LAKD AND AYATER 
September U, 1914 
from the town of Krasnilc, IkuI f..veo<l tliose opponents 
back Avithout cnvi'lopini^ or breakinfj tlieni. 
Actions of this sort repeatod in the eastern 
tlieatre of the war were exactly what the (ieneral Stalf 
lit Berlin liad planned and desired. Tlieir repetition 
would ultimately ])rove to the llussians the 
impossibility of invading llupsburg or llolienzoUern 
territory in force. 
But as it so hai)|)eued, the whole effect oi tliis 
success was first negatived and then completely ruined 
by what took place immediately to the east. 
This main adxanced Austrian body v.hieli was 
marching upon Lublin and Avhicli we call Austrian 
Army No. I. had to the ea.st of it, that is upon its 
right Hank, another force which we will call Austrian 
Army No. II. This Austrian Army No. 11. was 
drawn up upon a line the left of which re])osed upon 
iCaniionka and the riglit of which extended, roughly, 
.south and eastward from that town down to Halicz. 
This Austrian Army No. II. was presumably at 
lirst no larger than Austrian Army No. I. which was 
making the main advance u[X)n Liiblin : for the second 
Army was only thus extended n])on the flank of the 
lirst to jH-otect the first army from being turned and to 
cover from attack the comniuuications,and those depots 
lying in the fortified town of Ijcniberg, for Army 
No. II., and for Army No. I. in the fortified town of 
Bi'zemysl. 
Now this flanking force, Army No. II., evidently 
came npagainst something much l)igger than itexpected. 
It had to be i-a])idly reinforced to meet the Itussian 
bodies which it discovered upon its front, and the action 
to which it was com]>clled became, against the will of 
the Austrian connnanders, juuch more im])ortant 
than that other action in Avhich Army No. I. had 
been enjjaged near ICrasnik. 
These reinforcements were so rapid and so 
numerous that when the shock came more than six 
Austrian Array Corps were in line in this second 
Austrian Armv lietween Kamiunka and llalicz. 
They were the "ard, the 7th, the 11th, the 1:2th, the 
Kith, and the llth, with five Divisions of Cavalry 
and some unknown contingent of the Last lleserves, 
the Laudsturni. 
It is especially to be noted that this great con- 
centratltm of men amounted to scnnething like a third 
of all those Austria-Hungary can put into the field. 
If Ave add to it Army No. I. upon its left inuch 
more tlian half, i)erhai)S two-thirds, of the total 
Austrian forces were ])resent \i])on this Cialician 
front. The Bussian Army marching to meet 
this Army No. II. of the " Austrians " lay at first 
Avitli its left n])on the railroad at Dubno, its 
light beyond Luzk. It crossed the frontier on 
August 20th, the day Avhen the Germans Averc 
marching through Brussels; it pushed back the 
Au.strian outposts A'ery sloAvly ; indeed, its advance 
appears to have been heavily contested. It Avas 
not until Tuesday, September 1st, ten davs ago, that 
the full mass of the Austrian Army No.' II. felt the 
shock. 
Tlie Eussian attack lasted apparentlv over forty- 
eight hours, and upon the third day (just at the 
moment Avhen the (lerman advance ni 'France had 
come to the neigh hourhood of I'aris) the Austrian 
forces of Ai-my No. II. broke and partially dissolved. 
It Avas not a victory like Sedan in wliicli an armv 
i.s sm-rounded and wholly destroyed. But it Avas a 
victory of the partial type in Avliich tlie cohesion of 
the enemy's force as a w hole, and tlierefore its military 
value, is .so largely impairi'd as to destroy all its power 
for the immediate future and most 'of its power 
throughout the Campaign. A'ery nearly one-third of 
the men here drawn up to meet the Bussians fell into 
the hands of the enemy, as did 200 of their guns, and 
the decisive miturc of the result is still better proA-ed 
by the abandounxent of Ijemberg. 
The situation by September 5th, last Saturday, 
Avas that of the accompanying sketch, Avith ouo 
SEMANOIR. 
CRACOW 
PRI-^liVL J^ O 
N\^ 
OLEM&ErSG 
^.^k^ 
A'J5TRIAN5 K \ <\ 
6EC0XD I'OSlT10>r OF THE AUSTBIAX AKMIE3 AiXiiE TU;i BAITLB 
or i,s3iisi:K(i. 
Austrian army (I.) successful in the 
trvinsr to break a Bussfau force before 
North and 
.J, .„ .^^v.,.. ..V ^. „.,.....„ ^v..v.v .^^^v..^ it in the 
neighbourhood of J^iublin-Cholm, Avhile the other 
army (II.) had broken before a larger Bussian force 
in front of Lemberg aiid had abandoned that toAvn 
to the eneuAy. 
Immediately after this Bussian success in front 
of Lemberg it became clear that this defeat of Austrian 
Army No. II., complete as it Avas, or rather because 
it was so complete, Avas no more than the beginning 
of the business. 
It is obvious from the sketch that for the 
Bussians so to destroy Austrian Army No. II. Avas 
equivalent to their putting themselves immediately 
\ipou the flank of Austrian Army No. I.; and the great 
Bussian force Avhich had put out of action one-third 
of the military power of Anstriti in front of Lemberg 
Avas now in a positioji to attack the second third of 
that military poAver — the fraction which I liaA'C called 
the Austrian Army No. I.- — in flank. It couhl 
threaten its communications Avitli I'rzemvsl, its base. 
Here a verv curious situation seems to have 
arisen. Au.strian Army No. I., threatened in flank 
by the enemy after the defeat of Austrian Army 
No. II., should have retreated as fast as it could to 
sa\'e itself from being turned. The first I'cports 
received were to the effect that it had so retreated. 
But later repoiis told a different story, and what seems 
to have happened after is that Austrian Army No. 1. 
instead of falling back made a desperate attempt to 
get round the rear of the successful Bussian force 
upon its rigiit in the direction A — B. In that 
aitemjjt it is said so far to have failed. It is even 
said to have lost 5,000 prisoners, and to have had the 
10th Army Cor])s cut up in the attempt. It is 
obvious that a daring stroke of this sort is paid for in 
])ropoi-tion to its daring. 
Austrian Army No. I. therefore Avas compelled to 
retreat, and, at the time of Avriting this (^^'ednesday 
evening), the Bussians already clanned a partial 
victory oA'cr its right Aving. The retreat of the 
first Austrian Army cannot have taken place on 
Brzemysl, for that line A\as threatened by the Bussian 
advance from Lemberg. The retreat must be Avell 
to the Avest, towards Cracow, and the Bussian 
message is to the effect that this Au.strian Army 
No. I. thus in retreat was caught in flank and 
soA'crely pressed. How thorough that defeat has 
