Bielgoray or Bilgoray. — A small town of the 
province of Lublin, in Russian Poland, about seventy-five 
kilometres .south of the town of Lublin. It is about live 
kilometres distant from tiie frontier of Austrian (Jalicia, and about 
five kilometres distant from the river Tanow, a tributary of 
the San. 
19» 
