Scptombn- 12, 1914 
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THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOG. 
THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 
IPROPOSP] in my notes of this week to begin 
Avith an examination of the Eastern field of the 
war. Becanse liere things have Ixjen brought 
to at least a local decision. 
From the very beginning of this vast series of 
Enro]X!an campaigns it has rightly been taken for 
granted that a factor of time was involved peculiar to 
this universal war. 
In all wars the factor of time is a positive 
detenninant. That is, it is a factor the neglect of 
which makes nonsense of all the rest, and the under- 
standing of which is essential to the understanding of 
all the rest, liut in this war, more tlian in any other 
which I can call to mind, the factor of time is 
emphasised with extreme simplicity and absolute 
effect. 
To repeat what has been said ujion all sides (and 
more than once in these pages), the forces of the two 
<Jernianic Powers, tliKMiteued from tlio West and from 
llie East, find themselves superior to tlie Western, at 
the mo.st equal to the Eastern, enemy. By an acci- 
dent, happy for the Germanic powers, the Eiistern 
enemy cannot enter the field until long after the 
Western enemy. Therefore it is the whole business 
of the Germanic forces so tlireatencd to destroy the 
menace from the West before the menace from the 
East comes into play. 
The Western enemy of the Germanic Powers is 
the French Army, which, Avith its six per cent, con- 
tingent of English and its unexpected and fortunato 
addition in strength received through the resistance 
of the Belgian Militia and Trained Uegulai's, stands 
to the Germanic Powers in the proj^ortion of rather 
more than 1 to rather less than 3. The Eastern 
enemy is the Russian Amny, which is superior in 
mere number to the Armies of the two Germanic 
Powers combined. 
Let me show first in more detail tlian has 
hitheiio been attempted in these pages why the 
l)ressure exercised by the Kussian Army will be felt 
later than is generally imagined. 
That Russia would mobilise more slowly than 
France has been amply appreciated. 'I'here was hero 
an element of delay amounting to a fortnight or three 
weeks. 
